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A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUND COMPLEXES*
DONALD W. GLAZER t
I. INTRODUCTION
A. What Is a Mutual Fund Complex?
The last decade has seen an increasing number of dollars entrusted
to the care of professional money managers. Although most of these
dollars continue to be invested in such time-honored vehicles as common
law trusts and life insurance, a growing portion is being invested in
new or newly popular vehicles such as variable annuities, commingled
trust funds, and mutual funds.- The growth of mutual funds has been
particularly striking.2 From 1940 through 1969 the net assets of
* This Article bears a date of Sept. 30, 1970.
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I prepared this Article while a Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School Center for Study of Financial Institutions. Much of the information on
specific mutual funds and fund complexes was gathered in field studies at a number
of mutual fund complexes. In addition, many of the ideas in this paper were dis-
cussed at a round table at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on September
15, 1970. I am indebted to the Director of the Center, Professor Robert H. Mund-
heim, for his invaluable counsel and assistance. I would also like to thank participants
in the round table discussion, members of the mutual fund industry, and especially
William J. Nutt, a Fellow of the Center, for their contributions to this paper. The
views expressed are my own.
1 Foldessy, Rush to Mutual Funds by Insurance Concerns Approaches Stampede,
Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1970, at 1, col. 1. See also Mattlin, New Policies for Insurance
Companies, INs. Isv., Jan. 1970, at 53.
2 "Mutual fund" denotes a company which offers or has offered securities to the
public representing a proportionate share of an investment portfolio held by the fund.
An investor may redeem his shares at any time for their net asset value-the fair
market value of fund assets divided by the number of outstanding shares. Mutual
fund is common parlance for an open-end investment company as defined by § 5(a) (1)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(a)(1) (1964). See
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mutual funds increased from $450 millionI to $48.3 billion, and by
the end of the next decade are expected to reach $100 billion.4 Growth
will accrue not only to existing funds but also to a large number of new
entrants. One-third of the funds currently registered with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have been in existence for
less than two years.' In addition, the creation of new funds by insur-
ance companies is accelerating so rapidly that one commentator has
characterized the trend as approaching a "stampede." C
One striking characteristic of mutual funds is their propensity to
cluster into groups--each group managed by a common adviser and
sold by a common distributor. Mutual fund groups so dominate the
industry that forty-nine major groups, each with $100 million or more
in net assets, are responsible for over ninety percent of the industry's
net assets. The SEC has referred to "groups of funds under common
management" as "'fund complexes.' "' So defined, the term "fund
complex" suggests the common interests ordinarily shared by the funds
in a group. With a common adviser, distributor, and frequently boards
of directors and officers, 9 with shareholders who can transfer among
the funds in the group without payment of a sales charge,' ° and with
graduated load reductions based on cumulative purchases of all the
funds," each fund in a complex has an interest not only in its individual
success but also in the success of the other funds in the group.
12
1 L. Loss, SEcURTnS REGULATION 144-46 (2d ed. 1961). Open-end investment com-
panies ordinarily sell their shares through distributors who charge the investor the
net asset value of the shares plus a sales charge or "load," usually between 7.5% and
8.75% of the total purchase price. SEC, PUBLIC PoucY IMPLIcATIoNs OF INVEST-
MENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-54 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT].
3 SEC REPORT 2.
4 Investment Company Institute, Annual Report 5 (1969).
5 Of the 1167 investment companies registered with the SEC at the close of
fiscal 1969, 389 were created during fiscal years 1968 and 1969. See 35 SEC ANN.
REP. 126 (1969). Although these figures include closed-end as well as open-end
companies, the great majority of investment companies created in recent years have
been open-ended.
6 Foldessy, supra note 1. See also 35 SEC ANN. REP. 128-29 (1969).
7 Marketing Mutual Funds in the 1970's: A Strategic Appraisal, Address by
John C. Bogle, National Mutual Fund Conference sponsored by the Institutional
Investor, in New York City, Mar. 31, 1970, on file in Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania Law School [hereinafter cited as Bogle Address].
8 SEC REPORT 47.
9 See Bogle, The Mutual Fund Complex, 3 REv. OF SEC. REG. 911, 912 (1970).
10 SEC REPORT 47-48.
11Id. 48 n.98. See also note 50 infra.
12 For a description of some mutual fund groups, see SEC REPORT 104-08; SEC,
REPORT OF SPECIA. STUDY OF SECURITIES MARxERs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 4, 102-07 [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]; WHARTON SCHOOL OF
FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 69-73 [hereinafter cited as WHARTON REPORT] ; Fiske, Fidelity: The
Problems of Success, INST. INv., Mar. 1969, at 29; Mattlin, The Problems of Being
the Enterprise Fund, INST. INv., Mar. 1970, at 25; Welles, Capital Research: Can a
Fund be Run Like a Think-tank, INST. INv., Dec. 1968, at 43; The Whiz Kids Take
Over at Wellington, INST. INv., Jan. 1968, at 23.
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John C. Bogle, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Investment Company Institute, points out that the SEC definition of
the term fund complex, although properly empbasizing the common
interests of the funds in a group, is not sufficiently comprehensive."
Because a community of interest exists not only between the funds in
a complex but also between the funds and their adviser, 4 any definition
of the term is misleading unless it includes the adviser as well as the
funds. The funds have an interest in providing the adviser with ade-
quate compensation so that the adviser can in turn attract topflight
analysts and portfolio managers. The adviser has an interest in pro-
viding superior performance, even without an incentive fee,' 5 because
performance normally is important in attracting new investment. 6 The
funds and the adviser usually share an interest in increasing fund net
assets through the sale of fund shares because the management fee
usually increases with an increase in fund assets, 7 while the expense
ratio, the cost per invested dollar of operating the fund, usually de-
creases. Fixed expenses paid directly by the fund may be spread
over a greater number of invested dollars, and, if the fund's manage-
ment fee-usually a percentage of fund net assets-is scaled down as
assets increase, the average percentage paid on each dollar of net assets
may be reduced. 8
Mr. Bogle is correct in pointing out that the interests of the funds
and their adviser often converge. Yet identity of interests is not always
the rule.' 9 Conflicts between these interests will be the subject of
this study.
Many of the problems to be discussed are not restricted to fund
complexes; they are present whenever a professional money manager
is responsible for more than one account. Bank trust departments and
investment advisers handling more than one counseling account have
similar problems. In fact, many of these problems are compounded
for investment advisers who manage both a large number of counseling
accounts and a complex of mutual funds and for banks and insurance
companies which have moved into the mutual fund industry with
registered investment companies and with fund-like products such as
13 Interview in Philadelphia, Pa., Feb. 1970; see Bogle, supra note 9, at 911-12.
14 Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated
Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058, 1059-60 (1967).
15 An incentive fee ties the adviser's compensation at least partially to the per-
formance of the portfolio it is managing. See generally 35 SEC ANN. REP. 129-30
(1969).
16 See note 123 infra; cf. Mitndheim, supra note 14, at 1060.
17 SEC RToRT 89.
1' See id. 96-101, 255.
19 SeMundheim, supra note 14, at 1060-62.
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commingled trust funds and variable annuities.20 Indeed, a broader
definition of "fund complex"-perhaps a better term would be "invest-
ment complex"-might include a variety of investment media and
their common adviser. A complex might consist of several mutual
funds, a contractual plan, a closed-end investment company, a variable
annuity, investment counseling accounts, a weekly investment pub-
lication, and the adviser's own portfolio. Although no complex cur-
rently embraces all of these variations, a surprisingly large number
of combinations do exist."' This study is relevant to the problems of
investment complexes, but the focus of the discussion will be limited to
mutual fund complexes.
B. The Legal Context
1. Organization
Mutual funds and their investment advisers depend for their legal
existence upon state law. Funds take the form of corporations or
trusts; 22 advisers, usually organized separately from the funds, almost
always take the form of public or private corporations or partner-
ships. State law and federal statutes, including the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, define the regulatory limits within which funds
and their advisers operate.'
With few exceptions each fund, whether organized as a corpora-
tion or as a trust, exists as a separate legal entity within the complex.2"
Each fund organized as a corporation has its own charter or certificate
20See generally SEC REPORT 35-37; MUTUAL FUNDS 1-59 (PLI 1970) (remarks
of Reese H. Harris, Jr. & Lawrence J. Latto) ; Note, Commingled Trust Funds and
Variable Annuities: Uniform Federal Regulation of Investment Funds Operated by
Banks and Insurance Companies, 82 HARv. L. REV. 435 (1968).
21 Investors Diversified Services, for example, includes among its many products
mutual funds, contractual plans, variable annuities, and the adviser's own personal
portfolio. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Growing Through Service 6-11 (Oct.
1969). The Wellington Management group includes mutual funds, a closed-end
company, and investment counseling accounts. Wellington Management Co., Annual
Report 8-11 (1968).
22 WHARTON REPORT 44. The trust form of organization is not as important
today as it once was. For some of the reasons behind the decline, see id. 45.
Mutual funds organized as trusts should not be confused with unit investment
trusts, sometimes called fixed trusts. Fixed trusts are used as the vehicle for con-
tractual plans and as such their portfolios almost always consist solely of the shares
of a specific mutual fund. SEC REPORT 226-27.
23 SEC REPORT 46.
24 For a general description of the federal regulation governing investment com-
panies, see North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation,
44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677 (1969).
25 See SEC REPORT 47-49.
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of incorporation, its own board of directors, and its own shares of
stock; each fund organized as a trust has its own trust agreement de-
fining the fund's purpose and powers.26 Thus, funds within a complex
ordinarily have the trappings of individually operated companies. As
a matter of practice, however, most funds are little more than pools
of dollars, skeletons with few if any employees other than officers and
directors." The real job of running most funds is done by the
investment adviser hired by the fund or, in the case of trusts, named in
the trust agreement as trustee or hired by the named trustee.' The
adviser normally serves each fund pursuant to a separate advisory
contract or trust agreement,29 although frequently the contracts or
agreements of the various funds are quite similar.
This barebones description of fund complexes does not do justice
to the diversity within the mutual fund industry. A number of im-
portant complexes were organized before the industry had settled on
a more or less standardized form of organization"0 and, for the most
part, the Investment Company Act left such organizations undisturbed.
For example, the funds in several complexes are not managed by an
external adviser." Rather, the funds hire their own employees to
provide investment advice and other services. These employees may
work directly for the funds or for a corporation jointly owned by the
funds.2 2 But even funds within an internally managed group are
ordinarily organized as separate corporations or trusts, with man-
agerial responsibility vested in separate boards of directors or trustees. 3
26 Mutual fund trusts also issue shares of stock which cumulatively represent the
entire beneficial interest in the fund assets. See, e.g., Keystone Custodian Fund
Series S-4, Prospectus 1 (Sept. 29, 1969).
27 CCH MUTU.L FUNDS GuiDE f 1531 (1970) ; see SEC REPORT 46.
2 SEC REPORT 46; WHARTON REPORT 49-51. Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc.
serves as corporate trustee and investment adviser to the nine Keystone Custodian
Series Funds. See, e.g., SEC REPORT 332 n.30. The Putnam Management Company,
Inc. serves as investment adviser to The Putnam Growth Fund, which also has its
own trustees. See The Putnam Growth Fund, Prospectus 3-4 (Mar. 2, 1970, revised
May 1, 1970).29 See SEC REPORT 108.
30 For a general description of the history of the mutual fund industry, see The
Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NoTRE DAME LAW. 732, 767-812 (1969).
31 See SEC REPORT 49. See generally id. 102-11.
32 Until recently, when it changed over to an external management arrangement,
the investment advisory and other management services of the Massachusetts Investors
Trust-Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund (MIT-MIGS) complex were
performed "by a board of five trustees, an advisory board and a staff of employees,
all of whom" were paid directly by the funds. Id. 104. In the Union Service group
(formerly known as the Broad Street Group), investment research and administrative
services are furnished by Union Service Corporation, which is jointly controlled by
all the investment companies. Union Data Service Center, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Union Service, performs transfer, redemption, and other shareholder
services. Broad Street Investing Corporation, Annual Report 22 (1969). See also
SEC REPORT 106-07.
33 MIT, for example, is organized as a Massachusetts business trust. MIGS is
organized as a corporation, as is each fund in the Union Service group. SEC REPORT
104, 106.
19701
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The difference between such funds and externally managed funds lies
in the source of their investment advice, not in their legal organization.
In a few instances, the funds in a complex are not organized as
separate legal entities. Instead, they jointly comprise a single invest-
ment company which issues several series of stock, each series repre-
senting a different portfolio with a different investment objective.3 4
The funds share a single board of directors " and an adviser which
manages each of their portfolios pursuant to a single investment ad-
visory contract. 6  Nevertheless, the investors in any one series of
stock, like the shareholders of more conventionally organized funds,
participate only in the performance of the portfolio represented by that
series.
Mutual funds generally hire a principal underwriter to sell fund
shares, granting it an exclusive distributorship and the right to charge
purchasers of the shares a sales commission, or "load." 3 The prin-
cipal underwriter is almost always either the adviser itself or a cor-
poration controlled by the adviser." Each fund in a complex ordi-
narily has its own contract with the underwriter but, like the advisory
contracts, the distribution contracts for the most part are identical.
This general pattern is subject to several exceptions. No-load
funds traditionally have sold their shares directly to the public without
an underwriter-intermediary," but even no-loads sometimes sell their
shares through a principal underwriter owned by the investment
adviser.40 Internally managed funds, lacking an external adviser, may
3 4 United Funds, Inc. is an example of this type of investment company. Incor-
porated in 1940, the company issues four series of capital shares, each series repre-
senting ownership of a separate portfolio of securities. Though all four portfolios
are managed by the same adviser, Waddell & Reed, Inc., each has its own investment
objective. Thus, the company consists of a growth fund, an income fund, a science
fund, and a bond fund. In 1968, a capital appreciation fund was added to the complex,
but it was organized as a separate corporation. United Funds, Inc., Prospectus 2
(July 3, 1969) ; United Vanguard Fund, Inc., Prospectus 5 (Oct. 20, 1969). For a
brief description of this complex, see SEC REPORT 47. Because the objectives of one
series may conflict with those of another, but the approval of a majority of all
shareholders may be required to effect major changes, the SEC has recommended to
Congress that "existing series companies be prohibited from creating new series in
the future and that no new series company be permitted to register under the Act."
Id. 330-31.
3 5 See United Funds, Inc., Prospectus 6-7 (July 3, 1969).
36 Id. 10.
37 SEC REPORT 54-56.
3 8 Id. 54.
39 Id. 59.
4 0 For example, the no-load mutual funds advised by Scudder, Stevens & Clark,
a partnership, are distributed by Scudder Funds Distributors, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Scudder, Stevens & Clark. Scudder, Stevens & Clark Common Stock
Fund, Inc., Prospectus 9 (Apr. 18, 1969). Because Distributors receives nothing
from fund purchasers to compensate it for its function as distributor, it must be
subsidized by Scudder, Stevens & Clark.
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own the underwriter themselves 4- or may contract for distribution.'
Finally, funds organized as a single corporation ordinarily do not
negotiate separate underwriting contracts for each series of stock; 43
similarly, the trustee for a complex of funds organized as separate
common law trusts may, depending upon the trust agreements, negotiate
a single distribution contract on behalf of all the funds.
44
2. Judicial Review of Mutual Fund Directors and Advisers
The adviser initially determines how the various funds are treated.
Its determination is subject to review by each fund's board of directors,
and both the adviser and the fund boards are in turn subject to judicial
review.
Judicial review of the actions of mutual fund directors is grounded
in the state law duties of care 4 and loyalty,4" duties the law has
41 The shares of the Union Service funds are distributed by Union Service
Distributor, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Union Service Corporation, the
organization which performs investment research and administrative services for the
funds and for Tri-Continental Corp., a closed-end investment company. Union Service
Corporation, in turn, is controlled by the investment companies. Broad Street Invest-
ing Corp., Prospectus 3, 5 (May 1, 1970).
4 2 When they were internally managed, MIT and MIGS were distributed by
Vance, Sanders & Co., Inc., a corporation not owned by the funds. See SEC REPORT
106; note 32 sipra.
43 See United Funds, Inc., Prospectus 13 (July 3, 1969).
44 Shares of the nine Keystone Custodian Series Funds, each organized as a
separate common law trust, are distributed by the Keystone Company of Boston and
by Cornerstone Financial Services, Inc. pursuant to common underwriting contracts
negotiated by the funds' common trustee, Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc. The two
underwriters are wholly owned subsidiaries of Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc. See
Keystone Custodian Fund Series S-4, Prospectus 8-9 (Sept. 29, 1969).
45 The duty of care affords only cursory control of directors' activities. Cases
in which directors have been found to have violated the standard are highly unusual.
As one commentator has put it, "The search for cases in which directors of industrial
corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the .Tndeinnifica-
tion of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). See
generally id. 1094-1101; cases reprinted and abstracted in W. CARY, CASES AND
MATERIALS o1r CORPo.ATION S 513-50 (4th ed. 1969).
There is some question whether mutual fund directors owe the same duty of care
as that applicable to directors of ordinary industrial corporations or whether they
owe the higher duty applicable to directors of financial corporations. Compare
Jaretzki, Dtties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAW &
CoNTEmp. PRoB. 777, 780 n.10 (1964), with Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the
Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Invest-
ient Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 181, 189-92 (1966). See generally
Note on Liability of Directors of Banks and Other Financial Instiltutions, in W. CARY,
supra at 525; Wymeersch, Some Aspects of Management Fees of Mutual Funds,
17 BurFFA.o L. REv. 747, 762 n.58 (1968).
For a case in which both the affiliated and nonaffiliated directors of a mutual
fund were found negligent, see Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (Del.
Ch. 1961).
46The duty of loyalty prevents a director from preferring his own interests over
those of the corporation on whose board he sits. In the words of one court, the
duty of loyalty requires a director "not only affirmatively to protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything
that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage
which his skill and ability might properly bring to it." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.
1970]
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traditionally imposed on corporate directors. In addition, mutual fund
directors and advisers owe the funds duties arising under the Invest-
ment Company Act.
7
Judicial review of the adviser, apart from federal law, derives
from several different state-law theories.4" Review may be based on
the adviser's contractual obligation, express or implied, to treat each
fund fairly. Courts generally have been disposed to imply covenants
of good faith and fair dealing in contracts, especially if such covenants
are indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties. 9 When
an adviser serves a group of funds, the intent of the parties is ap-
parently that each fund participate in a fair share of the benefits deriv-
ing from its membership in the fund complex.50  A covenant of good
faith and fair dealing may also be implied from the adviser's position
with respect to the funds. By hanging out its "shingle" as an invest-
ment adviser, the adviser impliedly represents that it will deal fairly
with each of the funds it serves.51
Ch. 255, 270, 5 A2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939). When a question of loyalty is
involved, the courts will scrutinize a director's actions closely, applying a fairness
standard rather than the more permissive standard of care. See Johnson v. American
Gen. Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 802, 809 (D.D.C. 1969) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)) ; Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., - Del.
Ch. -, 261 A.2d 911, 915 (Del. Ch. 1969); DeGraaf v. Birckhead, 103 N.Y.S.2d 942
(Sup. Ct. 1951) (defendant directors liable for preferring one subsidiary in an
industrial complex over another). See generally W. CARY, supra note 45, at 550-698.
47 See generally Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 45.
48The state-law duties of advisers serving as trustees for funds organized as
common law trusts or hired by fund trustees are at least as strict as those binding
the directors of funds organized as corporations. See Note, Rights and Obligations
in the Mutual Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1120, 1135-38 (1967).
In many cases the trust agreement reinforces the duties arising under state law.
See Jaretzki, supra note 45, at 778 n.6.
49Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329 (1927). See also
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167
(1933).
50 Mr. Bogle has summed up what he sees to be as some of the benefits of a
fund complex:
[N]ew funds of all types will probably be necessary for a management or-
ganization that wishes to maintain its growth, to say nothing of its vitality.
With more funds will come more services, too. The multi-fund complex
will aim at providing a variety of services that tend to unify and consolidate
the offering of its various funds and build an identity of interest among the
shareholders of all of the funds. Thus, we should see an expansion of com-
bined fund purchase arrangements (owning a "package" of funds) and inter-
fund exchange privileges (making it possible to modify the risk-reward
character as the investor's goals change). And, if management company
profit margins return to former levels, it may not be far-fetched to project
substantial cost-saving benefits to the investors in the funds within the com-
plex, in the form of management fee schedules that relate in part to the
assets of the complex, rather than the assets of its individual fund components.
Bogle Address 8-9 (emphasis omitted).
51 Te theory under hich the covenant might be implied is appropriately known
as the "shingle" or "implied representation" theory. See Cohen & Rabin, Broker-
Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication
in Their Development, 29 LAw & CoNTEM-P. PaoB. 691, 702-04 (1964), and references
cited therein.
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Judicial review of the adviser may also be based on obligations
arising not from the contract but from the relationship between the
adviser and the funds.52 Obligations of care arise when an adviser
dominates the funds' boards of directors. 3 Domination is, of course,
a factual question, but the fact that fund boards consist of affiliated
directors and nonaffiliated directors who frequently are nominated by
the adviser and are closely attuned to its interests suggests that a find-
ing of domination and thus a duty of care for state-law purposes may
be made in some instances."
If the investment adviser does not dominate its funds' boards of
directors, a finding that it owes duties beyond those flowing from its
advisory contracts is more difficult. On the one hand, an adviser is a
separate legal entity selling its services pursuant to separately negotiated
contracts. On the other, an adviser is closely identified with the
funds " and often does not deal with them at arm's length. Recogniz-
ing the adviser's dual role, some lawyers have chosen to view advisers
as fiduciaries in most of their dealings with the funds, but not with
respect to the management fee, which, they argue, is set in arm's length
52 It may be unnecessary to use existing state-law principles to define an adviser's
duties to its funds if, as some commentators have suggested, a common law of mutual
funds is or should be evolving. See Note, supra note 48, at 1144. If a common law
of mutual funds does evolve, however, it may result from interpretation of the
Investment Company Act and not from development of new state-law doctrine.
Id. 1148. See generally Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 45. But see Moses v. Burgin,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f192,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18,
1970). Moses involved a shareholder's action against Fidelity Fund, Inc., one of the
twelve funds in the Fidelity group, Fidelity Management & Research Co., investment
adviser for the group, The Crosby Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the
adviser and exclusive distributor of Fidelity group funds, and Fidelity Fund's affiliated
and nonaffiliated directors, alleging violations of defendants' statutory duties under
§§ 1, 15, 35, and 36 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, 15, 35,
and 36 (1964), and their common law fiduciary duties. Judge Wyzanski concluded
that "the claimed federal common law does not exist." Moses v. Burgin supra at
92,267.
53 See, e.g., Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., - Del. Ch. -, 261 A.2d 911, 914
(Del. Ch. 1969). While the court might have relied on the generally accepted
principle of Pepper v. Litton, 303 U.S. 295, 306 (1939), that a dominant or con-
trolling shareholder-in this case Sinclair Oil-is a fiduciary, it instead emphasized
the factual dominance Sinclair exercised through selection of the subsidiary's directors.
54 [Y]ou know and I know that if you are choosing an unaffiliated director
or an independent director you are not going to choose anybody who is going
to be too hard on you. You are going to tend to pick a friend of yours;
and may I say again, as a footnote, that in my litigation I have encountered
two situations where a so-called unaffiliated or independent director happened
to be the son of the leading stockholder of the adviser.
Now, how funny can you get? And yet with straight countenance under
oath the testimony was that the son was going to "call them as he sees them,"
to coin a phrase, and he was not going to be partial to his father.
UxvxNRsirr or PEN NSvVANrA Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 669,
739-40 (1967) (remarks of Abraham L. Pomerantz) [hereinafter cited as Conference].
Yet the independence of the nonaffiliated directors may be on the increase. See
text accompanying notes 143-44 infra.
55 For example, advisers and their funds frequently have similar names. Thus,
Scudder, Stevens & Clark advises, among other funds, Scudder, Stevens & Clark
Balanced Fund, Inc., Scudder, Stevens & Clark Common Stock Fund, Inc., and
Scudder Special Fund, Inc. See, Scudder, Stevens & Clark Common Stock Fund,
Inc., Prospectus 4 (Apr. 18, 1969).
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negotiations with the nonaffiliated directors." The SEC would extend
the adviser's fiduciary status, even absent the new amendments " to
the Investment Company Act, to the management fee."
Though no court decision is directly on point, the conclusion that
advisers are fiduciaries, at least in most of their dealings with the
funds, seems compelling. Like investment counselors, who have been
held to be fiduciaries with respect to their counseling accounts, 9 ad-
visers of mutual funds occupy a position of "trust and confidence" with
respect to the investments they manage." Indeed, in some complexes
the adviser serves both funds and counseling accounts, according them
the same treatment.el Thus, it is untenable to say that advisers owe
fiduciary duties to one and not to the other. Surely the legal organiza-
tion of funds as corporations and trusts is not a meaningful difference:
counseling accounts can also take these legal forms. Nor does the
conclusion that advisers are fiduciaries depend on the generally dis-
credited "shell theory," which would disregard the funds' status as
separate legal entities.' The fiduciary obligation need run only to the
funds and not to the shareholders themselves.
To say that directors and advisers have duties subject to judicial
review is not to say that the courts will carefully scrutinize the dis-
56 Conference 745 (remarks of Alfred Jaretzld, Jr.) ; id. 758 (remarks of Robert
M. Loeffler).
57 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969), the Senate's version of the "mutual fund
bill," amending the Investment Company Act of 1940, was passed in May 1969 and
referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The House
Committee reported its own bill (H.R. 17333) to the House on August 7, 1970.
H.R. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). H.R. 17333 was vacated and S. 2224
as amended passed in lieu thereof on August 23, 1970. The bill is presently in
conference.58 Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, & H.R. 14737 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 189-90 (1969). See also Consumer-Investor
Planning Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8542 (Feb. 20, 1969),
in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'. 1177,677, at 83,528 n.7; note
268 infra & accompanying text.
-o E.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8426
(Oct. 16, 1968), in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 177,618;
Haley & Co., 37 S.E.C. 100, 106 (1956); Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 638
(1948).
60 See Nielson, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company
Act, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 153-54 (S. Hodes, P. Geerlings, M. Simpson
eds. CCH 1966). The "trust and confidence" theory is different from but closely
related to the "shingle" or "implied representation" theory. See generally Cohen &
Rabin, supra note 51, at 702-04.
61 In Scudder, Stevens & Clark, for example, each fund (except for Scudder
Special Fund) has a portfolio manager who is also responsible for a number of
investment counseling accounts. The manager bases his portfolio decisions for both
the fund and the accounts primarily on the investment recommendations of Scudder's
collective research staff. His latitude to depart from these recommendations is the
same in both instances.
62The shell theory is propounded in Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural
Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181 (1961). For the current attitude toward the shell
theory, see Conference 748 (remarks of Alfred Jaretzki, Jr. & Professor Morgan A.
Shipman).
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charge of these duties. When an adviser has an equal self-interest in
each of the funds it serves, the courts, in their traditional reluctance
to become involved in questions requiring the substitution of their
judgment for that of a disinterested decisionmaker, will defer to the
adviser's and the fund directors' good faith business judgment on how
to resolve conflicts between the funds. Even if the higher standard
of care applicable to bank directors is also applicable to mutual fund
directors, the courts will find illegality in only the most egregious
cases.
0 3
The nature of a fund complex is such, however, that the adviser
sometimes has a greater self-interest in some funds than in others."4
For example, one fund may be paying an incentive fee which gives the
adviser a special reward for good performance.0 5 The adviser's self-
interest may be served in such a case by giving the fund preference
when executing transactions in companies which the fund and other
funds in the group concurrently wish to buy or sell.6" When the
adviser has an especially strong self-interest in a particular fund, the
courts have cause to scrutinize more carefully the adviser's treatment
of the other funds in the complex, 7 unless the nonaffiliated directors
have already discharged this responsibility.6" The nonaffiliated di-
rectors are in a good position to protect the funds from self-dealing by
the adviser. To the extent that they perform this function effectively,"'
their efforts need not be duplicated by the courts. In fact, in a number
of states, statutes embody the principle that transactions between cor-
porations with overlapping directors are not void or voidable for that
reason alone if, after appropriate disclosures have been made, the
transactions have been approved by a majority of disinterested di-
03 See note 45 supra.
64 For a discussion of factors which might lead an adviser to perceive a stronger
self-interest in particular funds, see text accompanying notes 117-26 infra.
65 In recent years incentive fees have become increasingly popular. 35 SEC ANN.
REP. 129 (1969). See generally text accompanying note 122 infra.
G See text accompanying notes 150-65 infra.
67 During the course of a discussion concerning proposed revisions to rule 17d-1,
the SEC, almost as an aside, mentioned the danger that the adviser of a fund complex
may be tempted to favor one fund at the expense of another: "Of course, if the
investment adviser which controls such companies were to engage in certain activities
that advantaged one company to the detriment of another, he might be engaged in
a breach of his fiduciary obligations . . . ." SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 5128 (Oct. 13, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 77,477.
6R See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 148; Mundheim, supra note 14, at 1058-59.
In many complexes the same nonaffiliated directors serve on the boards of several
funds. For a discussion of one of the advantages to the funds of overlapping
directorships, see part VI infra.
69 The problem hts been that nonaffiliated directors have been generally ineffective
in safeguarding the interests of mutual fund shareholders. SEC REPORT, Mpra note
2, at 12, 130-31, 148. But see Conference 741, 755 (remarks of Joseph E. Welch).
See also note 54 supra.
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rectors or shareholders.7° In a fund complex such statutes might seem
to insulate from judicial review transactions between the adviser and
a fund even if the adviser has a strong self-interest in favoring another
fund in the group. In practice, however, such statutes leave the courts
an important role to play in protecting fund interests.
First, because the statutes are directed toward situations where
directors or officers of a fund are closely associated with or sit on the
board of the adviser, they would not seem to apply to complexes in
which the funds are not organized as corporations and thus have no
boards of directors. Second, even in complexes where the funds are
organized as corporations, the nonaffiliated directors may not qualify
as disinterested under state law and thus their approval may not satisfy
the statutory requirement.7 ' The need for a provision broadly defining
interested directors in the recently enacted amendments to the Invest-
ment Company Act suggests that some directors have been nonaffiliated
under the Act while still maintaining a strong interest in the adviser. 2
Third, the board of directors may not review many transactions be-
tween the adviser and the funds. For example, in some complexes the
board does not review or reviews in a perfunctory manner the assign-
ments of portfolio business to brokers who have provided the adviser
with research or who have sold fund shares. Finally, statutes on in-
terested directors are not commonly thought to validate basically un-
fair transactions, regardless of the literal meaning of the statutory
language. 73  The approval of the disinterested directors is thought
merely to shift to the plaintiff the burden of proving unfairness. 74
If the courts do, in some circumstances, scrutinize the fairness of
the adviser's treatment of the various funds, they are most likely to
70 E~g.CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1955) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp.
1968) ; NEW YORK BUS. CORP. LAW §713(a) (McKinney 1963). Several of these
statutes are reprinted in W. CARY, srupra note 45, at 557-59. For a brief discussion
of the law as it exists in states which have not enacted such statutes, see Note on
Transactions Between Corporations Having Common Directors; And Burden of
Proof, id. 571.
71 See WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 465-66; note 54 supra.
72S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §2(3) (1969) (passed by Senate May 26, 1969,
115 CONG. REC. 13700-01 (1969)). The provisions apply not only to affiliated persons
but also to members of their immediate family and persons who have certain business,
professional, or personal relationships with the adviser. For the complete text of
the House version of the Mutual Fund Bill, amending the Investment Company
Act, and the House Committee Report, H.R. 17333, see CCH SPEcIAL 2 (CCH
Mutual Funds Guide, Special Report, Aug. 11, 1970).7 3 See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dondini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418,
241 P.2d 66, 73-74 (1952); C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE 195-97 (2d ed. 1968);
Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 46-47 (1966) ; Wymeersch, supra
note 45, at 778-80.
74 C. ISRAELS, supra note 73, at 197. Such shifting of the burden of proof may
well be unimportant. Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 22 Bus. LAW.
29, 129 (1966) (remarks of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
In Delaware and a few other jurisdictions shareholder ratification does change
the standard from fairness to waste. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486,
184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). See generally Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note
45, at 224.
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impose as a remedy an injunction against further unfairness. In some
cases, however, they may also find dollar liability. Liability in the
case of the adviser would be contractual or grounded in its fiduciary
obligations.75 Liability in the case of the affiliated directors would be
grounded in their duty of loyalty."6 By sitting on both sides of a
transaction and favoring some funds over others, the affiliated directors
have acted in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the
funds they serve.
It is harder to establish liability on the part of the nonaffiliated
directors. If, despite their nonaffiliated status under federal law, they
are found to be "interested" under state law, then their status is com-
parable to that of the affiliated directors.77  But if they are not in-
terested in the adviser, it is difficult to find that they have acted out
of self-interest and thus breached their duty of loyalty. Nevertheless,
such a finding might be made if a nonaffiliated director sits on the
boards of several funds, as such directors frequently do, and owns
materially different amounts of stock in each of the funds.
78
With this legal framework in mind, we can now turn to some
of the specific problems which arise within the fund complex.
II. INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
Before analyzing some of the problems posed by the adviser's role
as investment manager to a fund complex, we will first examine the
process by which mutual fund advisers manage fund portfolios. We
will then focus on the problems by presenting them as they might arise
in a typical complex.
A. The Investment Management Process
Investment management is usually a four-step process: basic re-
search, dissemination of information, portfolio decisionmaking, and
executions.
75 See text accompanying notes 45-63 supra.
7T 6See note 46 supra.
7
7 See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921);
Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E2d 793 (1960).
78 A footnote in the Wharton Report raises the question whether a nonaffiliated
director might not be considered affiliated if he serves on the board of more than
one fund in a complex. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 465 n.22. Service on
more than one board similarly might lead a court to find that a nonaffiliated director
was "interested" in the adviser for state law purposes. Such a finding, however,
would be ill founded and have undesirable effects. Business practicality often dictates
that the same directors serve on more than one board, and this practice may in fact
be advantageous from the fund's viewpoint. The Senate committee report on the
mutual fund bill currently in conference, see note 57 supra, includes an express
statement that "a director of one investment company would not ordinarily be deemed
an interested person of that company by reason of being a director of another invest-
ment company with the same adviser." S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 34
(1969).
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Advisers must do basic research on the general investment climate,
on the investment outlook of particular industries, and on the invest-
ment prospects of individual companies.79 Advisers can do such re-
search internally so or can obtain it from outside researchers, usually
brokerage houses."' Ordinarily advisers utilize both types of research,
differing primarily in the extent to which they rely upon each type. 2
Advisers may conduct and collect research once on behalf of all
the funds in their group or separately for each fund. In some com-
plexes the adviser employs a team of analysts to conduct research into
whatever investment opportunities appear most promising. Although
this research is done without reference to the needs of particular funds,
the adviser assumes that enough opportunities will turn up to satisfy
each fund's needs.8 3  In other complexes, the adviser assigns analysts
-9 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 84-86.
80 Though not an "adviser" within the terms of the Investment Company Act,
Union Service Corporation, the organization which performs investment research and
administrative services for the Union Service group of funds, relies almost entirely
upon the research of its twenty-one analysts. See Hedges, . .. And Three Bfq
Ones Which Ran Well, INST. INv., Mar. 1970, at 32, 36-37. This research includes"armchair" analysis of a company, its competitors, and the industry outlook, and
personal interviews with company management, its customers, and its competitors,
among others. Although Union Service receives outside research (most of it un-
solicited), it places little reliance on much of it. It believes that outside research
alone is insufficient to support an investment recommendation and that analysts should
have latitude in pursuing their own original investment ideas. Other difficulties with
outside research cited by advisers are the uncertainty as to their position on the
information line and the danger that research organizations serving companies in
other capacities (usually investment bankers) may find it difficult to prepare forth-
right reports. Many investment advisers today seem to be taking an increasingly
critical view of outside research. See Mattlin, Can Wall Street Research Shape Upf,
INsT. INV., Apr. 1970, at 29.
81 Carlisle-Asher Management Co., adviser to Afuture Fund, Inc., a small no-load
fund, and a number of discretionary investment accounts, has only a few investment
management employees and consequently must rely almost entirely upon outside
research. It maintains that good analysts are rare and high priced, and only infre-
quently come up with usable ideas. Rather than attempt to hire such analysts,
Carlisle-Asher believes its time is better spent identifying the best analysts in the
investment community and then "picking their brains" for investment ideas. The
Carlisle-Asher employees devote their efforts to evaluating the opinions of others
rather than researching companies themselves.
Shareholders Management Co., adviser to a number of different funds, has taken
essentially the same position with respect to outside research. See Mattlin. supra
note 12, at 25, 76; Welles, Fred Carr: Tracker of Emerging Growth, INsT. INV.,
Dec. 1968, at 57, 60.
82 Advisers often use outside research as a source of new investment ideas, as
a means of keeping in touch with what the investment community has been thinking,
and as a check on their own ideas. Such research supplements the research done
by the adviser's own analysts. Advisers usually require that in-house research be
done on a company before purchasing its securities.
8 Each analyst working for Union Service Corp., see note 80 supra, is assigned
to a particular industry or group of industries. The analysts examine the general
outlook of the industry but concentrate on those companies within it offering the
best investment potential. When an analyst decides that a company is especially
attractive, he studies it in depth. Thus, the Union Service analysts select com-
panies for study on the basis of their investment potential and not on the basis of
portfolio needs.
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to do research tailored to the needs of specific funds.84 But even these
advisers usually do some collective research, at least on the general
investment climate. 5 A number of advisers employ some analysts to
conduct research for the funds generally and others to conduct research
for specific funds.8"
The adviser must arrange for the basic research product to be
distributed to those who are responsible for portfolio decisions.8 7 Dis-
tribution poses no problem if the research is done for a specific fund or
a small group of funds. If the adviser does not have a policy that such
research must be shared among all the funds in the group, it can depend
on informal memoranda or word-of-mouth to convey the information
to those responsible for managing the funds' portfolios. But if re-
search is done collectively or the adviser has a policy that research done
for specific funds must be shared with the other funds in the group, a
problem of equitable distribution arises. Here, the adviser must dis-
seminate the information to a relatively large number of people, and
informal methods may be unreliable and may pose a question of fair-
ness, especially if a few analysts and decisionmakers have become par-
ticularly close. Thus, many advisers have adopted formal methods of
distributing such information. Some advisers go to considerable
lengths to insure that timely information about specific opportunities is
delivered simultaneously to all decisionmakers. Others distribute regu-
larly published lists containing ratings, earnings forecasts, and other
84 The investment management division of Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc. at
times has consisted of four essentially autonomous groups: an income group, a
conservative growth group, an aggressive growth group, and a speculative growth
group. Each group is responsible for specific funds, conducting its own research
and collecting outside research on companies in which those funds might invest.
Although two groups may do research on the same company, Keystone utilizes a
number of formal and informal techniques to keep such inefficiencies to a minimum.
85 In Keystone, for example, a committee meets regularly to discuss the general
economic outlook and to formulate the general investment policy of the complex.
A different committee discusses particular industries and develops a comparative
rating of industries to guide the various groups in deciding which industries to
emphasize in their funds' portfolios. Keystone also employs technical analysts who
serve all the groups.
80 Wellington Management Co. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Ivest, Inc.,
employ ten analysts whose full-time job is to research for the entire organization
and about eleven analysts assigned to research for particular funds. Unlike many
other complexes, all analysts and portfolio managers do a certain amount of research
for the complex in addition to the work which they do for specific funds. Each
individual in the investment management division is responsible for "primary coverage"
of from one to ten companies and for monitoring another one to ten. Primary
coverage involves intensive and continuing study of a company and requires personal
contact with management and with customers of the company. Monitoring involves
meeting with management and making earnings estimates but is less intensive than
primary coverage. In all, about 200 companies are given primary coverage and
another 200 are monitored. See generally The Whiz Kids Take Over at Wellington,
INST. INV., Jan. 1968, at 23, 62.
87 In a number of mutual funds, outside research is channelled directly to the
portfolio managers rather than passing first through the collective research staff.
Ellis, To Get Performance You Have to Be Organized For It, INST. INV., Jan. 1968,
at 44, 70-71. If the adviser has a policy which requires portfolio managers to share
information, the problem of fairly disseminating outside research still arises.
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information on a large number of different companies."8 Still others
hold regular meetings during which members of the investment
management division get together to exchange information and to
discuss new developments.8 9 Advisers often adopt more than one
method of distributing the information.
The third step in the investment management process is portfolio
decisionmaking. Although the board of directors of each fund has a
statutory duty to manage the fund's affairs, specialists usually handle
the day-to-day task of managing the fund's portfolio." Traditionally,
an investment committee-sometimes but not always including di-
rectors-has handled portfolio decisions for most if not all the funds
in a complex." Recently, however, a single individual, commonly re-
ferred to as a "portfolio manager," has assumed this responsibility in
many complexes.92 A portfolio manager usually manages the portfolio
88 The work product of Scudder, Stevens & Clark's collective research staff is
distilled into a list of about 800 stocks which is printed every two weeks and
distributed simultaneously to all the portfolio managers (Scudder refers to them as
"investment counselors") in the organization. The list contains the standard informa-
tion available in a stock digest, an earnings estimate for the next twelve and
twenty-four months, and a positive, neutral, or negative rating on the company.
If this rating is changed or a rating is made on a company not previously included
on the list, the new rating is immediately teletyped to all Scudder offices and
simultaneously distributed throughout the office in which the rating change originated.
The initial notice is followed by a short paragraph explaining why the rating was
changed and a longer memo if the change was serious.
89 Every Tuesday morning the New York office of Scudder, Stevens & Clark
holds a meeting during which analysts discuss particular industries and specific com-
panies. This meeting is video taped and a tape is distributed to each of the other
offices. Every Friday morning a conference call is held during which subjects of
importance are discussed and questions answered.
Wellington Management Co. has taken the meeting concept one step further.
Every morning at 9:10 a.m. a meeting of all analysts and portfolio managers convenes.
The analysts and portfolio managers in various cities are tied into the meeting
by telephone. The meeting is conducted in three parts. (1) All transactions of the
previous day are read and portfolio managers who made investment decisions stand
ready to be quizzed. This takes roughly ten minutes. (2) Anyone who wishes to
comment on a company or industry does so. (3) A portfolio manager, an analyst,
or the management of a company makes a more formal presentation. If any time
remains before the meeting's prompt adjournment at 9:50 a.m., the floor is thrown
open for further comment. The minutes of each meeting are published and usually
distributed on the same day. See The Whiz Kids Take Over at Wellington, INST.
INv., Jan. 1968, at 23, 27, 62.
GOSee WARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 49-50.
91 The portfolio of each of the four Union Service funds is managed by an
executive committee of each fund's board of directors. The same four men serve
on the committee which manages Broad Street Investing, National Investors, and
Whitehall; except for one member, an entirely different committee manages Union
Capital. The executive committees meet daily. Each Union Service fund also is
served by a portfolio supervisor. See note 95 infra; Hedges, supra note 80, at 37.
92 The current attitude of many advisers is summed up well in Windsor Fund,
1968 Annual Report 4 (1968):
During its first 51/2 years, the investments of Windsor Fund, like those of
most mutual funds at the time, were supervised by an Investment Committee.
A group of money managers together decided which securities should be
purchased, which sold. For the Fund, the period can best be described as
humbling . ...
In May of 1964, Wellington Management Company, the Fund's Invest-
ment Adviser, altered its method of supervising the Fund's investment pro-
gram. The new-and present-style focused responsibility and authority on
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of only one fund. But in some cases he may manage the portfolios of
several funds " or, in a new development known as "satellite manage-
ment," he may manage only a portion of a single fund's portfolio. 4
a Portfolio Manager heading a small team of skilled, experienced securities
analysts and supported by the Investment Adviser's total research organiza-
tion. The aim is to enhance flexibility and exploit fully the large and
growing flow of financial information so that the Fund would be more
responsive to the rapid changes which characterize the investment world
today.
A mutual fund's investment results are a reflection of its management's
strategy. On page 7, Windsor Fund's Portfolio Manager outlines his
strategy, relates it to 1968's progress, and looks into 1969.
Wellington's former method of portfolio decisionmaking is described in WHARTON
REPORT, supra note 12, at 50-51. A new column in Forbes on "The Money Men"
is one illustration of the public interest which has been directed towards portfolio
managers in recent years. For an article on John Neff, Windsor Fund's portfolio
manager, see FORBES, Apr. 1, 1970, at 72. For a discussion of the relative merits
of the investment committee and the portfolio manager systems of portfolio manage-
ment, see Ellis, supra note 87, at 46-47, 68.
Portfolio managers may vary in the freedom they have to manage fund portfolios.
In Scudder, Stevens & Clark, for example, the portfolio managers of the Balanced
and Common Stock Funds are expected to manage the funds in keeping with the
general investment policy of Scudder, Stevens & Clark. They rely primarily upon
the master list prepared by the collective research department, see note 88 supra,
and have no staff of their own to do research specifically for the funds, although
they do some research themselves. The portfolio manager of Scudder Special Fund,
on the other hand, has more latitude in making investment decisions. He receives
the master list but also has three or four analysts who work specifically for the fund.
A partner of Scudder, Stevens & Clark explains that the nature of a more aggressive
fund such as Special Fund requires that it be managed by a man with full respon-
sibility to work with the collective research department in pursuance of the unique
requirements of the fund. He also suggests that special research is needed for
Special Fund because Scudder's research does not concentrate on some of the smaller
and more volatile companies in which Special Fund is interested.
93 For example, John Neff, portfolio manager of Windsor Fund, is also portfolio
manager of Gemini Fund, a dual-purpose investment company. See FORBEs, Feb. 1,
1970, at 68.
94 In a Forbes article, Thomas R. Reeves, senior vice president of Investors
Diversified Services, has explained why and how a satellite system was instituted
at IDS:
"When you hire a good money manager what you are getting is a proven
stock picker. But with $6 billion to invest you don't need one proven stock
picker; you need about 30, with another 30 in training. .. "
"We had izvo men making all the equity decisions . . . . Two
men "could only follow so much, which led to investing solely in the largest
companies. ... "
s ve . "We set out to divide up the portfolios into as many 'satellites'
as we could find competent people to manage the money . . . . Today, we
have 27 people managing some amount of money. . ..
Investors Mutual now is managed by six people, Stock Fund by nine,
Variable Payment Fund by seven. . . . One type of portfolio manager gets
some $250 million to invest and considerable freedom to roam the investment
world with it.
Others get $25 million to $100 million to invest in areas where they
have research responsibilities.
FoRBEs, Mar. 1, 1970, at 85-86 (emphasis in original); see Fiske, supra note 12, at
111 (Fidelity Funds); Mattlin, supra note 12 (Enterprise Fund). The drawback
of the satellite system, as expressed by one portfolio manager, "is that you lose a
certain amount of continuity, objectivity or scheme in your portfolio." Hedges, supra
note 80, at 50 (remarks of E. Kirkbride Miller, portfolio manager of T. Rowe Price
Growth Fund). For a suggested restructuring of the satellite management system,
see Mongello, A New Way to Split Your Portfolio, INsT. INV., Aug. 1970, at 28.
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A portfolio manager system may also operate below the level of final
decisionmaking.95
The final step in the investment management process is the execu-
tion of trades. A central trading department ordinarily handles trans-
actions for all the funds."8 The trader selects the market on which to
execute each trade and the broker to handle the order.97 He often
furnishes information to portfolio managers on market conditions, on
inquiries from other traders, and on the availability of and market for
large blocks of stock.98 He grants reciprocal business, when possible,
to brokers who have furnished research, sold fund shares, or performed
some other service for the funds or the adviser.9 9 In addition, the
trader often allocates executions between funds which have entered an
order to buy or sell the same stock.100
B. A "Typical" Complex
We shall deal with the investment management problems arising
95 In the Union Service group, for example, a different portfolio supervisor
follows the portfolio of each fund and makes investment recommendations to the
director of research who considers them when making investment recommendations
to the executive committee of the fund's board of directors.
96 For a general description of the trader's role in the investment management
process, see Geyer, An Institution's Best Friend Can Be Its Trader, INST. INV.,
Jan. 1969, at 35.
97 The process by which the central trading department for the Keystone group
handles fund portfolio transactions is fairly typical. A portfolio manager (the head
of one of Keystone's four investment management groups) sends the trading depart-
ment an order slip which stipulates the fund involved, the security, the number of
units of such security to be bought or sold, and the appropriate price range. The
slip may stipulate the sale or purchase price and/or the speed of execution, but
generally the trader prefers to have full discretion as to price and speed because of
the rapidly changing situations which often arise in the market. Once entered, an
order is good from day to day until satisfied, and the trader regularly appraises the
portfolio manager of the order's progress.
Upon receipt of the order, the trader determines whether the price (if stipulated)
is realistic in terms of present market conditions. If it is not, the trader will not
fill the order until the market price returns to the price range indicated. If the price
is realistic, the trader refers to a long list of brokers (Keystone deals with 100 to
150 different brokers) and to the various compilations of blocks available in the
third market. Autex and Instanet, electronic block trading devices, are helpful in
this regard as are the sheets distributed by various block trading houses. In addition,
the trader keeps a list of all the block buy and sell solicitations phoned in to his office.
On the basis of such information, the trader decides how and where to execute
the trade. See text accompanying notes 166-78 infra. Price, the secrecy with which
the trade will be made, and the market information which a broker will provide are
all factors which enter into his judgment. The trader next considers whether the
trade might be placed with a broker who has provided Keystone with research or
sold fund shares. The central trading department at Keystone handles about 100
to 150 orders a day.
The trader for the Wellington Management group prefers to have the portfolio
managers decide whether a stock should be purchased (or sold) immediately as a
large block or whether it should be accumulated (or disposed of) slowly over a
period of days or weeks. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 12, at pt. 2, at 856-57;
Greene, Execution of Portfolio Transactions, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS
49, 55-58 (P. Geerlings ed. CCH 1967).
9 8 See Geyer, supra note 96.
99 See text accompanying notes 209-18, 239-42 infra.
100 See text accompanying notes 151-57 infra.
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within a fund complex in the context of a hypothetical group of funds.
The XYZ group consists of Funds A, B, and C, their adviser XYZ,
and their distributor XYZ Distributors, a wholly owned subsidiary of
XYZ. Fund A is what is commonly known as an income fund: its
investment objective is "to produce favorable current income and long-
term growth of income with due regard to preservation of capital
value." Fund A is the smallest of the group, paying XYZ a fee of
.5 of 1 percent of its net assets, 1 ' and (to simplify this analysis) XYZ
pays all the fund's expenses. 0 2 Last year the fund paid an advisory
fee of $125,000 based upon average net assets of $25 million. The
fund has a board of five directors, two of whom are also officers and
directors of XYZ. The other three directors are not affiliated with
XyZ.103
Fund B is a "growth" fund: its objective is "longer-term ap-
preciation in capital value and an increase in future dividends from
income." Fund B is the largest fund in the group and pays what is
commonly known as a scaled-down fee: on its first $100 million of net
assets it pays a fee of .5 of 1 percent; on its second $100 million, .4
of 1 percent; and on its third $100 million, .3 of 1 percent. 04 Again
XYZ pays all of the fund's expenses. Last year Fund B paid a total
fee of $1.2 million, .4 of 1 percent on average net assets of $300 million.
Fund B's board of directors is identical to that of Fund A.
Fund C is a capital appreciation fund: its objective is "to produce
capital appreciation for investors in its shares." XYZ created the fund
two years ago to reach the then-lucrative market for volatile funds
which might achieve impressive short-term gains. During the last
two years sales of Fund A and Fund B shares have just managed to
offset redemptions, while sales of Fund C shares have been strong and
have led to a rapid increase in the fund's total net assets. Fund C pays
a basic fee of .75 of 1 percent of net assets, but the percentage increases
to a maximum of 1.5 percent or decreases to zero depending on Fund
C's performance relative to Standard and Poor's Index of 500 Common
101 A fixed .5 of 1% is the traditional formula for figuring the management fee.
Since the publication of the WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, however, a scaled
down fee schedule has become popular, especially for larger funds. SEC REPORT,
supra note 2, at 89.
102 Ordinarily, advisers do not absorb all of a fund's expenses, SEC REPORT,
supra note 2, at 90-91, though a few advisers, such as IDS, do so for their larger
funds. Id. 92.
103 Section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1964),
requires that, ordinarily, at least 40% of the directors be nonaffiliated with the
adviser, but when the principal underwriter is a subsidiary of the adviser, a majority
of the fund's board must be nonaffiliated if the fund and the underwriter have even
one overlapping director, officer, or employee. Typically, the adviser does control
the principal underwriter. SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
'
0 4 See note 101 supra.
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Stocks. °5 In its first year, Fund C paid a fee of 1.25 percent of its
average net assets, but last year its performance slumped and it paid
only .4 of 1 percent on average net assets of $75 million, or a total
fee of $300,000. The same five directors who sit on the boards of
Funds A and B sit on the board of Fund C.
The XYZ investment management division consists of three
analysts who do general research on industries and companies they
think attractive; three portfolio managers, one assigned to each fund;
and two analysts who work directly for Fund C, ferreting out new
issues and small companies usually traded in the over-the-counter
market. The manager of Fund A is Mr. Ames; the manager of Fund
B is Mr. Bright; the manager of Fund C is Mr. Cap.
The cost to XYZ of the collective research staff and its sup-
portive facilities, such as office space and library, is $200,000 per
year. Mr. Ames receives a salary of $30,000 a year, Mr. Bright
$100,000, and Mr. Cap and the two Fund C analysts, a combined
$100,000. If the cost of investment services is apportioned among
the funds in accordance with the formulas discussed below,10 6 XYZ is
spending $42,500 on Fund A,' 7 $250,000 on Fund B,' and $137,500
on Fund C.10 9
C. The Duty of Care
The initial problem arising in the investment management area
is whether the relative amount an adviser spends on each fund in its
complex has any bearing on whether it is discharging its fiduciary
obligations. Put more concretely, does the fact that XYZ is spending
more on Fund B than on Funds A and C suggest in any way that it is
breaching its fiduciary duty to A and C?
105 Each percentage point that the fund's performance exceeds the performance
of the Standard & Poor's Composite Stock Price Index of 500 Common Stocks
(S & P Index) will increase the basic .75 of 1% fee by .05 of 1%; each percentage
point below the S & P Index will reduce the fee by .05 of 1%.
Five types of performance fee are generally in use. Four of these five types
relate the fee to the performance of some specified securities index. The fifth bases
the adviser's compensation on a certain percentage of the fund's net realized capital
gains and unrealized capital appreciation. P. Vanica, Size, Growth, Performance,
and Advisory Fee Arrangements of Registered "Speculative" Investment Companies:
1960-1969, at 14-15, 56-60, June 4, 1970 (unpublished thesis submitted to the Alfred
P. Sloan School of Management, MIT); see 35 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 129-30 (1969).
'
0 r See text accompanying notes 286-88 infra.
107 30,000 (direct cost) + 25 (Fund A net assets)
25 + 300 + 75 (total complex net assets)
x 200,000 (collective expenses) = 42,500.
108 100,000 (direct cost) + 300 (Fund B net assets)
25 + 300 + 75 (total complex net assets)
X 200,000 (collective expenses) = 250,000.
109 100,000 (direct cost) + 75 (Fund C net assets)
25 + 300 + 75 (total complex net assets)
X 200,000 (collective expenses) = 137,500.
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The amount the adviser spends on each fund has no necessary
bearing upon whether it is discharging its duty of care. An adviser
owes each fund a minimum standard of professional care." ° Whether
it meets this standard with respect to a fund depends solely upon its
treatment of that fund and not upon the expenses it has incurred on
the fund's behalf."' Similarly, the treatment it accords the other
funds is irrelevant, except possibly as evidence of what the minimum
standard should be. The minimum standard is determined according
to industry practice and the special needs of each fund. If, for example,
a fund has a large number of portfolio holdings, or if achievement of
its investment objective involves a high portfolio turnover or invest-
ment in highly volatile companies requiring continual review, the
adviser may have to do more to meet the standard of care than it would
for a fund with only a few securities, a low turnover rate, or invest-
ments in stocks of relatively low volatility." 2
Thus, the difference in XYZ's expenditures itself has no signif-
icance. Fund B, by virtue of its many holdings, or Fund C, by virtue
of its volatility or high turnover rate, may require additional ex-
penditures. But even if they do not, the issue is whether the treatment
XYZ accords each of the funds meets the standard of care which that
fund commands. Once XYZ has met that standard, it is free to
devote additional attention and dollars wherever it chooses, and the
funds have no legal grounds for complaint."'
11 See note 45 supra.
"'lSee generally FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 330-31
(R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & D. Glazer eds. PLI 1970) (remarks of Leonard
M. Leiman) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION].
1 2 A comparison of Ivest Fund and Wellington Fund, both in the Wellington
Management group, illustrates the difference in the demand funds may make upon
the adviser. An aggressive fund, Ivest on Aug. 31, 1969 held 63 different common
stocks (plus unspecified miscellaneous stocks) worth about $273 million, see Ivest
Fund, Annual Report (1969), and had an average yearly portfolio turnover of over
100%', see Ivest Fund, Prospectus 1 (Jan. 2, 1969, revised Mar. 27, 1969). During
this period Ivest had the services of two portfolio managers and two analysts in
addition to the collective research available to all the funds in the group, see note 86
supra. At the same time Wellington Fund, a conservative fund, held 92 different
common stocks worth over $1 billion, see Wellington Fund, Quarterly Report (Aug.
31, 1969), and had an average yearly turnover of under 40%, see Wellington Fund,
Prospectus 6 (Apr. 1, 1969, revised May 19, 1969). Wellington had for the common
stock portion of its portfolio the services of one portfolio manager and three analysts
in addition to the collective research. Thus, Ivest, with its more aggressive objective
and higher turnover rate, required the same size staff as Wellington Fund, with its
greater size and number of holdings but more conservative orientation. Of course,
the size of the staff may also depend upon the abilities of each analyst and portfolio
manager.
113 In some circumstances one fund may be able to contract with the adviser
for services additional to those required by the duty of care. If, for example, the
adviser should agree to assign additional analysts to a fund, no problem is posed
because the other funds are not affected. Situations arise, however, in which such
a contract may impinge upon the adviser's fiduciary obligations to the other funds.
If the adviser contracts to allow one fund to execute all its trades in securities held
in common, before the other funds, those other funds are placed in a disadvantageous
position when executing their trades. If the adviser's fiduciary duty to treat each
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If this conclusion is correct, it means not only that the comparative
amounts which the adviser spends on each fund have no bearing on
whether it has discharged its fiduciary obligation, but also that the
comparative amounts which the adviser collects from each fund have
no bearing. The standard of care is determined by fund needs and
industry practice, not by the amount which a fund pays the adviser.
That a fund has paid too little is no excuse for the adviser's inattention.
That a fund has paid too much is no grounds for preferred treatment.
The remedy in each case is to renegotiate the fee to reflect better the
actual costs of meeting the appropriate standard of care." 4
D. The Duty of Fairness
Although the standard of care ordinarily affords adequate control
over the adviser's activities, it does not provide adequate protection in
several situations. Inherent in such situations is the danger that the
adviser will engage in self-dealing, not in the obvious sense of appro-
priating for its own a benefit belonging to a fund, but in the more
subtle sense of preferring funds in which it has a strong self-interest
over funds in which it does not. The law traditionally has applied a
standard of fairness to situations posing a threat of self-dealing." 5
This standard allows closer scrutiny of the adviser's activities than the
standard of care, an essentially permissive standard that leaves the
adviser considerable discretion in exercising its business judgment."'
In the fund complex, situations calling for the standard of fairness
fund evenhandedly arises under state law, the other funds can contractually agree to
such an arrangement, provided that it is approved by a majority of their disinterested
directors. See text accompanying note 70 supra. But if the adviser's fiduciary duty
arises under the Investment Company Act, see note 52 supra, the funds cannot contract
away their statutory rights. Investment Company Act §47, 15 U.S.C. §80a-47
(1964).
114 In practice, a fund's nonaffiliated directors may conclude that the benefits of
being part of a complex justify subsidizing, at least to some degree, certain other
funds in the group. See text accompanying notes 286-88 infra. An alternative to
renegotiating the fee would be for the nonaffiliated directors to contract for a higher
level of services than that required by the common law-thus bringing the value of
the services received into accord with the fee paid.
115See notes 46, 113 supra. Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. §80a-17(d) (1964), might also be applicable to many of the problems
discussed in this study. Section 17(a) prohibits an affiliated person of an investment
company and the investment company to effect any transaction as joint participants
in violation of SEC rules. Rule 17d-1, the applicable rule, prohibits such transactions
unless they are first approved by the SEC. In a fund complex, the adviser is an
affiliated person of each fund within §2(a)(3)(E) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §80a-
2(a) (3)(E) (1964), but the funds themselves are not presumed to be affiliates of
each other unless the SEC in an action under §2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(9)
(1964) establishes that the funds are under common control. Such control might be
premised on the fact that the funds have common boards of directors or that different
boards are under the controlling influence of the adviser. A finding that the funds are
under common control and thus affiliates of each other would be retroactive, see
Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285 (1962), and would consequently have
far-reaching effects. See generally MUTUAL FUNDS 357-96 (PLI 1970) (remarks
of John A. Dudley & Robert J. Routier).
116 See note 45 supra.
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exhibit four characteristics which distinguish them from the more
common situations calling only for the standard of care. All four
of these characteristics must be present if the standard of fairness is
to apply.
The first is that the adviser stands to gain more from some of
the funds which it manages than from others. In the case of the XYZ
group, XYZ may profit most from promoting the performance of
Fund C, even if this involves prejudicing Funds A and B. In contrast
to the fees paid by Funds A and B, which are based solely on their
respective net asset values, 117 the fee paid by Fund C rewards or
penalizes XYZ in accordance with the fund's performance."' Some
actual figures will highlight the difference.
An investment generating appreciation of $1 million 119 will in-
crease by $1 million the net asset base on which the fees payable by
Funds A and B are figured. Thus, because the percentage used to
compute each fund's fee-.5 of 1 percent for Fund A and .3 of 1
percent for Fund B-will not be changed by the increase in net assets,
the appreciation will produce $5000 in additional fees from Fund A 120
and $3000 in additional fees from Fund B.121 In the case of Fund C,
however, the additional appreciation will mean an increase not only in
the asset base upon which the fund's fee is figured but also, and more
importantly, in the percentage used to compute the fee. Consequently,
if the $1 million in appreciation improves Fund C's performance rela-
tive to Standard and Poor's Index by even 1 percent, it will increase
the percentage payable on the fund's total assets by .05 of 1 percent
which on total assets of $76 million ($75 million plus $1 million in
appreciation) will mean an increase in XYZ's fee of $38,000.122
17 See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
118 See note 105 supra & accompanying text.
119 The discussion is in dollars rather than percentages because situations calling
for the fairness standard involve the distribution of benefits which are of insufficient
quantity to satisfy all fund needs. See text accompanying note 132 infra. Conse-
quently, they pose for the adviser the problem of allocating a benefit potentially
worth a certain number of dollars among a number of interested funds. Such benefits
may take the form of an especially good stock with only a small number of shares
in the public float or an unusually inexpensive block of stock which is too small to
fill all the funds' authorizations. Of course, there is no certainty in investment
management. Advisers can never be sure that any particular investment will be
profitable. Nevertheless, the funds are purchasing the adviser's best judgment as
to which stocks represent the best investment opportunities. Even if the adviser's
judgments prove wrong, a fund that has not been allowed to invest in what the
adviser thought to be best has been treated unfairly because it did not get all that
it bargained for. If investment management is really worth paying for. the funds
investing in the opportunities the advisers consider best will, presumably, perform
best in the long run on a risk-adjusted basis.
120The additional fee is figured by multiplying .5 of 1% times the $1 million in
additional assets which the appreciation has produced.
121 The additional fee is fieured by multiplying .3 of 1%. the percentage Fund B
pays on assets in excess of $300 million, times the additional $1 million in assets.
122 A concrete illustration may be helpful. Assuming that the S & P Index were
unchanged for the year and that Fund C similarly had no capital gain or loss, the
228 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Other, less quantifiable factors may also lead XYZ to conclude
that it has a special interest in promoting Fund C's performance. It
may believe that Fund C's sales depend more heavily on its short-term
performance than do the sales of the other funds because Fund C has
yet to establish a long track record and because investors are more
concerned with the relative performance of aggressive funds.123 In
addition, XYZ may believe that by promoting the performance of the
fund which is in the potentially "hottest" market 124 and which pays
the highest basic percentage of net assets 125 it will maximize sales and
hence its management fee. Finally, it may note that an investment
generating a million dollars in capital appreciation will have a greater
percentage effect on the portfolio performance of Fund C than on the
portfolio performance of Fund B: $1 million will increase Fund C's
portfolio by 1.3 percent (1,000,000 - 75,000,000), Fund B's by only
.3 of 1 percent (1,000,000 - 300,000,000). Of course, $1 million
will have an even greater percentage effect on the performance of
Fund A (1,000,000 -- 25,000,000 = 4 percent), but the assumption
has been that investor interest in income funds, as reflected in new
sales, is comparatively low.
The factors contributing to XYZ's special interest in Fund C are
typical of those which may operate in a complex. 120  Sometimes the
$1 million in appreciation would mean an increase in the fund's net assets from
$75 million to $76 million or 1.3%. The Fund thus would outperform the Index by
1.3% and the basic .75 of 1% fee would be increased by .065 of 1% (1.3 X .05%).
See note 105 supra. By preferring Fund C over Funds A and B when it decides
which fund is to be given the opportunity to reap such appreciation, XYZ stands to
benefit by over $30,000 in increased fees.
123 The Wharton Report noted a weak positive relationship between the inflow
of new money and past portfolio performance among the common stock funds studied,
but not among the balanced funds. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 20. Investor
awareness of fund performance, as reflected in a boost in sales, has increased since
the time of the Wharton Report. I. FRIEND, M. BLUME, & J. CROCKETT. MUTUAL
FUNDS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 13 (1970).
124 In light of the poor performance of many aggressive funds during the recent
market decline, the assumption that demand is strongest for aggressive funds may
no loner be realistic. Mr. Bogle has noted "the sharply increased market share of
the 'middle-of-the-road', average volatility funds, at the expense of the aggressive,
high-volatility funds that were the favorites of the latter part of the past decade."
Bogle Address, supra note 7, at 5. The experience of the Keystone group illustrates
the strength of the demand for aggressive funds in former years. In 1968, K-2 and
S-4, two aggressive funds in the Keystone group of what was then twelve funds
(two were not offered publicly), accounted for over 70% of fund sales. And Key-
stone's newly created and aggressive Polaris Fund (previously known as Keystone
International Fund, Inc.) was responsible for $75 million in sales, over 16% of the
group's sales, althoutzh it was offered during only the last five months of the year.
Keystone Custodian Funds Inc., Annual Report 6 (1968).
125 The size of the percentage used to figure the fee is more important in terms
of the adviser's self-interest than the total fee payable by a fund. An adviser stands
to gain most by promoting the performance and hence the sales of a fund which
pays a high percentage fee even if that fund presently is small. This assumes, of
course, that a very large fund paving a low percentage fee will not be so neglected
as to invite many redemptions. But even a significant number of redemptions may
represent only load-free transfers to better performing funds in the group.
126Forbes has described a situation in which the prospect of increased sales,
among other reasons, has seemed to give the adviser a stronger self-interest in some
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adviser will perceive its self-interest to be strong, as in a case where
the sales of its best selling fund seem to be highly responsive to the
fund's short-term performance and where the fund is also paying an
incentive fee. At other times the adviser will perceive its self-interest
to be weaker. But even funds with the same fee schedules may hold
out different rewards for the adviser. The sales of one may appear,
for example, to be more responsive to performance, or the percentage
fee paid by a smaller fund may not be scaled down as much as that
of a larger fund.
Although this analysis suggests that an adviser may have a
stronger self-interest in some funds than in others, it does not mean
that advisers necessarily will perceive their self-interest in terms of
immediate compensation. A well-established adviser may believe its
long-range interests are best served by devoting extra effort to its
weakest funds in order to maintain the image of the complex as a
whole-even if such funds include, for example, a small closed-end fund
in which the adviser's financial interest will always be small. Such
advisers need not concern themselves so closely with short-term profits
or the exigencies of establishing the reputation of at least one fund
in the group as do advisers who are less established or in a financially
insecure position.
The second characteristic of situations calling for a fairness
standard is that more than one fund has an interest in what the adviser
is furnishing to the funds. Thus, it is of no concern to Fund A that
XYZ proposes to add a third analyst to the two already working
directly for Fund C, if Fund A is already receiving all the investment
research it can use from the collective research staff. Similarly, Funds
B and C, whose investment policies emphasize growth, need not be
concerned if Fund A is the only fund to purchase the shares of a
company recommended by collective research if the company pays a
very high dividend but has little prospect for capital appreciation. The
investment objective of each fund narrows the range of investments in
which it is potentially interested.
funds than in others. In the summer of 1968, New England Mutual Life Insurance
took over Loomis, Sayles, the investment adviser to a large number of private invest-
ment accounts and a few no-load mutual funds. Because New England Life's sales-
men could not earn commissions by selling no-loads, Loomis, Sayles began developing
load funds. The first two of these funds, NEL Growth and NEL Equity, came out
in December 1968. Since that time Capital Development Fund, Loomis' best selling
no-load, has been closed to new customers, ostensibly to keep it small and flexible
but, as Forbes remarks, unlike T. Rowe Price, which closed its New Horizons Fund
for the same reason, Loomis is not starting up a replacement. Moreover. during
the last year, the new load funds performed much better than Capital Developments,
"perhaps," Forbes speculates, "because of management's preoccupation with getting
the new funds invested." New Design, FOREs, Dec. 1, 1969, at 92, 93. Forbes sums
up by saying: "The shape of Loomis' future can be seen from the three funds still
in registration: Two are variable annuities tailored for NEL's insurance salesmen,
while the third is designed for wholly or largely tax-exempt organizations like
profit-sharing plans, pension plans and life insurance companies." Id.
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Regardless of how sound this conclusion is in theory, however,
it may overstate what actually happens. Although investment objec-
tives might at first glance appear to delimit fairly precisely the universe
of investments in which each fund is interested, in practice objectives
are not overly helpful in singling out the particular fund to which an
investment should be assigned. In many complexes the objectives of
the funds overlap,' and as the number of funds increase I'S the area
of overlap has a tendency to expand.' -  Moreover, the same security
may serve more than one objective, even if the objectives are widely
disparate. 3 Indeed, instead of selecting issues which individually
approximate the degree of volatility indicated by the fund's objective,
an adviser may select issues of both higher and lower volatility, mixing
them in such a way that the sum of the individual parts and not the
parts themselves reflect the appropriate degree of volatility."'
127 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 108.
128 During the last decade the number of funds within existing fund complexes
has increased markedly. From 1960 to 1970 the advisers of the 49 major complexes
have increased the number of funds they sponsor from 105 to 190. Bogle Address,
.supra note 7, at 1.
129 Some advisers make an effort to spread the objectives of their funds over
the risk-reward spectrum. Thus, Wellington Management advertises that no one
fund can serve every need, and has fashioned the objectives of the funds in its group
to appeal to a broad range of investors. But as the number of funds in the group
has increased from two to twelve, differences between several of the funds have
been reduced. Other advisers make no effort to create funds with different objectives.
Thus, Oppenheimer Management Corporation has created Oppenheimer A.I.M. Fund,
Inc., although it has similar investment objectives to those of Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc., a fund also managed by Oppenheimer Management. Oppenheimer A.I.M. Fund,
Inc., Prospectus 2 (Feb. 9, 1970). Moreover, as Mr. Bogle has remarked, a number
of advisers have created funds which will "terminate their offerings as they approach
asset levels that may be inconsistent with the implementation of their investment
policies. When this happens, it seems obvious that a new fund must be formed to
take the place of the closed fund in the spectrum." Bogle Address, supra note 7,
at 8. Still other advisers have created funds which differ in the industries in which
they concentrate or in the techniques they use (for example, short-term trading,
technical market analysis) to achieve the same objective. The objectives of several
of the Fidelity Funds are "essentially" identical and "vague" so that each fund can
"take on the personality of its manager." Fiske, stpra note 12, at 86.
130 At the end of 1969, 33 of the 75 common stocks in the portfolio of Broad
Street Investing, a fund with an objective "to produce favorable current income . . .
and long-term growth of both income and capital value," were also in the portfolio
of National Investors, a fund with an objective "to produce long-term gain in capital
value and future growth of income." Compare Broad Street Investing Corporation,
Annual Report (1969), with National Investors Corporation, Annual Report (1969).
On June 30, 1969, the largest single holding of Scudder Special Fund, a highly
aggressive capital appreciation fund, was American Telephone and Telegraph, a
company one would expect to see in the portfolio of a much more conservative fund.
Scudder Special Fund, Inc., Third Quarter Report (June 30, 1969). On Scudder
Special Fund's investment approach, see Rim, Fox, Run, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1970, at 55.
131 At the close of 1969, Broad Street Investing's portfolio contained such low
dividend paying issues as Holiday Inns and Burroughs, and its largest single holding,
IBM, historically has paid a relatively low dividend. Presumably management is
relying on other securities to produce current income and anticipates that growth
companies such as Holiday Inns, Burroughs, and IBM in the future will raise their
dividend levels or will appreciate in value, thus expanding the fund's asset base for
generating future income. Broad Street Investing Corporation, Annual Report
(1969).
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The third characteristic of situations calling for a fairness standard
is the limited availability of whatever the adviser is providing. If there
is enough to go around, the adviser can give each fund all that it can
use and thus has no cause to indulge in unfairness by preferring a fund
in which it has a special interest. For example, if the collective research
staff should recommend the purchase of American Telephone and
Telegraph on the grounds that its yearly earnings are likely to show
a handsome increase, its dividend is expected to grow, and its market
price double in the next few years, XYZ can have each fund buy as
many shares as seem appropriate to the fund's objective, cash position,
and portfolio mix. Its decision as to how many shares each fund
should purchase is a business decision, and there is no reason to
examine the fairness of its judgment-even if it has a greater interest
in one fund than in another. On the other hand, if research recom-
mends a smaller company with a limited number of shares in the public
float, the group's trader may be able to accumulate only enough shares
to satisfy the needs of a single fund. In this situation, the funds cannot
divide up the relatively few shares available without each taking too
few shares to be meaningful in terms of their overall portfolios. The
bother of administering small holdings may well outweigh any benefit
they produce.' 32 When the funds' investment objectives do not indicate
which fund should make the purchase, the adviser may be tempted to
favor the fund in which it has the greatest self-interest.
132 For some larger funds entire industries, though attractive, may be too small
to justify an investment. See Investing: The Case for Bigness, FORBES, May 15,
1970, at 190, 192:
[Forbes interviewer]: Still, you rule out some possibly hot new areas that
aren't big enough to make an impact on your total size.
[Richard Johnson, vice president Dreyfus Fund]: Size is a factor here.
There are perhaps areas that we might forego if we thought we could commit
only a half of 1% of our assets to the whole idea. I suppose the tape-
cassette area would be one of those. It could be defined as a major new
investment thought, but the total market value of any direct play would be
small.
Mr. Johnson went on to say, however, that industries of small size often are too
speculative for a growth fund such as Dreyfus Fund. Id. 194.
In a complex consisting of a very large and a very small fund, the minimum
worthwhile holding for the large fund may be so great that it must leave to the
smaller fund investments in companies with small public floats. Thus, differences in
size might appear to provide a solution to the allocation problem. In practice,
however, such differences do not seem to be overly helpful. As funds grow, they
frequently increase the number of issues in their portfolios. E.g., Dreyfus Fund,
Inc., Prospectus 5 (Mar. 19, 1970):
[Elighteen years ago . . . the Fund had net assets of about one-half
million dollars. Today, the Fund has net assets of approximately 2.3 billion
dollars ...
Therefore there will be a tendency for the Fund's portfolio to contain
securities of many more issuers than in former years.
See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 295-96.
Moreover, some advisers have earmarked a special portion of large portfolios
for smaller than average positions in attractive companies with a limited number of
shares in the public float. Three funds with such positions are National Investors,
Chemical Fund, and T. Rowe Price Growth Fund. Hedges, supra note 80, at 48.
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The fourth characteristic of situations calling for the fairness
standard is that more than one fund has a claim to what the adviser
is providing. The funds in the XYZ group, for example, all have a
claim to participate in the investment opportunities turned up by the
collective research staff. The research is being done for all of them,
and thus they all may expect to participate in its fruits. On the other
hand, Funds A and B have no claim to participate in opportunities dis-
covered by the analysts working directly for Fund C. XYZ is free to
structure its investment research division however it wishes, and if it
chooses to assign certain individuals to a particular fund and to limit
the benefit of their work product to that fund, it may do so 3 -- pro-
viding, of course, that it continues to meet its duty of care to the other
funds. Thus, no fund may claim the services of another fund's analysts
or portfolio manager. Similarly, if the adviser has chosen to set up a
separate trading department for each fund, no fund may claim to
participate in the transactions of another fund's trader. A fund has a
claim only to work done at least partially on its behalf.
At this point a summary is appropriate. Ordinarily, an adviser
has considerable leeway in how it treats the funds it manages so long
as its activities with respect to each fund meet the minimum standard
133 In the Shareholders Management group of funds, not only is each fund run
independently of the others but the portfolio of Shareholders' largest fund, Enterprise
Fund, has been divided into five parts, each of which is managed independently by
a different portfolio manager. Shareholders provides no collective research. Each
of Enterprise's five portfolio managers has been described as an "individual entre-
preneur," who develops his own network of outside analysts to feed him ideas.
"There are no office conferences and little cross-checking among the portfolio
managers." The men are "thoroughly competitive." The most important central
facility provided by Shareholders is a central trading desk to see that no two portfolio
managers are competing for the same stock and to prevent one from buying what
another is selling. Mattlin, supra note 12, at 73. Thus, in the Shareholders Manage-
ment group, the fourth characteristic, that more than one fund have a claim, would
not seem to be present, except in the area of executions when the trader is buying
or selling on behalf of more than one manager.
Competitive Capital Fund, as originally organized, took the concept of competition
between portfolio managers even further than Shareholders Management. It divided
its portfolio among five outside managers each of whom was paid in accordance with
his performance relative to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The amount of new
money which each received depended upon his performance relative to the other
managers. See Fiske, The In-House Performance Derby: Competitive Capital,
INsT. INv., Jan. 1969, at 42, 44. Poor performance during the past two years has
led to a reorganization at Competitive Capital. It has fired its original managers
and hired new ones who are described as a "competitive team." Another Icon
Smashed, FoRBEs, Aug. 1, 1970, at 55.
Wellington Management pursues a policy of cooperation between portfolio man-
agers. The portfolio managers and analysts working for particular funds are en-
couraged to and in fact do share information affecting other funds in the group.
See generally notes 86, 89 supra. So long as this policy remains in effect, the funds
would seem to have claims to the work product but not the services of persons
working for other funds in the group. Accordingly, the standard of fairness would
apply in situations which also display the first three characteristics. For a description
of Capital Research, another complex which places a premium on cooperation, see
Welles, mepra note 12.
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of care which industry practice and each fund's needs require. In some
situations, however, the adviser's activities may have to meet the more
stringent standard of fairness. Four characteristics distinguish situa-
tions calling for the standard of fairness: (1) the adviser stands to
benefit more from some funds than from others; (2) more than one
fund has an interest in whatever the adviser is furnishing; (3) what
is being furnished is of insufficient quantity to satisfy all fund needs;
and (4) more than one fund has a claim to what is being furnished.
The danger of self-dealing in such situations is not that the adviser
might take for itself something belonging to a fund (a danger which
always exists), but that the adviser, in mediating between the funds'
conflicting claims, will make decisions which consistently redound to
its own benefit.
E. Safeguarding Fund Interests
In situations displaying the above four characteristics, advisers
risk violating their legal duty not to engage in self-dealing if they
favor funds in which their self-interest is strongest. Consequently, it
might seem that such problems are best left with the courts which, in
punishing a few of the most egregious cases, will deter other mis-
conduct. If judicial action is likely, mutual fund advisers, like brokers
in the securities industry, might be expected to hire a compliance officer
to insure that the adviser's procedures with respect to the funds are
within the legal limits."'
But the Investment Company Act contemplates the presence of
nonaffiliated directors on the boards of mutual funds, 35 and the
presence of these directors and their review of transactions between
the adviser and the funds insulate advisers from liability when self-
dealing might otherwise be found. Advisers have successfully defended
actions alleging a breach of their fiduciary duty by convincing the
court that the nonaffiliated directors made a disinterested review of the
transactions in question.1 36  Courts have generally been unwilling to
delve into the adequacy of the inquiry underlying directors' business
judgment.
137
So long as the presence of nonaffiliated directors reduces the
pressure for advisers to adopt effective self-regulatory measures,
adequate regulation seems best assured by spelling out fairly precisely
134 See Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960).
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1964).
'
36 See Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
ff 92,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970). See also Plaintiff's Reply Brief After Trial at
51-65, 96-102, id.; Defendant's Reply Brief at 5-15, id.
137 See note 45 mipra.
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the factors which should enter into the nonaffiliated directors' business
judgment. 3  Guidelines delineating the problems upon which the non-
affiliated directors should focus their attention, the materials they
should require, and the factors they should consider in making a judg-
ment will not only serve as an ethical standard of conduct, but also
may provide the courts with the standard they now lack for evaluating
the sufficiency of the inquiry which has led up to that judgment. Such
guidelines can provide content to the "due care" concept, thus causing
the nonaffiliated directors to risk liability for negligence if the guide-
lines are not followed.
Of course, the possibility remains that any suggested procedures
will remain just that-procedures rather than the vehicle for an inquiry
into the substantive problems raised. There is no reason to suppose,
however, that nonaffiliated directors would elevate form over substance
once their duties were more clearly defined. Their ineffectiveness in
the past '" may be attributable more to their failure to identify their
responsibilities, their lack of time and information, and their close
identification with the adviser, than to any conscious abdication of their
duties. 4 Guidelines would educate them as to what their job requires
and would indicate the information with which they should acquaint
themselves. 4' In addition, the recently enacted amendments to the
Investment Company Act help reduce the identification of the non-
affiliated directors with the adviser by replacing a number of references
to affiliated persons in the Investment Company Act with a new term,
"interested persons." 142 Interested persons include not only affiliated
persons but also members of their immediate families and persons who
have certain business, professional, or personal relationships with the
adviser. Furthermore, some advisers are voluntarily strengthening the
independence of their nonaffiliated directors by encouraging them to
135 The danger of self-dealing might alternatively be dealt with by equalizing the
benefit each fund confers upon the adviser. Although incentive fees might be
applied to income as well as to growth funds, compare Oppenheimer A.I.M. Fund,
Inc., Prospectus 9-11 (Feb. 9, 1970), with Massachusetts Income Development Fund,
Inc., Preliminary Prospectus 6-7 (July 29, 1970), differences in the adviser's self-
interest, while reduced, may still be present. If, as suggested in Part IV balow,
the fee is made to depend on the total assets within a complex, the danger of self-
dealing will also be reduced.
139 WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 34. See also note 69 supra.
140 See Mundheim, supra note 14, at 1058-59; Rottenberg, Developing Limits on
Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 309, 324 (1970).
141 See Mundheim, supra note 14, at 1058-59. It might be objected that even if
the nonaffiliated directors perform their role more effectively, they lack the bargaining
power needed to effect meaningful controls over the adviser. "Strong and reasoned
objections," however, may induce an adviser to change its course of conduct. Business-
men want to appear to their peers to be doing what is right and, in any case, the
nonaffiliated directors can always threaten to air their objections publicly or to require
that they be set forth in the fund's proxy statement. Id. 1068.
142 CCH SPECIAL 2 (CCH Mutual Funds Guide Special Edition, Aug. 11, 1970);
see S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32-34 (1969).
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nominate their own successors when they retire from the board. Thus,
new directors do not owe their appointments to the adviser's largesse
and may have had no prior relationship with the adviser.' Finally,
the independence of the nonaffiliated directors, at least in the view of
some advisers, may be increasing. These advisers have observed that
in recent years the nonaffiliated directors of their funds have taken a
more critical attitude toward the adviser's decisions--an attitude
prompted perhaps by studies critical of the effectiveness of the non-
affiliated directors.4
If the nonaffiliated directors are to assume the burden of safe-
guarding fund interests, the practical question remains of what precisely
they should do to insure that their funds are treated fairly.
The nonaffiliated directors should first determine whether their
fund is in any danger of receiving prejudicial treatment from the
adviser. If the adviser's self-interest in their fund is as great as its
self-interest in the other funds in the group, then the first of the four
characteristics of situations requiring review for fairness is missing
and the nonaffiliated directors have no reason to scrutinize the adviser's
resolution of conflicts between their fund and other funds in the group.
Thus, the three men who serve as nonaffiliated directors on the boards
of the XYZ funds can, in their capacity as Fund C directors, depend
on XYZ to safeguard Fund C's interest. For XYZ to do otherwise
would be to act against its own self-interest. On the other hand, in
their capacity as directors of Fund A, they must actively protect the
fund from possible- self-dealing on the part of XYZ. XYZ stands to
benefit most by favoring either Fund B or Fund C in conflict situations.
Initially, therefore, the nonaffiliated directors should compare the
benefit the adviser stands to receive from each of the funds in the
complex. Such a comparison will not be easy: even after considering
the fee schedules of the various funds, the relative demand for their
shares, and the apparent responsiveness of their sales to good perform-
ance, the nonaffiliated directors may still be unable to conclude with
any certainty that the adviser's self-interest in one fund is substantially
greater than in another. If the nonaffiliated directors are unable to
conclude that the benefit the adviser receives from certain funds is un-
usually great, then they need not concern themselves further about the
special problems arising when an adviser manages a number of different
portfolios.
To discharge their task properly, the nonaffiliated directors should
begin with a review of fund performance. Such a review is already
143 Nevertheless, in 90% of the cases or more, the nonaffiliated directors continue
to be selected by the management of the mutual funds. MUTUAL FUNDS 285 (PLI
1970) (remarks of Allan F. Conwill).
144 See notes 69, 139 .mipra.
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conducted by the directors of many funds, but the special problems
raised by fund complexes require that the nonaffiliated directors
scrutinize the performance of all the funds in the group, not merely
the funds on whose boards they serve. They should compare the
performance of their funds with the performance of any other funds in
the group with like objectives, and they should compare the perform-
ance of every fund in the group with the performance of the funds in
other groups with like objectives. If, for example, the nonaffiliated
directors of Fund A should note that Fund C has been performing well
compared with other aggressive funds and Fund A poorly compared
with other income funds, they should be alert to the possibility that
XYZ has been treating Fund A unfairly.
Although review of performance is helpful, the nonaffiliated di-
rectors cannot rely solely upon such review to protect their fund's
interests. Relative performance figures may be unreliable over a short
period of time. Moreover, adverse performance in itself does not mean
that the adviser is preferring some funds over others-the adviser may
simply be better at managing funds with certain objectives. More
important, unfair treatment may not yet have revealed itself in perform-
ance comparisons. A purposeful effort to favor certain funds in situa-
tions displaying the four characteristics discussed above is illegal, even
if it has been unsuccessful in the past. The nonaffiliated directors
should see that such an effort is thwarted before it becomes manifest
in poor performance.
Thus to assure themselves that their fund's interests are protected,
the nonaffiliated directors have other inquiries to make. One im-
portant inquiry is whether the fund is adequately represented in the
investment management process. Usually this representation will be
provided by a portfolio manager who acts as an advocate for their
fund.'45 Sometimes, however, an advocate will work below the level
of final decisionmaking, pressing a fund's interest before an investment
committee with final say on all portfolio decisions.' 46 When an ad-
vocacy process operates properly, it greatly reduces the opportunity for
the adviser to engage in self-dealing by favoring some funds over
others. Thus in the XYZ group, the directors of Fund A can depend
on Mr. Ames, the fund's portfolio manager, to vie with Mr. Bright and
Mr. Cap, portfolio managers of Funds B and C, for those investments
which, because of the limited availability of the shares, may be made
by only one of the three funds.1
4
7
1
4 5 See generally text accompanying notes 90-95 supra.
146 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
147 The trader of the Wellington Management group believes that the problem
of allocating shares of attractive companies is especially acute in the area of new
issues. When a new issue is "hot" and several funds are potentially interested, the
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If their fund has such a portfolio manager, the nonaffiliated di-
rectors should get to know him and should satisfy themselves that he
is performing effectively as an advocate for the fund's interest. 48
Because the portfolio manager is an employee of the investment adviser,
the nonaffiliated directors should approach this task with some delicacy,
recognizing the danger of creating unnecessary tensions between the
manager and the adviser. The nonaffiliated directors of Fund A
should speak regularly to Mr. Ames to see that he is sensitive to
possible problems and to discover any instances in which he thinks
the fund has been treated unfairly. They may learn, for example, that
certain analysts doing collective research have been passing on in-
formation to Mr. Bright or Mr. Cap before Mr. Ames and, to protect
Fund A from such unfairness, may require XYZ to establish a formal
method of disseminating information.'49
An advocacy process does not operate in complexes in which the
same portfolio manager or investment committee serves more than one
fund. In addition, some problems cannot be resolved by advocates
representing the interests of particular funds. In these cases the non-
affiliated directors must rely on other techniques to safeguard their
fund's interest.
One such technique is a formula or prearranged plan for allocating
a limited asset among a number of funds. This technique is often used
to apportion purchases or sales when more than one fund has entered
an order, known in the industry as an authorization, for the same
security. " ' If a block of the stock cannot be bought or sold at an
acceptable price, the group's trader usually will begin to execute a
series of relatively small orders on the exchange.' Each fund would
trader determines from the various underwriters how many shares he will be able
to buy and gives this information to the group's portfolio managers. The portfolio
managers then decide among themselves how the allocation is to be made. New
issues represent only a small portion of the shares purchased by the funds in the
Wellington Management Group.
148 Nonaffiliated directors might feel more confident in relying upon a portfolio
manager to represent fund interests if the manager's salary depends, at least in part,
upon fund performance. In a number of complexes, including Wellington and Share-
holders Management, a portfolio manager's salary does depend, to some degree, on
the performance of the portfolio (or portfolios) he is managing. But this practice
is not universal.
149 See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra. In the Wellington group portfolio
managers, as an additional safeguard, are ordinarily notified of transactions proposed
by the other managers so that they can press any claim their fund might have to
participate.
o The following discussion may also be understood in terms of the adviser's
duty to seek best execution. See generally text accompanying notes 166-78 infra.
If the adviser is to secure best execution for several funds making simultaneous
purchases or sales through a central trader, it must see that each fund has an
opportunity to participate in transactions yielding the best price.
151 See generally note 97 supra. Although this pattern is most common, some
traders believe it is advantageous to trade in and out of the market and do so even
though a block is available in their price range.
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like the trader to fill its authorization first because timing may be
important and even skillfully placed orders may have an adverse effect
on the market price. 5 ' In resolving the funds' competing claims, many
advisers have adopted a formula allocating to each fund a share of daily
purchases (or sales) in the ratio of its authorization to the total
authorizations of all the funds.153 Thus, if Fund A has authorized two
thousand shares, Fund B five thousand, and Fund C three thousand,
Fund A would receive one-fifth of the shares purchased (or sold) each
day, Fund B one-half, and Fund C three-tenths. "4  Theoretically, this
seems the best way to allocate purchases and sales because it serves each
fund's needs, as reflected by its authorization, to the same degree each
day with comparably priced stock. 5
Nevertheless, such a formula may sometimes cause a fund to incur
greater commissions on its portfolio transactions than might otherwise
be necessary. Because the volume discount on the minimum com-
mission rate applies only to purchases or sales made during a single
day, the longer a fund takes to fill its order, the greater the commission
expense it will incur for the same number of shares.'56 Thus, if
152 For a few examples of the difficulties traders may experience in buying or
selling large blocks of stock, see SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 255-57.
153 See, e.g., Union Capital Fund, Inc., Prospectus 4 (May 1, 1970) : "If two
or more of the investment companies . . . desire to buy or sell the same security
at the same time, the purchases and sales are normally made as nearly as practicable
on a pro rata basis in proportion to the amounts desired to be bought or sold by
each company." Nearly identical language appears in the National Investors, White-
hall and Broad Street Investing (all members of the Union Service group) prospec-
tuses of the same date.
154 Under rule 410 of the New York Stock Exchange, each fund is a separate
account and thus the funds as a group ordinarily cannot make a joint purchase or
sale of the same stock. 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 12,410 (1969). But see
note 156 infra. Although the rule requires that the commission be figured separately
on each fund's daily purchases (or sales), it does not prevent traders from allocating
their total daily purchases or sales among a number of funds. The trader will tell
the broker who is executing the order that, for example, it is being made on behalf
of Funds A, B, and C. At the end of the day, the trader, after figuring how many
shares should go to each of the funds, will call back the broker to tell him how
many shares should be included on each fund's order slip.
155 Executions in one complex normally are allocated pro rata in accordance
with the relative size of each fund's authorization, but when a portfolio manager or
analyst working for a specific fund has recommended a security after having con-
ducted extensive investigation, his fund is given preference in purchasing up to 1%
of fund assets, with the other funds following as a group.
156 The nonaffiliated directors might want to explore the possibility of creating
a broker-dealer subsidiary, either of the adviser or of the funds, for the purpose of
purchasing stock on behalf of all the funds in the group. So long as the purchase,
confirmation, and delivery are made for only one account and the shares then
allocated by the broker-dealer among the funds, the funds would be able to pay the
discounted commission on all shares except the first one thousand. If the new,
proposed minimum commissions rates are adopted, the savings will be even more
substantial because of the steep reduction in commissions for very large orders.
The broker-dealer need be only a shell, neither a member of a stock exchange nor
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). It need only
satisfy the SEC capital requirements. By creating such a broker-dealer subsidiary
for the purpose of bunching orders, an adviser would be able to do for their funds
what the banks have long been doing for their trust accounts. See American Stock
Exchange Information Circular No. 210 (Nov. 13, 1968) ; New York Stock Exchange
Member Firm Educational Circular No. 249 (Nov. 27, 1968).
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Funds A and B each authorize the purchase of four thousand shares
of Company Z and the trader can accumulate only four thousand shares
a day, each fund, under the formula, will receive two thousand shares
the first day, and two thousand shares the second. If Company Z's
stock is selling at $30 a share, this means that each fund will pay $340
commission for the first thousand shares it purchases each day and
$180 commission on the second thousand.' Each fund will pay a
total commission, therefore, of $1040 for its four thousand shares.
If, on the other hand, Fund A were to buy all four thousand of its
shares on the first day and Fund B all four thousand of its shares on
the second day, each fund would pay a commission of $340 plus $540
($180 + $180 + $180) or $880-a savings of $160.
The prospect of securing such savings has led some advisers to
reconsider their use of a formula allocating executions on the basis of
the funds' respective authorizations. At least one adviser is considering
the feasibility of replacing the formula with an arrangement permitting
only one fund to be in the market during a single day. Fund A would
buy (or sell) on the first day, Fund B would buy (or sell) on the
second, and so forth. The sequence would be prearranged and the
opportunity to go first rotated among the funds. Under one formula-
tion of this plan, if Fund A authorizes six thousand shares and Fund B
six thousand, and Fund A is able to purchase four thousand shares on
the first day, Fund B would then have the opportunity to purchase at
least four thousand shares, even if this requires that Fund B make
purchases on days two and three. If Fund B has purchased four
thousand shares by the end of day three, Fund A would begin buying
again on day four and so forth.
Whether the nonaffiliated directors select a formula based on the
relative size of authorizations, a plan of sequential purchases, or another
method of allocating executions may well depend on factors peculiar to
their complex. The nonaffiliated directors might consider, for example,
whether the adviser ordinarily is able to deal with allocation problems
through block purchases (or sales) in the third or fourth markets."'
This might depend on the type of stock usually requiring allocation,
the size of typical authorizations, and the adviser's attitude toward non-
stock exchange transactions. The nonaffiliated directors might also
consider whether brokerage commissions are being recaptured for the
funds.159 If they are, the cost of a pro rata formula in terms of extra
commission dollars may be greatly reduced.
1
5 7 See 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GuiDE 1,702, at 2,381.14 for the formulas
for determining the minimum commission rate.
158 Sce notes 170-71 infra.
159 See text accompanying notes 175, 198-208 infra.
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If their fund is not served by a portfolio manager, the nonaffiliated
directors may themselves have to insure that their fund has had the
opportunity to invest in those companies with too few shares in the
public float to be purchased by more than one fund in the complex. A
formula, such as the one adopted for allocating executions, will not be
helpful here because a formula cannot take into account fund objectives,
liquidity, and other factors relating to the character of the fund's
portfolio.
To safeguard their fund's interests, the nonaffiliated directors
might use a chart listing all the issues in which the funds in the group
have made significant transactions during the last month and over the
last three-month period. 6 From such a chart the directors could
readily determine the investments in which the fund had not par-
ticipated and could begin voicing their concern if over a period of time
all of the most attractive investments appeared to be going to funds
in which the adviser's self-interest seemed to be stronger. In many
complexes the directors review the fund's portfolio transactions every
month,' 61 and where the funds have common boards, they are already
scrutinizing the investments made by all the funds in the complex. But
such a chart would not be overly burdensome even for directors who
sit on a single fund board because their principal job, at least until their
suspicions were aroused, 1 6 would be to detect patterns of purchases,
not to scrutinize particular transactions.
160 In a complex consisting of several funds with identical directorates, informa-
tion on the portfolio transactions of all funds will automatically be available to all
the directors. But if each fund has different directors or a complex also includes
investment counseling accounts, information on the portfolio transactions of all the
funds and accounts ordinarily will be unavailable to the directors of any one fund.
Sevr.ieless, it an adviser places itself in a position of possible self-dealing, it
has no right to refuse such information to a director who needs it to prevent possible
prejudice to his fund. Disclosure to a limited number of individuals does not amount
to a recognizable invasion of the funds' or accounts' right of privacy. Cf. W. PRossER,
LAW OF TORTS 835 (3d ed. 1964). Moreover, disclosure would not seem to violate
any confidential relationship existing between the adviser and his advisees. Physicians,
whose confidential relationship with their patients is well established, may disclose
confidential information if necessary to protect third persons. See Berry v. Moench,
8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P2d 814 (1958); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177
N.W. 831 (1920). See generally Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy,
43 MINN. L. REv. 943 (1959). An analogy can be made to investment advisers
when disclosure is needed to protect the interest of a fund. "An occasion is con-
ditionally privileged when the circumstances induce a . . . reasonable belief that
(a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently important interest of . . . a third per-
son . . . ." RESTATEMFENT OF TORTS §595(1) (1938). The Comment to this
section suggests that such interests include "lawful business, professional, property
or other pecuniary interest."
161 Prior to the monthly meetings of the boards of directors of the Union Service
funds, each director receives a written report on executive committee authorizations
of purchases and sales of securities for that month and on all completed purchases
and sales. At the meeting the fund's portfolio supervisor discusses business prospects
of various companies and the reasons particular companies were bought or sold.
162 As Mr. Jusice Holmes stated in Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529 (1920):
"Some animals must have given at least one exhibition of dangerous propensities
before the owner can be held." But when "hints and warnings" have been given,
the directors' suspicions should be aroused. One signal might be significantly lower
risk-adjusted performance compared to other funds in the group.
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As the number of funds in a complex increases, however, such a
chart will become less helpful, and it may become valueless in com-
plexes consisting of several funds and a large number of discretionary
accounts. In such cases the chart might include so many companies
as to be meaningless when accorded the relatively superficial analysis
which can reasonably be expected of the nonaffiliated directors. More-
over, in such complexes, a formula or prearranged plan for allocating
executions may be impractical because of the very large number of
accounts. 6 Fortunately, the risk of self-dealing in such complexes,
at least from the funds' standpoint, is reduced by the fact that an
adviser's self-interest in its mutual funds is ordinarily greater than in
any one discretionary account."" Moreover, in some complexes the
investment counseling division is completely isolated from the fund
management division. Finally, the need for the nonaffiliated directors
to detect a misallocation of investment opportunities (but not to adopt
a formula for allocating executions) is eliminated in many of the
larger complexes because the funds and accounts in such complexes
usually are managed by portfolio managers who represent their interest
in a conflict situation."" If, however, the nonaffiliated directors find
it necessary to conduct their own review, they might single out a
manageable number of competing funds or accounts from those posing
the greatest threat of adviser self-dealing and make spot checks of
allocations of opportunities and executions between those funds and
accounts and their fund.
III. ASSIGNMENT OF BROKERAGE
An analysis similar to that used to examine an adviser's duties in
managing fund portfolios may be used to examine its duties towards
163 See INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 111, at 332 (remarks
of Leonard M. Leiman). At least one broker-dealer has worked out with the SEC
and the New York Stock Exchange a procedure "to permit an allocation among a
group of customers that wish to buy the same kind of securities." Id. 332-33 (remarks
of George A. Blackstone).
In addition to using a formula to allocate purchases or sales of a stock which
more than one fund or investment counseling account has authorized, Scudder, Stevens
& Clark has a special committee which convenes specifically to identify any other
salient factors which should be considered in the course of the allocation procedure.
164 The Wharton School and the SEC staff have concluded in separate studies
that serving as a mutual fund investment adviser is generally more profitable than
providing like services to investment advisory clients. WHARTON REPORT, Supra note
12, at 495-96; SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 120-21. Investment counseling accounts,
unlike mutual funds, are prohibited from paying an adviser an incentive fee unless
the adviser fits into one of the exemptions allowed by the Investment Adviser's Act.
The most important of these applies to advisers who have less than 15 clients and
do not hold themselves out generally to the public. Investment Adviser's Act §§ 205,
203(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5, 80b-3(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
165 See generally INSTITUTE ON SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION, supra note 111, at 326-28
(remarks of Leonard M. Leiman).
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all fund assets; for example, fund names 166 and brokerage generated
by fund portfolio transactions. Discussion here will be limited to
fund brokerage.' 67
In supervising orders to buy and sell a fund's securities, an adviser
has a fiduciary duty to direct executions "in such a manner that the
result for the [fund is] most favorable under the circumstances." 168
That is, the adviser must seek "best executions." 169 Several factors
should enter the adviser's business judgment on what constitutes the
best execution of a specific trade. The most important is the average
price per share. The adviser must seek the highest average price for
shares the fund is selling and the lowest average price for shares the
fund is buying. But the average price per share does not alone deter-
mine the price paid or received in a transaction. The commission
which must be paid in making the trade also enters into a calculation
of the price. For example, a purchase (or sale) in the third 170 or
fourth market 171 at a price per share slightly less favorable than the
price on the New York Stock Exchange may nonetheless represent the
"best execution" if such trades are made on a net basis or involve the
payment of a sufficiently lower commission than the New York Stock
Exchange minimum commission. The speed with which a broker can
dispose of a large block is also important. An adviser may find it
essential to liquidate a holding immediately, even at a price below the
current market price, because it expects the price to plummet in the
near future, or because it needs the cash to make other investments or
to meet redemptions. Moreover, even if an adviser can get a better
price elsewhere, it may still elect, in some circumstances, to pay a
broker a higher price because of the superior service the broker pro-
vides. An exceptionally speedy confirmation, for example, may be
166 See Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963); SEC
Investment Co. Act Release No. 5510 (Oct. 8, 1968), in 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,619.
167 See generally Commissions and Service Charges, N.Y. Stock Exch. Const.
art. XV, §§ 1-12, in 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE f[ 1,701-12 (1970).
168 Consumer-Investor Planning Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8542 (Feb. 20, 1969), in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 77,677. See also Hubshman Management Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8557 (Mar. 20, 1969), in 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 177,678.
169See Delaware Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8128 (July 19, 1967), discussed in Fleischer, Regulation, INST. INv., Dec. 1967, at 14.
170 In addition to being traded on the exchanges, many listed securities can be
bought and sold in a specialized segment of the over-the-counter market commonly
called the "third market." SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 159-61.
171 When institutional buyers and sellers deal directly with one another, their
trading is referred to as the "fourth market." Brokerage commissions are not paid
in such transactions. Id. 161; A One-Man Stock Market, FORBES, Mar. 1, 1970,
at 70-71.
The funds in a complex may also save brokerage commissions by selling stock
directly to one another in compliance with the procedures described in Investment
Company Act rule 17a-7, in 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 148,367 (1969).
[Voi.119:205
MUTUAL FUND COMPLEXES
very important if the adviser is attempting, by a series of transactions,
to dispose rapidly of a large block.
172
The many considerations entering into the question of "best ex-
ecution" make the trader's task difficult. The difficulty is compounded
by the devices currently available for recapturing in cash or valuable
services at least part of the commission payable on a trade. The
adviser must consider not only the price per share and the commission
payable but also the possibility of recovering in the future part of the
commission paid today.173  Since the abolition of "giveups," ' advisers
have used two principal devices for recovering commissions. The
first is a brokerage subsidiary, either of the adviser or of the funds,
with a membership on a regional stock exchange. 75  By routing its
transactions through such a subsidiary and by participating in its
profits, a fund can receive what in effect is a cash rebate of a portion
of the commissions it has paid the subsidiary. The second and more
172 The secrecy with which a broker can execute a trade may also be important.
See note 96 supra. See also A One Man Stock Market, spra note 171, at 71
(secrecy in handling orders important to development of fourth market). To avoid
risking disclosure that it is purchasing or liquidating the stock of certain companies,
Union Service sometimes uses a number of different brokers to execute the total
order. At least one commentator has expressed skepticism over the ability of an
adviser to keep its transactions secret. MUTUAL FUNDS 136 (PLI 1970) (remarks
of Eugene Rotberg).
173 The opportunity for a fund to recover part of the value of its brokerage
commissions has led some commentators to refer to brokerage as an "asset" of the
fund. E.g., Butowsky, Mutual Fund Brokerage, 3 REV. OF SEC. REG. 915 (May 20,
1970): "The ability of investment companies to direct transactions to particular
brokers or dealers is a valuable asset of the investment company . . . ." See also
Fleischer, supra note 169, at 13.
In Kurach v. Weissman, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1f 92,607 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1970), defendants, in settlement of a shareholder's claim,
proposed that the net profits derived from the fund's principal underwriter (a sub-
sidiary of the adviser) on fund portfolio transactions be credited against the
management fees payable by the fund to the adviser. The SEC urged the court to
reject this proposed settlement on the grounds that it was illusory and "offered no
benefits to Fund shareholders which they were not in any event entitled to receive."
Id. at 98,724. The court rejected the SEC's argument and approved the settlement,
reasoning that the settlement was of value to the funds because a broker affiliated
with an adviser is not legally obligated to turn over its commissions on fund portfolio
transactions to the funds. It has been suggested, however, that the court never
ruled that brokerage was not a fund asset. See 46 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. X-5
(1970) (remarks of Meyer Eisenberg before PLI program on "The Institutional
Investor," Apr. 10, 1970).
174 New York Stock Exchange Const. art. XV, § 8, in 2 CCH N.Y. STOcK
ExcH. GUIDE 1" 1,708 (1970). See generally Rottenberg, supra note 140, at 314 n27.
175 See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 109-10, 172-73. See also Investors Stock
Fund, Inc., Prospectus 4 (Jan. 13, 1969):
An amount equal to any net profit . . . which IDSS (the IDS brokerage
subsidiary) may realize from transactions attributable to the Fund, is credited
to the Fund as a reduction of the amounts otherwise due to Investors Diversi-
fied Services, Inc. under the investment advisory and services agreement
between it and the Fund.
The prospectus does not indicate what would happen if IDSS were to incur a
loss. Presumably, IDS would bear such a loss since the prospectus indicates that
the fund is to participate only in "net profits," not net profits or losses. See also
Conference, supra note 54, at 832-33 (remarks of Robert M. Loeffler) ; MUTUAL
FUNDS 114-23 (PLI 1970) (remarks of Robert M. Loeffler).
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common recovery technique is for the adviser to place portfolio business
with brokers who furnish services such as investment research "' or
who sell fund shares. 1 7  Commonly known as "reciprocal business,"
this technique recovers for the funds a "benefit" which is not quantifi-
able and may in some cases be of questionable value."'
When deciding which-if either-of these devices to use, the
adviser must consider certain provisions of the Investment Company
Act, common law fiduciary duties, and business practicality.
A. Statutory Considerations
It has been suggested that the benefits the adviser derives from
reciprocal business may be a form of compensation which, under section
15(a) (1) of the Investment Company Act," 9 must be precisely de-
scribed in the investment advisory contract.' 80 Perhaps to protect
themselves from such an interpretation of section 15(a) (1), some
advisers have included in their funds' prospectuses a statement that
the adviser uses reciprocal business but that a "dollar value" cannot be
placed on the benefits obtained and that they do "not tend to reduce the
adviser's over-all expenses." 11 Other advisers admit that outside
research "may tend to reduce [the adviser's] cost," but go on to say
that the dollar value "is indeterminable," that it "may in fact be
negligible," and, apparently contradicting their earlier statement, that
it "does not tend to reduce [the adviser's] normal and customary
research activities." 182
Evidently advisers believe that if their costs are not reduced, the
benefits obtained through the use of reciprocal business are not a form
176 Almost every adviser uses brokerage to reward brokers who have provided
the adviser with investment research. SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 163-64. One
exception, however, is Bear, Stearns & Co., a New York Stock Exchange firm.
It has created an investment advisory unit which proposes to compensate other
brokerage firms with cash rather than brokerage orders. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the unit will rely heavily on Bear, Stearns research, and brokerage
which does not go to other brokers will presumably continue to go to Bear, Stearns.
177 A few advisers such as IDS have captive sales forces and thus have no need
to use brokerage to promote sales of fund shares. Among dealer-distributed mutual
funds, however, the practice seems to be almost universal. SEC REPORT, supra note 2,
at 164-67; Bogle, supra note 9, at 913. Other services purchased with fund brokerage
include wire and teletype services and pricing of portfolio securities. SEC REPORT,
supra note 2, at 164.
178See text accompanying notes 211-15 infra. Although it may be difficult to
place a dollar value on outside research or sales of fund shares, some of the services
which may be obtained with brokerage do have clearly defined values. Thus, the
cost of a new Arthur Lipper service is advertised as being $5,000 in cash or $10,000
in brokerage commissions. Numbers Gane, FoRBEs, Dec. 15, 1969, at 73.
For an interesting article on the practices of banks with respect to reciprocal
business, see Fiske, How Banks Pass Out Commissiois, INST. INv., Dec. 1969, at 29.
179 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1) (1964).
1s0 See, e.g., Bogle, supra note 9, at 914.
181 E.g., United Vanguard Fund Inc., Prospectus 8 (Oct. 20, 1969).
182 E.g., Allstate Enterprises Stock Fund, Inc., Prospectus 14 (Jan. 2, 1970).
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of compensation and need not be precisely described in the advisory
contract. Perhaps the key to the factual issue they raise lies in the
carefully hedged language of some prospectuses that reciprocal practices
do not "materially" reduce the adviser's costs."8 3 Section 15(a) (1)
would seem to require that any reduction be precisely described.
The solution to this problem may simply be to include in the
advisory contract a statement that, in addition to the management fee,
the adviser receives as compensation benefits obtained through re-
ciprocal business. Advisers, however, may be reluctant to acknowledge
that reciprocal business is a form of compensation because it would
then enter into the calculation of the fee's reasonableness. Moreover,
such an acknowledgement in the advisory contract might not be suffi-
ciently precise to satisfy the statutory requirement. The value, in the
words of many advisers, is "indeterminable," and there is no accurate
way of knowing how much reciprocal business will be available in the
coming year. Nevertheless, the management fee depends on a number
of other unpredictable factors, including the fund's net asset value and,
in the case of incentive fees, portfolio performance. Thus, drawing an
analogy to the management fee, it would seem that an adviser could
discharge its obligation under section 15(a) (1) by including an ap-
propriately drafted clause in the advisory contract.
A recent case, however, suggests that no statement relating to
reciprocal practices need be included in the advisory contract. In
Moses v. Burgin, Judge Wyzanski found that outside research obtained
with fund brokerage was not compensation within the meaning of
section 15(a) (1) because the research was given to the adviser for
the fund's benefit.'8 4  The fund had no obligation to secure outside
research for the adviser and any benefit which the adviser received was,
in the judge's opinion, purely incidental to the primary purpose of
benefiting the fund. But Judge Wyzanski's view of fund brokerage
fails to appreciate the reality of the situation. The adviser controls
the purchase of research with brokerage commissions and in many
cases would have to supplement the services it provides the funds were
183 E.g., The Gibraltar Growth Fund, Inc., Prospectus 13 (June 2, 1969). Mr.
Bogle has acknowledged that services obtained with reciprocal business may be of
value to the adviser:
Brokerage commissions generated by portfolio transactions-like management
fees and sales revenues-must be counted in assessing the total resources
available to the management company in carrying out its responsibilities for
management, distribution, and administration. The value of commissions as
a resource is demonstrated by management companies that act as brokers
for their fund portfolio transactions, and particularly by one company, which
for 40 years has been managing a fund group at cost in return for receiving
substantially all of the fund brokerage commissions.
Bogle, supra note 9, at 912.
184 Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
192,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970).
1970]
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it not for the outside research it obtains. 8a Indeed, one might imply
from the prior practice of the parties that the adviser has the right to
use fund brokerage to obtain research. Apparently in response to this
argument, Judge Wyzanski noted that when giveups to the adviser
were discontinued "no one supposed that an implied condition of the
advisory contract had been broken .... " 1S6 But his argument
ignores the fact that the adviser continued to receive outside research
from brokers with which it placed business directly. Even after giveups
were prohibited, 187 complexes were able to obtain research from
brokerage houses by placing portfolio business directly with them.
Perhaps the need to describe reciprocal business as compensation
under section 15 (a) (1) should turn on the possibility of recovering the
value of the brokerage commissions for the fund shareholders. Be-
cause the purpose of section 15(a) (1) is to notify shareholders of the
cost to them of investment management, it seems unreasonable to re-
quire advisers to describe reciprocal business as compensation if the
brokerage involved would otherwise have no value to fund share-
holders. If, on the other hand, the brokerage might be recaptured, it
does have a dollar value to fund shareholders and consequently should
be described as advisory compensation when used to obtain services
which reduce the adviser's expenses.' 8
A second challenge to reciprocal business stems from a recently
suggested interpretation 189 of section 17(e) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940.190 Section 17(e) prohibits advisers from receiving
any compensation for the purchase or sale of fund portfolio securities
except "usual and customary broker's commission[s]" in the course
of the adviser's business as a broker. The section is basically an "anti-
kickback provision." 9' It prohibits an adviser from being paid by a
broker for the opportunity to handle portfolio transactions. But it
185 Compare note 80 sipra, with note 81 supra.
186 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,747, at 99,271.
187 See note 174 supra.
188 What must be described under § 15(a) (1) may not be identical with what
the nonaffiliated directors should consider when negotiating the management fee.
For example, if a fund might recover in cash 20% of the value of its brokerage
commissions through a brokerage subsidiary, it must disclose any arrangement by
which it furnishes the adviser a certain amount of brokerage for use in obtaining
outside research or in rewarding sales of fund shares. If a brokerage subsidiary is
not created, the value to the adviser of reciprocal business, according to the view
suggested above, need not be disclosed. Nevertheless, the nonaffiliated directors
should consider this value when negotiating the fee. Moreover, they should consider
the value of the brokerage to be not the 20% in commissions which the fund might
have recovered from a brokerage subsidiary, but, for example, the 50% which it is
worth to the adviser as reciprocal business.
189 Butowsky, supra note 173, at 915.
190 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1964).
191 Butowsky, mipra note 173, at 915.
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does not prohibit an adviser from handling fund portfolio transactions
itself, charging normal commissions in the course of its "full-scale
.brokerage business." 192
The problems posed by section 17(e) for reciprocal business arise
in the area between these two extremes. 9" The specific problem relat-
ing to fund complexes is whether the prohibition of section 17(e)
extends, as has been suggested, to the use of brokerage as a reward
for sales of fund shares. To the extent that such sales benefit the
adviser and not the funds by increasing the fund's net asset value and
hence the total advisory fee, 194 they are arguably a form of kickback
for placing portfolio business with a broker, and as such are statu-
torily prohibited. 9 ' The difficulty with this theory is that it prevents
the fund directors from deciding how the brokerage should be used 19_.
despite the fact that this decision involves considerations which are by
no means clear cut. Because fund directors are in a better position
than the courts to judge whether the sales promoted with fund broker-
age do in fact benefit the fund, they should be able to do so without fear
that the courts will second-guess them by ruling that their decision was
statutorily prohibited under section 17 (e).
Nevertheless, if section 17(e) should be found to extend to re-
ciprocal business, then adviser's duties in assigning brokerage as a
reward for sales of fund shares require no further examination. An
adviser may not do so, and even a contractual provision assented to by
a fund's board of directors and shareholders would be ineffective in
overriding the statutory proscription.'97
B. Fiduciary Duties
Assuming that reciprocal business is not statutorily prohibited,
under what circumstances may the adviser use reciprocal business and
when do its fiduciary duties indicate that it should recapture for the
funds a portion of the commissions generated by fund portfolio trans-
actions ?
If an adviser is already a member of a regional exchange, it may,
under exchange rules, credit the value of brokerage commissions re-
192 West, Mutual Fund Brokerage, 3 REv. OF SEC. REG. 903 (June 19, 1970).
193 Id. 904.
194 See generally text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
195 Butowsky, supra note 173, at 919.
196 See West, supra note 192, at 904.
197 In Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
192,747, at 99,269-70 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970), Judge Wyzanski ruled that the
directors as a matter of business judgment could approve the use of giveups-
redounding to the benefit of the funds rather than to the adviser-to encourage sales
of fund shares. Thus, he obviously assumed that such a decision was not statutorily
prohibited. However, plaintiff in that case did not allege that § 17(e) had been
violated.
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ceived from the funds against the management fee paid by the funds.'
Such a credit would insure that the funds pay and the adviser receive
the exact amount of compensation deemed appropriate in the advisory
contract. Nevertheless, there is no legal requirement that the com-
missions received by an affiliated broker be credited against the ad-
viser's fee.' 99 As an alternative, the nonaffiliated directors can consider
the value of the commissions retained by the adviser as part of the
adviser's compensation for managing the funds and adjust the formula
for determining the fee accordingly."'
When an adviser is not a broker-dealer member of an exchange,
the only means of recapturing brokerage commissions for the Funds in
cash (as opposed to services such as outside research) is through
a brokerage-subsidiary, either of the funds or of the adviser, with a
membership on a stock exchange. The New York Stock Exchange
prohibits such subsidiaries but several regional stock exchanges handling
transactions in New York Stock Exchange listed stocks do not. If the
198 A New York Stock Exchange interpretation ("Rule" 440A), 2 CCH N.Y.
STOCK EXCH. GUIDE ff 2,440 (1969), allows a member firm to reduce the fee it
charges for "statistical and investment advisory services" by the amount of brokerage
it receives from the customer. If sufficient brokerage is generated, the fee may be
reduced to zero, as indeed it is for many of the large porttolios managed by member
firms. Testimony of Mr. Bishop, vice president New York Stock Exchange, quoted
in Plaintiff's Reply After Trial at 23. Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 192,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970). Under similar rules
on the Pacific Coast and the Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington Stock Exchanges,
IDS and a number of other advisers credit the profits or a share of the profits
earned by brokerage-subsidiaries on fund portfolio business against the advisory fees
payable by the funds. Nevertheless, Judge Wyzanski in Moses v. Burgin concluded
that rule 440A permits a credit for only "that miniscule portion of the advisory fee
which covered publications such as investment letters, loose-leaf and like investment
services, and the conventional statistical information stockbrokers give customers in
return for their business." Id. at 99,258. It does not permit "a credit against that
part of the advisory fee which represented research in deph or which represented
managerial advice beyond what brokers customarily give customers." Id. This
conclusion seems insupportable in light of the practice of New York Stock Exchange
member firms in providing sophisticated investment management services and other
services including assistance in the preparation of income tax reports in return for
the brokerage commissions generated by very large investment accounts. Even
accepting defendant's explanation that rule 440A does not allow a rebate but a
credit against the cost of advisory services which the customer already has paid
as part of his brokerage commissions, Trial Brief of Defendants at 64, Moses v.
Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,747 (D. Mass.
Aug. 18, 1970), it is hard to see why the large commissions generated by large
accounts do not have a large enough research component to command high-priced,
in-depth research services. Judge Wyzanski's reading of rule 440A would force the
funds to pay for such research twice, with the advisory fee and with their brokerage
commissions, although rule 440A according to defendants allows a "refund for invest-
ment advice for which the customer has already paid an advisory fee." Id. 65; see
SRLR Comment, 69 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-1, A-2 to 3 (1970).
The Seventh Circuit in Thill Securities Corp. v. NYSE, ['969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,756 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1970), has remanded
to the district court for consideration on the merits the question whether the anti-
rebate rules violate the antitrust laws. Both Moses and Thill are discussed at length
in Analysis, 69 BNA SEc. REaG. & L. REP. B-1 (1910).
199 See Kurach v. Weissman, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
RaP. 1 92,607 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1970), discussed at note 173 supra.
200 See MUTUAL FUNDS 152-53 (PLI 1970) (remarks of Robert M. Loeffler).
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broker-dealer subsidiary is owned by the funds, they can participate
directly in its profits; if owned by the adviser, the adviser can keep the
profits and credit their value against the management fee.
The SEC has taken the position that the decision to create a sub-
sidiary belongs to the "best business judgment" of management, which
the SEC defines to include both the adviser and the fund's directors.
20 1
Although the SEC has not spelled out the factors which should enter
into this judgment, one of the most important is the cost of maintaining
a member broker on a regional exchange. Curiously, concrete cost
data has not emerged from discussions concerning the virtues of creating
a broker-subsidiary; 202 but for large complexes which already maintain
rather elaborate trading departments, the additional cost, spread over
the transactions of all the funds in the group, would not seem to be
excessive compared with the savings in commission dollars such a
subsidiary might be expected to produce.2 3  Perhaps this is why ad-
visers have offered other reasons for not creating broker-subsidiaries.
The president of one adviser has suggested, for example, that insti-
tutional membership may involve "substantial financial liabilities," and
that it may impair the liquidity of the central market place, which he
sees as crucial to the ability of mutual funds to buy and sell large
quantities of stock and to value precisely the securities in their port-
folios. 204 Advisers also claim that a broker-dealer subsidiary may
provide poorer executions and distract the adviser from its primary
function of investment management.
Whether such considerations are in themselves adequate to justify
an adviser's decision not to create a broker-subsidiary 205 is a matter of
some dispute. The assumption that the interests of institutional in-
vestors are best served by the New York Stock Exchange version
201 Letter of SEC General Counsel Philip A. Loomis, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8746 (Nov. 10, 1969).
202 See generally MUTUAL FUNDS 114-23, 129-69 (PLI 1970).
203 Robert Loeffler, vice president-law of IDS, does not believe that the costs
of IDSS, IDS's brokerage subsidiary, are so high that a $1 or $2 billion complex
could not afford to create such a subsidiary and still enjoy substantial savings. He
asserts that many of the expenses of IDSS are directly related to volume and that
a smaller complex with one-quarter the volume of IDS might incur only one-half
the expenses. For the most part IDSS performs the same function as was previously
performed by IDS's central trading department and the additional costs are primarily
costs of accounting and other paper work. He estimates that total expenses do not
exceed 25% of IDSS's gross income.
204 Bogle, supra note 9, at 914. See also John C. Bogle, Mutual Funds-New
Challenges, Old Myths, Keynote Speech Before the 21st Annual International Mutual
Fund Dealers Conference, Sept. 15, 1969, summarized in 16 BNA SEc. REG. & L.
REP. A-11 (1969); Stein, A Fund Man Rejects NYSE Membership, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 15, 1970, at 18, col. 4.
205 Professor Mundheim reads General Counsel Loomis' letter, supra note 201,
as placing the burden on management to explain why creation of a brokerage sub-
sidiary is not in the funds' interest. MUTUAL FUNDS 167-68 (PLI 1970) (remarks
of Robert H. Mundheim).
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of the central auction market has been subjected to serious criticism. 0 6
In addition, the trading departments of many of the larger complexes
already have the technical and physical facilities required of a member
firm.
Because the adviser may lose some of the benefits of reciprocal
business if it creates a broker-subsidiary,20 7 it has a conflict of interest
when making that decision. 08 Consequently, the nonaffiliated directors,
who presumably do not have such a conflict of interest, have an im-
portant role to play weighing the merits of creating such a subsidiary
in light of the particular circumstances of their fund.
When a broker-subsidiary is created, it reduces the commissions
the adviser can use for reciprocal business. Although advisers may
argue that in some cases the services obtained from broker-dealers in
return for brokerage are worth more than the commission dollars which
might have been recaptured, they will have difficulty showing that re-
search and sales, services of nonquantifiable value, are worth more to
the fund than hard cash. There may be situations, however, when
considerations of best execution will justify the trader in placing trans-
actions with brokers who provide outside research or sell fund shares.
If a broker-subsidiary is not created, the adviser is no longer
dealing in cash equivalents and thus has considerably more leeway in
assigning brokerage. But the adviser should not have unbridled dis-
cretion. As in the case of the adviser's management of fund portfolios,
the nonaffiliated directors should assume the responsibility for seeing
that the fund's brokerage is used in a way which most benefits the
fund.
C. Pooling Brokerage
1. Brokerage as a Reward for Research
Most advisers make no effort to segregate by fund the brokerage
they use to reward ouside research.20 9 In many complexes, requests for
"reward" brokerage may come from anywhere in the investment man-
agement division, and usually do not specify a particular fund as bene-
2 0 6 See letter from Donald E. Weeden, executive vice president, Weeden & Co.,
to the SEC, Dec. 19, 1969, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School (comments of Weeden & Co. in response to Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8791 (Dec. 31, 1969)) ; MUTUAL FUNDS 143-45 (PLI 1970) (remarks of
Eugene Rotberg & Donald Schwartz).
207 The services obtained with reciprocal business are generally not considered
to be a rebate. See Moses v. Burgin, 11969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac.
L. REP. 92,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970).
20 8 See MUTUAL FUNDS 165-67 (PLI 1970) (remarks of Donald Schwartz).
209 E.g., Scudder, Stevens & Clark Common Stock Fund, Inc., Prospectus 5
(Apr. 18, 1969):
[I]t is the practice to place . . . brokerage business with brokers and
dealers who supply supplementary research and statistical information to the
firm of Investment Counsel for the Fund . ...
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ficiary of the research. 10 Thus, the trader may place portfolio business
with a broker without even knowing which fund the broker has
benefited.
Traders explain that by pooling brokerage they eliminate time-
consuming paperwork and have a better chance to reward brokers
quickly and with the appropriate amount of brokerage. The larger
pool of brokerage enhances their ability to find a transaction which they
can trust the broker to handle and which generates the desired amount
of commissions. In addition, advisers suggest that the fund or funds
which a particular piece of research has benefited frequently cannot be
identified. Such research may keep a fund from making a trade or
may prove helpful only at some future date. More important, outside
research usually supplements in-house research and seldom is of direct
benefit to any one fund.21
Thus, advisers have good business reasons for pooling the broker-
age they use as a reward for outside research. Under most circum-
stances these reasons should be sufficient to convince the nonaffiliated
directors that it is in their fund's interest to pool its brokerage with
that of the other funds.2"2 But if the adviser relies heavily upon
outside research and individuals working for particular funds have
the power to assign brokerage,218 the nonaffiliated directors of funds
in which the adviser's self-interest is relatively small should scrutinize
the assignment of brokerage more carefully. They might first speak
to the fund's analysts and portfolio manager to determine whether
they have been assigning all the brokerage they think the fund needs..2 14
If they have, the fund, by pooling its brokerage, is not losing out on
any outside research which it otherwise might have used. At the
210 In Wellington Management, for example, the brokerage request forms which
are used to request brokerage as a reward for research specify the broker-dealer to
receive the brokerage, the person at the broker-dealer who supplied the information,
the subject to which the information related, and the analyst or portfolio manager
in Wellington's investment management division who is making the request. The
slips do not specify which fund was benefited.
211 See generally text accompanying notes 80-86 supra. But see note 81 supra.
212See Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1192,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970).
213 This would seem to be the case with the funds in the Shareholders Manage-
ment group. Each portfolio manager has his own brokerage budget which he uses
in cultivating analysts who work for brokerage houses. The portfolio managers
rely heavily upon the research furnished by these outside analysts because Share-
holders Management has no in-house research department. See generally Mattlin,
supra note 12; notes 80, 133 supra.
214 In some complexes the portfolio managers and analysts have a great deal of
leeway in assigning brokerage and, for the most part, are able to utilize all the
brokerage they need for research purposes. More commonly, however, the portfolio
managers and analysts must limit themselves to a predetermined share of the
brokerage allowed to the investment management division. Though portfolio man-
agers vary widely in their desire to utilize such brokerage, at least one has com-
plained privately that he would like to be able to assign substantially more brokerage
to brokers who furnish information directly to him.
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worst, the fund is contributing brokerage worth more than the
research it is receiving-brokerage which otherwise might simply
have gone to waste. 15
But if the fund does have other uses for its brokerage,21 or if the
.portfolio manager and analysts have not been assigning all the broker-
age that they want,217 the nonaffiliated directors should determine how
their fund's brokerage budget compares with the amount of brokerage
which it has been contributing to the pool used to reward outside re-
search. 18 If the fund's budget is smaller than its contribution, the non-
affiliated directors have a firm basis for arguing for a larger budget.
2. Brokerage as a Reward for Sales
The nonaffiliated directors will have a more difficult task oversee-
ing the adviser's use of brokerage to reward sales of fund shares.
215 If, however, the nonaffiliated directors have not been completely satisfied with
the reasons the adviser has offered for not creating a broker-dealer subsidiary with
a seat on a regional exchange, see text accompanying notes 201-08 supra, they
might want to compare, as suggested below, the amount of brokerage the fund is
contributing to the pool used to reward outside research with the amount of brokerage
allowed to the portfolio manager and analysts working directly for the fund. By
determining whether the fund is contributing more brokerage than is assigned for
its benefit, see note 218 infra, they can get a better idea of what the fund is losing
by not creating a broker-subsidiary.
216 The fund, for example, might have reason to promote sales of its shares.
See generally text accompanying notes 220-24 infra.
217 See note 214 supra. One commentator has argued that mutual fund managers,
with a little imagination, could utilize considerably more brokerage than they are
now in securing helpful outside research. They might, for example, enlist the aid
of outside analysts in monitoring each of the stocks held in the fund's portfolio.
Ellis, Is "Recip" Smart Money?, INST. INv., Dec. 1969, at 38, 102. But see note 80
supra.
218 If brokerage is assigned both by analysts doing collective research and by
persons working for particular funds, the comparison is a little more difficult. The
nonaffiliated directors should compare the amount of brokerage allowed to their fund
with the amount of brokerage their fund has contributed to the pool multiplied by
the percentage of total brokerage which has not been assigned by analysts doing
collective research. To put it in actual figures, assume that Fund A has contributed
60 to the brokerage pool, Fund B 40. Fund A's staff is allowed to assign 30, Fund
B's 10, and the remaining 60 is assigned by analysts doing collective research. Thus,
100-60
Fund A is contributing 60 X or 24 and has a budget of 30 for its own
100
100-60
research. Fund B is contributing 40 X or 16 and has a budget of only
100
10. It should be remembered, however, that as the amount of brokerage assigned
by collective research increases, the need for doing such calculations decreases because
collective research, unlike research done for particular funds, presumably benefits all
the funds equally. In 1969 over 60% of the brokerage allowed to Wellington Man-
agement's investment management division was assigned for collective research. Any
danger of prejudice to particular funds was reduced still further by the fact that
some of the brokerage budgeted to particular funds may have been used for primary
coverage or monitoring by the funds' portfolio managers and analysts or may have
rewarded information which benefited all the funds equally after being shared at the
morning meeting. See generally note 89 supra.
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Unlike brokerage for research, which may improve portfolio perform-
ance and thus benefit both the adviser and the funds, brokerage for
sales may benefit only the adviser.
The benefit to the adviser is obvious. Because the formula used
to compute the management fee almost always relates in part to the
value of assets under management,219 an increase in assets produced by
improved sales almost always means an increase in the advisory fee.
The benefit to the funds is less readily apparent. Improved sales
may mean a reduction in the expense ratio as fixed costs are spread
over increased assets. 22 ' A steady inflow of new money may reduce
the risk that some securities will have to be sold prematurely in order
to meet redemptions221 and in some cases may promote better perform-
ance. 222 An increase in the adviser's compensation may also enable
it to hire more or better analysts and portfolio managers, thus en-
hancing its ability to do a good management job. 2 ' But whether
improved sales actually will produce meaningful benefits in any par-
ticular case is unclear. For a large fund and often for a large com-
plex, the benefit of additional reductions in the expense ratio or further
strengthening of the adviser may be of minimal value.2 4  Moreover,
the danger of a net outflow of cash has not been so great as to keep
2 19 See SEC REPORT, S.npra note 2, at 97-101.
220 Bogle, Portfolio Transactions and the SEC Report Arnalysis-Recommenda-
tions-Impact, in CONFERENCE ON MUTuAL FUNDS 75, 81 (P. Geerlings ed. 1967);
see SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 252-55.
2 2 1 Mr. Bogle has observed:
[D]espite the excellent record of an assumed investment of $10,000 in the
typical aggressive fund, the actual shareholder experience in most average
volatility funds has been far superior. Why? Because this latter group of
funds, with its steadier capital flow and more stable shareholder base, avoided
the pitfalls that come with extreme variations in performance ....
Bogle Address, supra note 7, at 5 (emphasis altered).
222 Robert L. Sprinkel and Richard E. Boesel, respectively, chairman and presi-
dent of Competitive Capital Fund, have tentatively concluded from a study they are
now conducting that cash flow can materially affect performance. They claim that
"if a fund has a positive or negative cash flow of 10 percent there is little effect on
its performance, but when you get up to a 30 percent positive cash flow, there is a
definite positive effect on performance." Fiske, supra note 133, at 46. But see text
accompanying notes 224-33 infra.
23 See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 252, 255; cf. CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL
FUNDS 69 (P. Geerlings ed. 1967) (remarks of Theodore Zimmerman). The benefits
of using reciprocal business to reward sales were summed up in one fund's proxy
statement in these words: "[T]his practice . . . may help to build the Fund or to
maintain it at a sufficient size to function economically and efficiently and to enable
the Fund to fulfill its continuing obligation to redeem its shares without necessarily
requiring it to sell portfolio securities." Ivest Fund, Inc., Proxy Statement 5 (Dec.
17, 1969).
2 The SEC has concluded:
Although the largest funds have lower operating expense ratios, lower port-
folio turnover rates and greater management resources, these funds have not
had superior performance as would be expected. . . . Accordingly, there is
no reason to believe that the shareholders of the largest funds would benefit
from further growth.
SEC REP OT, supra note 2, at 263. But see Conference, supra note 54, at 683-89
(remarks of William B. Moses, vice chairman, Massachusetts Investors Trust).
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advisers from creating funds which terminate sales to new share-
holders once they reach a certain size. 2 5
Indeed, in some circumstances sales of fund shares may be more
burden than benefit to a fund.226 Although the relationship between
performance and size is not fully understood and is a matter of some
debate,22 7 a number of portfolio managers have claimed that they can
do a better job on a smaller fund than on a larger.22 ' They cite the
difficulty larger funds may experience when acquiring a meaningful
position in certain stocks. Some investments must be ruled out
entirely22 9 and others must be made with great care so as not to
disturb the market price. 8 In addition, a portfolio manager has less
time to devote to each portfolio company as the number of different
holdings is increased. 1 This problem becomes especially acute if
225E.g, Polaris Fund, Inc., Prospectus 1 (July 30, 1969): "The management
of the Fund believes that attainment of its objective will be aided by limiting its
size. Accordingly, when total net assets of the Fund reached $100,000,000, the Fund
ceased selling to new shareholders." The argument that a continual cash inflow
promotes portfolio performance by assuring that portfolio decisions will be based on
informed investment management and not on an extraneous need for cash to fund
redemptions is viewed with skepticism in MUTUAL FUNDS 146-49 (PLI 1970).
226 See I. FRIEND, M. BLUME, & J. CROCKETT, supra note 123, at 31: "The
widespread use of brokerage business as a reward for selling fund shares is potentially
harmful to fund investors."
227 The SEC was unable to find any relation between fund size and performance.
See note 224 supra. However, it speculated:
Should the growth of the largest funds and fund complexes continue, these
funds might soon reach the point-relative to the size and conditions of the
markets and the economy-where their portfolio mobility would be so seriously
impaired as to affect gravely the interests of their shareholders. It is indeed
possible that the future investment experience of the largest funds, even if
their sizes were to continue near the present levels achieved only recently,
might be so affected.
SEC REPORT, supra note 2 at 263. This conclusion has not gone unchallenged.
See Conference, supra note 54, at 685-88 (remarks of William B. Moses) ; cf. Invest-
ing: The Case for Bigness, FORBES, May 15, 1970, at 190 (interview with Richard
A. M. C. Johnson, vice president Dreyfus Fund). The most recent and authoritative
study on the investment performance of mutual funds concluded that "there does not
seem to be any consistent relation between performance and size." I. FRIEND, lv.
BLUME, & J. CROCKETT, supra note 123, at 60.
228 The portfolio manager of one well-known fund has asserted that he could
do a better job on a $50 million portfolio than on the $300 million portfolio he is
managing. He has specifically requested that the adviser close sales of his fund to
new shareholders when the fund reaches $500 million.
2 29 See note 132 supra.
2380 See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 255-56. Nevertheless, improved facilities
for block trading have reduced the liquidity problem to some extent. Moreover,
where the problem does exist, it is not limited solely to larger funds. Smaller funds
have experienced similar problems when investing in certain over-the-counter and
even American Stock Exchange companies with unusually small public floats. Afuture
Fund, for example, invests the bulk of its assets in over-the-counter and American
Stock Exchange companies. Its positions in some of these companies are large
relative to the total number of shares available in the market. The capitalizations
are thin, the daily volume small, and for some of the over-the-counter companies
the market is not well-developed. Even Afuture avoids some investments when only
a few small houses are making a market in the stuok.
231 See, e.g., Mattlin, supra note 12, at 31:
Fletcher and Carr waited far too long to bring in new money managers for
a fund too big for two men . . . to run themselves. . . . Two of the five
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management, in an effort to keep a large inflow of new money from
diluting overall investment quality, increases the number of holdings
too rapidly. 32 Finally, too rapid an inflow of new money may have
an adverse effect on the efficiency with which shareholder accounts are
administered. 3
The full import of such problems is difficult to assess in the
context of a particular fund or complex. Moreover, advisers might
overcome investment management problems resulting from increased
size by dividing a fund's portfolio among several managers.2 4 In the
final analysis it often may be impossible to know whether sales benefit
or burden a fund.
Nevertheless, the nonaffiliated directors should recognize that the
interests of their fund and the advisers may diverge over sales of the
men now running Enterprise . . . were hired in 1968 but the other three
weren't brought in until last year.
t i With more than 350 positions in the portfolio to master and no
time to master them, things got out of hand as the market ran away from
them.
232 Some advisers have attempted to deal with this problem by terminating the
sale of fund shares. Undated letter to potential investors from Curran W. Harvey,
president, Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc.:
The New Horizons Fund, in the best interest of its shareholders, sus-
pended sale of new shares to the general public in October, 1967. This action
followed a very rapid increase in subscriptions . . . . Fund assets escalaLed
from $26,00,000 in December, 1966, to over $104,000,000 only nine months
later . . . . With most of the stocks in the Fund's portfolio and new
candidates for investment selling at prices far above our buy limits, it was
simply impossible to invest the large flow of new money to advantage;
consequently, management restricted sale of new shares.
New Horizons recently has resumed offering its shares to new investors. Neuwirth
Fund, Inc. offered similar reasons for discontinuing sales to new investors in April
1969. Like New Horizons, Neuwirth has resumed sales of its shares. Wall St. J.,
July 16, 1970, at 8, col. 3. The feeling that attractive investments in growth com-
panies might be limited was not universal at the time New Horizons suspended
sales. In 1968 Fred Carr, former portfolio manager of Enterprise Fund, stated
that there was an almost unlimited supply of emerging growth companies. Welles,
supra note 81, at 113.
23 See Mattlin, .rpra note 12, at 30: "The back office snafus that developed
when Enterprise grew from a fund of under $30 million at the beginning of 1967 to
one of almost $1 billion by the end of 1968 are nearly over . . . ." See SEC v.
Enterprise Fund, Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,600
(D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1970) (injunction against further sales and order to improve
record keeping).
2 34 See generally note 94 supra & accompanying text. If a fund's portfolio
manager is exceptionally capable, there is some doubt whether the fund, when it
gets too large for the manager to handle alone, can maintain its performance record
by dividing up responsibility among a number of new managers. See Mattlin, mupra
note 12, at 74:
It would be hard to find anyone on the Street who doesn't say something
like "Rader is one of the ablest men around."
. . . But Rader can't follow 500 stocks. In the final judgment, Enter-
prise can only do as well as its five portfolio managers, and it is hard to
believe that five men running $800 million can do as well as one man running
$200 million. "Look, it isn't likely that they'll all be good," says another
fund man. "And if even one of the five has a bad year, the fund can't be
a top performer. All you are going to get, really, is the average performance
of five guys."
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fund shares and, consequently, should satisfy themselves that their
fund's interests are actually served by increased sales. They would
have to do this, however, even if the adviser managed no other
funds ' 5 -the problem whether sales benefit a fund is not unique to
fund complexes. A problem which is unique is whether the non-
affiliated directors should allow the brokerage of their fund to be used
to promote sales of other funds in the group,"3 and alternatively,
whether they should allow the adviser to use the brokerage of other
funds to promote sales of their fund's shares.
As a matter of practice, complexes have taken a variety of ap-
proaches in their treatment of brokerage as a reward for sales. Some
advisers completely segregate each fund's brokerage, assigning only
Fund A's brokerage as a reward for sales of Fund A's shares.237 Other
advisers pool the brokerage, submitting to the central trader a list of
brokers to be rewarded and leaving to him the decision which brokerage
is to go to which broker.2 38  Still others take a middle course, assigning
Fund A's brokerage only to brokers who have sold at least some
Fund A shares but measuring the amount of brokerage by the broker's
total sales of all the funds in the complex.
Traders maintain that the efficiencies of pooling brokerage for
research are equally applicable to pooling brokerage for sales. Indeed,
some traders suggest that it is even more important to pool brokerage
235 See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 173-75; Butowsky, supra note 173, at 919.
236See generally Bogle, supra note 9, at 913; Butowsky, supra note 173, at 919;
West, supra note 192, at 903.
237 E.g., Scudder Special Fund, Inc., Prospectus 6 (July 25, 1969).
238E.g., Broad Street Investing Corp., Prospectus 6 (May 1, 1970) (emphasis
added) : "[T]he Corporation has placed, and expects to continue to place, brokerage
orders with broker-dealers who sell its shares and the shares of associated mutual
funds." This practice is also followed by a number of other major fund complexes
including Fidelity, Putnam, Massachusetts Financial Services, Keystone, and Anchor.
A few advisers have submitted to fund shareholders contract proposals which
would expressly allow the adviser to pool brokerage used to reward sales. Among
these are advisers of Fundamental Investors, Anchor Capital Fund, Keystone Custodian
Funds, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund,
and the Wellington Management Funds. Shareholder approval would not relieve
the nonaffiliated directors of the responsibility to conduct the type of review suggested
below. Such a review seems necessary if they are to make an informed judgment
as to whether contractual permission to pool brokerage should be continued when
the advisory contract comes up for renewal. One adviser has argued that share-
holder approval is appropriate with respect to the subject of pooled brokerage be-
cause it may help to protect the fund directors from liability in future lawsuits
involving the placement of fund portfolio transactions, an area of the law currently
wrought with uncertainty. Memorandum to the SEC Regarding 1969 Annual Meet-
ing Proxy Statement of Ivest Fund, Inc. 9-10, Nov. 4, 1969. As a legal matter,
however, such directors would seem to have the power to approve the pooling of
their fund's brokerage even without shareholder approval. See Moses v. Burgin,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18,
1970); West, supra note 192, at 904. But see Butowsky, supra note 173, at 919:
even with shareholder approval, the use of Fund A's brokerage to promote sales of
Fund B's shares constitutes "compensation of the common affiliate prohibited under
17(e)." Butowsky's argument here is subject to the same criticism as is his argu-
ment concerning reciprocal practices generally. See text accompanying notes 189-97
supra.
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which goes to reward sales because many smaller broker-dealers
specializing in fund sales have, at best, limited capacities for executing
portfolio transactions.2 9 The trader needs a great number of trans-
actions to draw upon if he is to find one of appropriate size which such
broker-dealers can handle effectively.240 In addition, pooling is im-
portant from the standpoint of timing. If the sales of one fund are
unusually high one month, the fund may not generate sufficient broker-
age to reward all sales of its shares. Pooling the brokerage solves this
problem and removes any pressure on the adviser to churn the fund's
portfolio in order to meet the brokerage needs.
2 41
Nevertheless, these efficiencies are meaningless to funds which do
not stand to benefit from improved sales. For these funds, use of their
brokerage to promote sales of their shares at best wastes their brokerage
and at worst may encumber them with too great or too rapidly growing
assets. 24 Consequently, the nonaffiliated directors should determine
whether sales already offset redemptions and, if so, whether an increase
in fund size is actually a disadvantage from the fund's viewpoint. If
they conclude that fund expansion is unwise, they should prohibit the
adviser from using the brokerage of their fund or of any other fund to
reward sales of their fund's shares.
In many instances the nonaffiliated directors will perceive no
harm to their fund from an increase in net assets which results from
239The difficulty smaller broker-dealers have had in handling fund portfolio
transactions has led some 120 of them to band together into a cooperative trading
corporation called IBDA, Inc. "IBDA is intended to give smaller firms which
specialize in mutual fund sales the capacity to execute the large trades required by
mutual funds. It has $2 million in working capital, three full-time securities traders
and clearing services. The 120 firms sold a total of $200 million in mutual fund
shares in 1969, or about 3% of all shares sold in the U.S. [that] year. The 120
firms combined have 4000 salesmen and 240 offices." Rustin, Sinall Brokers Form
Cooperative to Seek Mutual-Fund Commissions Lost in SEC Ban, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 30, 1970, at 4, col. 3.
24o In Union Service, which pools fund brokerage, the treasurer's office prepares
slips which specify the name of the firm and the dollar value of portfolio business
to be placed with it. The slips do not specify which fund's shares the broker has
sold. With these slips before him, the trader, when he can, places portfolio business
with the indicated brokers.
In Scudder, Stevens & Clark, which does not pool fund brokerage for sales, the
slips prepared by Scudder Fund Distributors to assign brokerage to brokers who
have sold fund shares specify the fund which was sold as well as the value of the
commissions to be placed.
In Wellington Management, the underwriter provides the Fund trading depart-
ment with information on the value of shares of each fund dealers have sold, and
with this information the trader prepares a ledger for each fund which shows the
amount of brokerage each broker has received and the dollar value of shares which
the broker has sold. Using these lists he attempts to reward brokers, when possible,
but points out that the requirement of best execution often prevents him from
rewarding some brokers for a considerable amount of time after they have sold fund
shares.
Mutual funds commonly assign broker-dealers commissions equal to about five
percent of fund shares sold. Ellis, supra note 217.241 See Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCt- FED. SEc. L. RaP.
1192,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970).
2 42 See text accompanying notes 224-33 supra.
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greater sales than redemptions. In such a case they have no reason to
object to pooling of fund brokerage. Indeed, pooling may produce
indirect benefits for the fund. An increase in the net asset value of
other funds in the group may reduce the fund's management fee if the
fee is scaled down in accordance with the total assets of all the funds
in the group.24 Alternatively, the increase may result in greater over-
all compensation for the adviser and thus enhance its ability to hire
qualified investment management personnel.24 In addition, an increase
in the net assets of what is now a small fund in the group may make
it a better investment vehicle for fund shareholders who may want to
transfer to it in the future.2 45 If the nonaffiliated directors determine
that the fund will benefit from brokerage-induced sales, they have the
responsibility of assuring that the fund, by pooling its brokerage, does
not receive a lesser benefit than it would have received if its brokerage
were not pooled. If they represent a fund in which the adviser's self-
interest is comparatively strong, they can assume that if the adviser
favors any fund, it is likely to favor the fund on whose board they
serve.
If, on the other hand, they represent a fund in which the adviser's
self-interest is comparatively weak, they must assume the responsibility
for seeing that their fund does not receive prejudicial treatment. They
243 See text accompanying notes 291-300 infra.
244 See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 255.
245 Bogle, supra note 9, at 913. Load-free or reduced-load transfer rights between
the funds in a complex are common in the industry. Although described as "an
invaluable service" by Mr. Bogle, such rights are a curious sort of benefit to a
fund and its shareholders. They might be thought to make the fund more com-
petitive in attracting new sales, but even if sales are in the fund's interest, the
principle function of load-free transfer rights seems to be to keep shareholders within
the complex when their investment needs change, when they become disenchanted
with the fund which they currently own, or when they believe the market is in for
a decline and want to switch to a more conservative investment. Thus, some in-
vestors in Keystone's more speculative funds transfer to the bond funds when they
foresee a market decline. (Keystone allows a load reduction but for the most part
transfers between the Keystone funds are not load-free.) And Wellington Manage-
ment's W. L. Morgan Growth Fund was created as an alternative for Wellington
Fund shareholders who wanted a more aggressive investment and who otherwise
would have redeemed their shares. W.L. Morgan Growth Fund, Prospectus 3
(Dec. 27, 1968). Although the opportunity to transfer load-free from their fund
benefits the shareholders who actually do transfer, it is more difficult to see how
the right benefits the fund and the shareholders who remain. In fact, the right
may actually be detrimental to the fund's interest. An almost 5% decline in the net
assets of Investors Selective Fund, Inc., for example, was largely due to the free
transfer of investments from the Fund to other funds in the IDS group. Investors
Selective Fund, Inc., Annual Report 4 (1968). If too many of its shareholders
exercise their transfer privilege, a fund may experience the same problems of cash
outflow to which advisers point when justifying continued sales of fund shares.
See notes 221-22 supra & accompanying text. The right to transfer load-free does
not, according to one court, give a shareholder standing to sue derivatively on behalf
of the fund into which he might have transferred: "[U]ntil such a transfer is accom-
plished, a shareholder . . . [of one fund] has no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in
the corporations." Verrey v. Ellsworth, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. ff 92,469, at 98,217 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1969). See generally Butowsky,
supra note 173, at 919.
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might require the adviser to keep an accounting of the amount of
brokerage the fund has contributed to the pool and the amount of
brokerage which actually has gone to reward sales of the fund's shares.
If over a period of months it becomes clear that the fund is contributing
substantially more brokerage than it is receiving, the nonaffiliated
directors may conclude that, despite the efficiencies of pooling and the
possible indirect benefits of promoting sales of the other funds, the
fund is being disadvantaged by pooling its brokerage. In making this
conclusion, however, they should be aware that many advisers believe
that an increase in the brokerage used to reward sales of certain funds
will not lead broker-dealers to sell those funds' shares if the brokers
are not already inclined to do so. Brokers expect a certain amount of
brokerage, but they are not "puppets" whose sales can be controlled
by the amount of brokerage they are provided.4 6  Consequently, the
nonaffiliated directors might require the adviser on a trial basis to bring
the total brokerage assigned for fund sales more in line with the amount
the fund contributes to the pool. If, after broker-dealers are notified,
the increase does not spur fund sales, then the nonaffiliated directors
might allow the adviser to reduce the brokerage to the original level.
IV. THE ADVISORY FEE AND OTHER FUND EXPENSES
As mentioned above, section 15 (a) (1) of the Investment Company
Act247 requires that the advisory contract between a fund and its
investment adviser precisely describe all compensation to be paid there-
under. This description usually takes the form of either a fixed per-
centage of fund net asset value, 243 a percentage of net asset value
scaled down for increased assets,24 9 or a percentage of net asset value
supplemented by a bonus or penalty determined by the fund's perform-
ance relative to some objective standard, such as the Dow Jones
Industrial Average.2 50  The compensation which a fund pays its adviser
under the advisory contract is commonly known as the "management
246Judge Wyzanski, however, apparently does not subscribe to the theory that
an increase in brokerage will be ineffective in promoting a particular fund's sales.
He suggests that an important benefit of pooling is that it allows the trader to
encourage a steady flow of new customers. By averaging brokerage, the trader
does not unduly encourage sales by providing rich rewards immediately after a
period of high sales. Moses v. Burgin, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FEm.
SEC. L. REP. 92,747 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1970).
247 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1964).
2 48 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 89. See generally text accompanying notes
101-04 supra.
249 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 89. See generally text accompanying note 104
supra.
25035 SEC ANNuAL REPORT 129-30. See generally text accompanying note 105
supra.
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fee." It is the major but not the only expense borne by the fund."'
Other expenses may include officers' and directors' salaries, insurance
premiums, auditors' fees, printing costs, and the cost of administering
shareholder accounts."' In a few complexes, usually those with very
large funds, the adviser assumes all such expenses, '2 53 but usually the
adviser assumes only some of the expenses and leaves the rest to be
paid by the fund. 54 Expenses commonly assumed by the adviser in-
clude the salaries of affiliated officers and directors as well as the office
rent and other office expenses of the fund.2  Each adviser, however,
has its own policy toward assuming fund expenses and it is difficult to
generalize. 5 ' Several advisers assume all fund expenses but charge
the funds an administrative fee in addition to the management fee.
257
The Investment Company Act conceives that a fund's directors,
especially its nonaffiliated directors, will negotiate the management fee
with the fund's investment adviser.2 58 It requires that at least forty
percent of a fund's board consist of nonaffiliated directors 59 and that
the advisory contract, after initial approval by a majority of the fund's
outstanding shares, be approved annually by the shareholders or by
a majority of directors, including a majority of nonaffiliated directors. 60
Nevertheless, these safeguards have not been wholly effective in assur-
ing adequate representation of shareholder interests.
26 '1
Consequently a number of shareholders have sought court rulings
that their funds' advisory fees have been excessive. Casting their ac-
tions as derivative suits, shareholders have alleged violations of both the
Investment Company Act and state law. Those cases which have not
been settled out of court, however, have all resulted in rulings favorable
to the adviser . 2 " These rulings have depended in great measure on
the legal doctrine that shareholder approval shifts the standard for
judging the fairness of a contract between interested boards from one
251 This discussion does not relate to the brokerage commissions incurred on fund
portfolio transactions. Such commissions are always paid by the fund.
2 5 2 
See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 46 & n.92.
253 Id. 92.
2 5 4 Id. 90-92.
255 Id. 90-91.
2
56 Id. 90.
257 Id. 92-94.
258 See Conference, supra note 54, at 739 (remarks of Abraham Pomerantz)-
id. 750 (remarks of Robert M. Loeffler) ; Mundheim, supra note 14, at 1063.
259 Investment Company Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. §80a-10(a) (1964). The Act,
however, exempts a few no-load funds from the 40% requirement. § 10(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-l0(d) (1964). As a matter of practice a majority of the members of most
fund boards are nonaffiliated. See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 130; note 103 supra.
260 Investment Company Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1964).
261See text accompanying notes 134-44 supra; notes 54, 69 supra. See also
I. FRIEND, M. BLumE, & J. CROCKETT, supra note 123, at 31-32.
262 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 133.
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of fairness to one of wasteY6 Courts have been willing to assume that
the approval of the nonaffiliated directors was not disinterested and
have upheld management fees that may have been excessive on the
grounds that they did not constitute a waste of fund assets.264
To facilitate closer judicial review of fund management fees, the
SEC in 1966 recommended to Congress that the Investment Company
Act be amended to require that all compensation paid by the fund to
its investment adviser be "reasonable." 265 After hearings on this pro-
posal and long discussion with industry spokesmen, the SEC aban-
doned the reasonableness test and, with the support of the Investment
Company Institute, recommended an amendment 26 which would make
the adviser a fiduciary with respect to the fee. 26" There is some ques-
tion whether this changes existing law.268
A. The Fee and Other Expenses Within a Complex
Discussion concerning the management fee has tended to focus on
the fee paid by individual funds, generally disregarding the fact that
a fund may be one of a group served by the same adviser.2 69 This
fact, however, has great significance. Frequently the funds in a group
have common directors who, when negotiating the fee for one fund,
must consider the fees the other funds pay the adviser. In this respect
the funds are interdependent. Together they must provide the adviser
with adequate compensation to hire the employees and maintain the
facilities necessary to responsible management of the complex.
2 7 0  If
one fund pays the adviser too little, another fund may have to pay the
263 E.g, Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
264 Id. at 479, 486, 184 A.2d at 605, 610. For a discussion of Saxe v. Brady and
other cases relating to the compensation of mutual fund advisers, see SEC REPORT,
supra note 2, at 132-43. See also Rottenberg, supra note 140, at 325-30, and sources
cited therein.
265 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 143-47. The recommendation was drafted into
legislation as S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; H.R. 9510 & H.R. 9511, 90.h
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (proposed § 15(d) of the Investment Advisers Act).
266S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (proposed §36(b) of the Investment
Company Act). For a description of the legislative developments since the SEC's
initial 1966 recommendations, see Rottenberg, supra note 140, at 333-35. Mr. Rotten-
berg's comments on the change to a fiduciary standard are especially interesting.
Id. 350-54.
267 For a complete text of the amendments, see CCH SPECIAL 2 (CCH Mutual
Funds Guide, Special Edition, Aug. 11, 1970).
268 Compare Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, & H.R. 14737 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Commn. on Interstate & Foreiqn
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 187, 199-203 (1969) (SEC's interpretation),
with id. 441 (Investment Company Institute's interpretation). The argument that
the adviser is not a fiduciary with respect to the fee is grounded in the proposi'ion
that the fee is set by arms-length negotiations between the adviser and the non-
affiliated directors. See Conference, supra note 54 at 753 (remarks of Mr. Jaretzki);
id. 758 (remarks of Mr. Loeffler). But see id. 752 (remarks of Mr. Pomerantz).
269 The SEC seems to have acknowledged the lack of attention accorded to the
complex aspect of management fees. See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 185.
270 Cf. id. 255.
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adviser too much. Directors who serve on only one fund board may
have a somewhat a different viewpoint because they do not control the
total compensation to be collected by the adviser. Nevertheless, funds
with entirely different boards are still to a great extent interdependent.
Many of the costs of operating a fund complex are incurred on
behalf of several if not all the funds in a group. Only in this way can
an adviser and the funds realize the efficiencies inherent in the complex
form of organization. An adviser may realize these efficiencies not
only by performing a function collectively for all of the funds,2"1 but
also by doing a job separately for each fund and standardizing the
procedure,272 and by utilizing the aggregate purchasing power of all
the funds as a bargaining tool to reduce the cost of particular products or
services. 3 To illustrate, counsel, in preparing a fund's prospectus, may
271 Portfolio valuation is an area in which the adviser may enjoy meaningful
savings by doing the job once for all the funds. IDS, for example, with its sophisti-
cated computer facility, see note 273 infra, treats all the funds as one for the purposes
of portfolio pricing. Thus, it feeds into the computer only once the price of stocks
which may be held in a number of fund portfolios. An analogous type of savings
results when an adviser is able to use the same facility for a number of funds that
it would have had to use for one fund. Thus, IDS is able to hire one receptionist
for the entire complex and can furnish all six funds with about the same amount of
office space as it would have had to furnish had it managed only one fund.
272 Standardization seems to be most important with respect to the documents
which must be prepared for each of the funds. For example, the shareholders report
of each fund in a group often contains a president's letter which is almost identical,
save for the fund's name and a short paragraph describing the fund's performance
during the past year. Similarly, the layout for each report frequently is the same.
Standardization, however, has its dangers because it may lead to documents painted
with too broad a brush and not focused on a fund's specific needs.
273 As an executive of one adviser puts it, the combined purchasing power of
all the funds provides "clout" during negotiations with suppliers.
The combined accounts of all the funds allows an important efficiency in the
administration of shareholder accounts. When a fund is small, with no more than
10,000 shareholder accounts, it can administer its shareholder accounts itself without
too much difficulty. Afuture Fund, for example, with under 6000 shareholders, is
able to handle its shareholder accounts with 6 or 7 employees and a computer time-
sharing arrangement. When a fund grows beyond this size, however, more sophisti-
cated techniques become necessary and many funds have turned to such outside service
organizations as Investment Companies Services Corporation (a subsidiary of Key-
stone) or the State Street Bank in Boston. But the few organizations capable of
doing a good job are over-loaded with business, see Keystone Custodian Funds, Inc.,
Annual Report 10-11 (1968), and a number of advisers have experienced considerable
difficulty in getting the job done properly. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224,
H.R. 13754, & HR. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
807, 819 (1969) (remarks of Norman F. Dacey) :
During the past year-and-a-half . . . the Fund's shareholder accounting has
continued its descent into a state of chaos. Errors go uncorrected, despite
a flood of complaints from shareholders and investment dealers. Redeeming
shareholders are frequently paid far more than their accounts are worth.
A computer-gone-wild rushes shares in and out of shareholders' accounts
without rhyme, reason or explanation. . . . [Slhare certificates were con-
stantly being presented for redemption by persons of whom the bank had no
record.
Thus, a few of the larger complexes have begun to establish their own in-house,
computerized system. One adviser cites as the advantage of having its own system
the quality and reliability which comes from doing the job itself. It contrasts this
with the "sloppiness" with which the accounts previously were handled. In addition,
it points out that by locating all distribution and shareholder processing records in
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compose certain passages which may be duplicated in the prospectuses
of the other funds in the group-thus doing the job once for all the
funds. For other sections, he may develop a standard wording into
which he can fit the facts peculiar to each fund. Finally, the adviser
may secure a reduced fee from the printer by promising him the busi-
ness of all the funds in the group.
274
The fact that an expense produces a benefit for more than one
fund has no apparent bearing on whether it is paid by the fund or by
the adviser. Thus, registration fees and state and local taxes, expenses
incurred by a single fund for its sole benefit, typically are paid directly
by the fund, 7 5 while salaries of portfolio managers, also expenses
which ordinarily benefit only one fund, are almost always paid by the
adviser.27 Similarly, the cost of shareholder reports, always incurred
at least in part for the joint benefit of all the funds, 77 is often paid
directly by the funds 2 7  while the cost of collective research, also of
joint benefit to the funds, almost always is paid by the adviser .2 7  The
one spot-in one computer-it is able to effect all purchases, transfers, and accumula-
tions almost instantaneously, thus eliminating the "float" which existed when it was
farming out the administration of its shareholder accounts to outside organizations.
It also notes that it is saving the profit it was previously paying to these organiza-
tions but says that this is a secondary consideration. An in-house data processing
system may also be helpful in other areas, including portfolio pricing, see note 271
supra, and possibly investment management. The uses to which such a system can
be put have been summed up as follows:
A massive data processing system utilizing three of the most advanced IBM
computers keeps track of approximately 50,000 transactions a day involving
1.8 million customer accounts. This system is used extensively by invest-
ment analysts and managers as well as by accountants and administrative
personnel. Output of the system is the primary source of home office, sales
office, and individual customer information. One vital new use for the
system is the automatic logging of incoming mail, the triggering of needed
processing, and the creating of follow-ups to make certain that each trans-
action is completed and acknowledged. In-process service items such as
redemption requests, account change notices and status inquiries are thus
effectively controlled and monitored.
Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Growing Through Service 15 (Oct. 1969).
Besides IDS, some of the other complexes which have developed or are developing
their own in-house data processing systems include Keystone, Union Service, Scudder,
Stevens & Clark, and the Delaware group. It should be noted that a complex
would seem to need at least 70,000 shareholder accounts to support its own system
and even then development of the system is unlikely to proceed without numerous
difficulties.
274 Usually a separate prospectus is prepared for each fund in a complex. But
in the United group of funds, see note 34 .sipra, a single prospectus is used for all
four of United Fund, Inc.'s portfolios. Most of the passages apply equally to all
four of the funds, although the prospectus does give separate treatment to each
fund's investment policy and portfolio holdings. The fact that many passages can
be made to apply to the entire group of funds suggests the extent to which
standardized passages can be used in complexes in which each fund has its own
prospectus.
2 75 See SEC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 92.
2 7 See id. 46.
277See note 272 supra.
278See SEC RPORT, upra note 2, at 92.
279 Cf. id. 46.
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fact that expenses may concurrently benefit more than one fund is,
however, of great significance.
First, it means that many of the expenses which a fund itself pays
are not attributable directly to the fund; rather, they represent the
fund's share of expenses which have been incurred jointly with other
funds in the group. The adviser decides initially how these expenses
are to be divided, but its decision is subject to review by the non-
affiliated directors who, as representatives of the fund's interest, have
the duty to see that the fund does not bear an unwarranted share.
Thus, if counsel has spent a substantial amount of time preparing the
prospectus for Fund A, and, using this prospectus as a model, has spent
a comparatively short time preparing prospectuses for the other funds
in the group, the nonaffiliated directors of Fund A should see that
Fund A does not bear the entire cost of the first prospectus while the
other funds, in effect, get a free ride. Fund A should participate with
the other funds in the efficiencies of being part of a complex. More
simply, hours spent on a fund should not always determine the cost
to be borne by that fund. Rather, it often may be fairer for the total
cost to the complex of funds to be divided according to some other
criterion.280
Second, because many expenses are incurred for the joint benefit
of several funds, the cost to the adviser of operating any one fund is
not immediately identifiable. Yet the nonaffiliated directors need to
know these costs if they are to keep the adviser from appropriating
for itself the savings which come from running the fund as part of
a complex. Knowledge of costs, and hence the profit the adviser is
making on their fund, is especially important because negotiations
between the nonaffiliated directors and the adviser are qualitatively
different from negotiations within the normal business community.
The nonaffiliated directors are in no position to switch advisers, and
thus have no way to solicit the competitive bids which in most busi-
nesses tend to keep profits at a reasonable level.""'
The belief that separate management contracts for each fund do
not reflect the efficiencies of running a group of funds has led a few
commentators to suggest that the management fee be viewed in terms
280 See text accompanying notes 285-88 infra.
281 See SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 126-27; Mundheim, supra note 14, at
1066-67. But see Conference, supra note 54, at 736-38 (remarks of Mr. Loeffier).
It might be objected that an efficient adviser which has increased its profit margin
through diligent management is penalized if the amount of its compensation is made
to depend upon its costs. The nonaffiliated directors, however, may choose to allow
the adviser a greater profit margin upon a showing that the adviser has been
especially conscientious in keeping its costs at a low level or, for that matter, upon
a showing that the adviser has done an outstanding job. Compare MUTUAL FUNDS
294-97 (PLI 1970) (remarks of Alan R. Gordon & Allan F. Conwill), with id.
(remarks of Richard M. Meyer).
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of the total assets within the complex."' This suggestion recognizes
that much of the work done for the funds is done collectively. But
it leaves unanswered the central question of how to allocate the total
fee among the funds.
A better way of approaching the fee is to consider it from the
viewpoint of each fund, but to introduce into the calculation the actual
cost to the adviser of running each fund.28 3  Presumably, if each
fund's fee is reasonable in terms of its cost, the total fee paid by all
the funds will be reasonable. The difficulty, of course, is determining
the cost of running any one fund. The problem is identical to the
one confronting directors who, in reviewing expenses payable directly
by the fund, must decide how to divide up those expenses incurred
jointly with other funds in the group.
The solution to this problem would seem to lie in the develop-
ment of formulas allocating expenses according to the relative benefit
each fund enjoys. Because the benefit which individual funds derive
from particular expenses will vary, the formulas also will vary-each
formula being tailored to a different expense.
28 4
B. Formulas for Allocating Costs
We can begin with the expense of preparing fund prospectuses.
As suggested above, a fair distribution of expenses would not permit
282 This recommendation has come from such diverse sources as Mr. Bogle,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Investment Company Institute, and
Norman F. Dacey, a recent critic of the mutual fund industry. Compare Bogle,
supra note 9, at 913 ("One possibility . . . would be reductions in management
fee rates on a "complex" basis. Reductions based on the total assets of the complex,
and pro-rated to the individual funds, would translate the growth of the complex
into cost savings benefits for all of the funds."), with Hearings, supra note 273, at
814 (remarks of Norman F. Dacey) ("The Commission does exert pressure upon
funds to reduce their fees proportionately as their assets grow, but it does not take
into account the total of the fees received by the manager from all the funds in
their care.").
283 An alternative to this approach which follows the Bogle-Dacey line more
closely and which produces the same result is for all the funds to negotiate a single
fee keyed to the costs incurred in managing the entire complex and then for the
funds to divide up this fee in accordance with the formulas suggested at text accom-
panying notes 285-88 infra.
284 Use of such formulas is not a novel idea. IDS, for example, employs a
variety of formulas for purposes of internal cost accounting.
Vhen expenses are paid by the adviser, the costs of particular services are
harder to identify because, unlike the expenses borne directly by a fund, they are not
broken down in a fund's income statement. Nevertheless, the nonaffiliated directors
should be able to get cost breakdowns from the adviser who will usually account
separately for each fund's expenses. The mutual fund bill, as originally introduced,
contained a provision which would have required a breakdown of the fee for other
management expenses. This provision was later deleted. But David Silver, counsel
for the Investment Company Institute, has indicated that most nonaffiliated directors
"do request and get this kind of breakdown." MUTUAL FUNDs 312 (PLI 1970).
For at least a rough breakdown of the cost of managing a group of funds, see the
annual reports of any of the Union Service Funds.
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one fund to bear the heavy cost of the first prospectus while the other
funds pay a lower cost for prospectuses based upon the first. A
formula effecting a fair allocation would divide among the funds the
total cost of preparing all the prospectuses according to the number
each fund is expected to use. Such a formula is "fair" because it
renders the cost per prospectus the same for all funds in the group.
Thus, it keys the expense to the benefit each fund enjoys.
The cost of administering shareholder accounts is another ex-
pense for which a formula can easily be devised. Here a fund benefits
according to the number of its shareholder accounts.2 85  Thus, each
fund should bear as its share of the cost of administering all the funds'
shareholder accounts an amount proportionate to the number of its
accounts relative to the total number of accounts in the complex. Again,
such a formula is "fair" because it renders the cost per account the
same for all funds in the group.
The allocation of prospectus and shareholder accounting expenses
poses no real difficulty because both the extent to which each fund
benefits and the expense incurred thereby is readily identifiable. It
is not always easy, however, to devise an appropriate formula. For
example, one might suppose that the fee for common directors should
be divided evenly among the funds-if five funds, each fund taking
one-fifth. But on closer scrutiny, it might appear that the directors
spend very little time on one fund, considerably more on another. The
total fee should be allocated accordingly. If the directors spend more
time on a fund because it has greater net assets or because it has a
greater number of portfolio holdings, then a formula reflecting rela-
tive net asset value or the relative number of portfolio holdings might
be applied. If the time depends on the number of portfolio transac-
tions, a formula based on the relative number of transactions might
be used. One way of dividing the cost of common directors, however,
will ordinarily be inappropriate. To divide the cost according to the
number of hours spent on each fund would be to abandon the concept
of allocating collective costs and to disregard the fact that the hours
spent on the first fund may reduce the hours which must be spent on
the others. It would deny the first fund the efficiency of being operated
as part of a complex.
One of the most important expenses to be allocated is the cost
of investment management services which are not incurred specifically
285 See text accompanying note 273 supra. Investment Companies Services Cor-
poration bases its charge for administering shareholder accounts on the type of
services desired and the number of separate accounts. It does not base its charges
on the dollar size of particular accounts.
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for the benefit of one fund. Such costs include, among others, the
salaries of the collective research staff and their supervisory personnel,
secretarial expenses and office rent for the investment managment de-
partment, and library maintenance. These and other costs necessary
to maintain the investment management division-salaries of man-
agement, accountants, and so forth-are all business expenses of the
adviser necessary to keep it operational and thus should be considered
to be a part of the cost of investment management.30
One way of apportioning these expenses is to divide them evenly
among the funds, thereby treating each as a separate entity benefiting
equally from the collective management effort. But this method of
dividing costs fails to reflect the fact that larger funds, by virtue of
their greater assets, stand to realize a greater benefit from the col-
lective effort than smaller funds. A formula resulting in a fair alloca-
tion would divide the total costs of collective management according
to the relative net asset values of the funds. Because the costs so
allocated would ordinarily be passed on to each fund shareholder
according to the relative value of his investment in that fund, each
dollar invested in the complex, regardless of the fund to which it
belongs, would bear the same charge for collective investment man-
agement. This seems appropriate because each invested dollar will
derive about the same benefit from the collective investment effort.2"
In a few situations, however, all or part of the collective research
effort may be of no possible benefit to a fund. A conservative bond
fund, for example, may benefit only from research on the "blue chip"
companies whose bonds it may purchase. Here the fund should
share only in the costs which conceivably could produce it some
benefit. If efforts to identify precisely the expenses from which a
fund may be deriving a benefit are taken too far, however, they may
result in a plethora of special exceptions that undermine the simplicity
of a single formula effecting a rough but useful approximation of
costs. For most complexes, therefore, the most appropriate method
280 In complexes such as IDS, where the adviser runs a number of other busi-
nesses in addition to its mutual funds, the question may arise as to how to divide
up the operational costs of maintaining the adviser. How, for example, should the
salary of a top IDS executive be divided between its mutual funds, its insurance,
and its real estate operations? A precise answer may require sophisticated cost
accounting, but for our purposes a rough estimate would seem sufficient.
287A concrete example may be helpful. Assume a complex of 3 funds, Fund A
with $1 million in assets, Fund B with $4 million, and Fund C with $5 million.
The total cost of collective investment management is $100,000. Fund A would bear
one-tenth of the cost of collective management or $10,000, Fund B four-tenths or
$40,000, and Fund C five-tenths or $50,000. Each dollar invested in Fund A woud
bear, therefore, a its share of the cost of collective investment management,
$10,000 $40,000 $50,000
or 1 , Fund B or 10, and Fund C or 10.
$1,000,000 $4,000,000 $5,000,000
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for allocating the costs of collective investment management will be
relative net asset values. 8
C. Evaluating the Fee and Expenses
Through the use of such formulas the nonaffiliated directors will
be better able to judge whether the fund is paying a fair share of
those jointly incurred expenses which it and the other funds pay
directly, and whether the fund is paying the adviser a reasonable
management fee. A reasonable fee would cover the costs the ad-
viser has incurred in running the fund and would also allow the
adviser a fair profit. To deny the adviser a profit would be to in-
ternalize fund management since the fee would provide only for
salaries and other expenses incident to fund management.
In deciding how much profit to allow the adviser, the nonaffiliated
directors should recognize that the adviser deserves a return on its
invested capital and may also merit some payment for the entrepre-
neurial risk it took in setting up the fund, although the latter ra-
tionale becomes more attenuated as a fund becomes older. The
nonaffiliated directors should also consider the adviser's efficiency and
the quality of its services, possibly by comparing the fund's performance
and expense ratio with the performance and expense ratio of funds
with like objectives in other complexes. If their fund's expense ratio
is comparatively high and its performance undistinguished, the non-
affiliated directors have reason to reduce the adviser's profit margin
and to drive a harder bargain the next time the management fee
comes up for negotiation.8 9
288 As suggested above, not all investment management expenses are incurred
collectively. The salaries of analysts and portfolio managers working directly for a
fund are not costs of collective research and therefore should be attributed directly
to the funds for which the analysts or portfolio managers work. To illustrate, in
the case of the complex described in note 287 supra, if Fund A has a portfolio
manager who is paid $20,000, Fund B a portfolio manager who is paid $20 000 and
Fund C a portfolio manager and two analysts who together are paid $100,000, each
$20.000
dollar invested in Fund A is responsible for 1 or 2 in addition to
$1,000,000
the 10 for collective investment management or a total of 30, 
Fund 13
$4,000,000
or .50 in addition to the 10 for collective management or a total of 1.50, and
$100,000
Fund C or 20 in addition to the 10 for collective management or
$5,000,000
a total of 30.
289 In complexes dominated by a large, conservative Fund D, the adviser may
be forced to admit to Fund D's nonaffiliated directors that it is overcharging Fund D
to offset losses on or to lower expense ratios of other funds in the group. Fund D's
nonaffiliated directors can then squarely face the issue whether the present or future
benefit Fund D might realize from the subsidized funds outweighs the present
savings to be gained from a share of expenses or from a fee more accurately reflecting
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Thus, an initial allocation of expenses is necessary if the non-
affiliated directors are to make an informed judgment on the reason-
ableness of the management fee. But once they decide on an amount
which seems reasonable, they can implement their decision, if they
wish, with one of the formulas traditionally used to compute the fee,
so long as they adapt the formula each year to produce the desired
amount of compensation.9 0 Because such formulas are entrenched
in the mutual fund industry, it seems helpful to examine, in terms
of the suggested analysis, a few of the more common fee arrangements.
The traditional management fee, a fixed percentage of net assets,
has the virtue, when applied to all the funds in a complex, of imposing
the same charge on each dollar of net assets, regardless of fund.
But such fixed percentages do not allow for the economies of scale
which ordinarily accompany an increase in the assets under manage-
ment. An adviser ordinarily does not have to spend as much man-
aging its second billion dollars in assets as it does managing its
first.291 To permit the funds to share in the savings which come from
increased size, many advisers have adopted what is commonly known
as a scaled-down fee.292 On a fund's first $100 million in assets, it
may pay .5 of 1 percent, on its second $100 million, .4 of 1 percent,
and so forth as the fund's assets increase. Although a scaled-down
fee overcomes some of the difficulties associated with a fixed percentage,
it also is deficient in several respects when used in a complex.
First, it looks only to the assets of particular funds and thus may
fail to reflect the savings generated by the total assets of all the funds
under common management. Much of the criticism of management
fees within a fund complex has been directed to this problem.
2 93
Nevertheless, the problem may be more imaginary than real because
the percentage fees payable by each fund may be scaled down at lower
the actual costs attributable to Fund D. They might include in their calculation the
opportunity for Fund D shareholders to make load-free transfers to the subsidized
funds and the likelihood that the subsidized funds may grow into meaningful con-
tributors to the adviser's overall compensation.
Some advisers have suggested that they will be unable during difficult times to
raise their fee to certain funds even if an increase is necessary to allocate costs in
a fairer manner. Consequently, if Fund D reduces its fee, albeit on rational grounds,
the adviser will be unable to make up its loss of revenue from other funds in the
group and may find its ability to manage the funds' portfolios impaired. The non-
affiliated directors of Fund D, if convinced by this argument, might continue the
subsidy temporarily, but should remember that the adviser is under no pressure to
reallocate its fee if Fund D continues to pay a disproportionate share.
290 If an adviser and a fund want to adopt an incentive fee, they should set the
base for the fee at a level providing the adviser with costs and a fair profit. Any
bonus or penalty would simply reduce or augment this amount.
291 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 94-96, 108. But see Bogle, supra note 9, at 912.
292 SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 89, 100-01. The SEC notes that scaled down
fees were adopted "against the pressures generated by the settlement of shareholder
litigation and the publication of the Wharton Report." Id. 110.
2 93 See note 282 stpra.
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assets levels than they would have been if they were applied to the
total assets within the complex. For a complex of two funds each
with $200 million in assets, it makes no difference whether each fund
pays .5 of 1 percent on its first $100 million, .4 of 1 precent on its
second $100 million, or whether the funds together pay a fee of .5
of 1 percent on their first $200 million of collective assets, .4 of 1
percent on their second $200 million. In either case the funds will
be paying the adviser a total fee of $1.8 million.
The second problem with a scaled-down fee based on the assets
of each fund is its inherent unfairness to the smaller funds in a group.
Even on a scaled-down fee schedule, the smaller funds ordinarily are
not large enough to realize meaningful savings, at least as compared
with that enjoyed by the larger funds. But a small fund can claim
with equal validity that its assets are the ones which generated the
efficiency because such efficiency is based on the total assets under
management.
The better approach, and the one several complexes have adopted,
is to scale the fee downward according to the total assets within the
complex-with the portion of that total fee which each fund pays
measured by the proportion of its net assets to the total net asset value
of all the funds in the group.29 4 Thus, each dollar invested within the
group would bear the same cost,295 a result which best accords with
the benefits of investment management.
296
Nevertheless, even a scaled-down fee based on the total assets
within a complex requires further refinement if it is to allocate costs
properly. In complexes where certain expenses such as the salaries of
portfolio managers are incurred for the sole benefit of one fund,297 it
may be necessary, if these expenses are substantial, to reduce the per-
centage payable on total assets, offsetting the reduction in the adviser's
compensation with a special charge to the funds enjoying the benefits of
special service. In the same vein, funds for which much of the collective
294 The Keystone Custodian Funds have this type of fee arrangement as do, in
a sense, the Union Service funds, which share the expenses of Union Service Cor-
poration in accordance with their relative net asset values. See SEC REPORT, supra
note 2, at 108.
295 See note 287 supra & accompanying text.
298 See text accompanying note 286 supra. If the percentages are adjusted each
year to produce for the adviser a certain amount of compensation, it may seem
more logical to figure the fee with a single, fixed percentage rather than with a series
of scaled-down percentages of total net assets. But a scaled-down fee schedule helps
protect both the adviser and the funds from the effects of a marked change during the
course of the year in the amount of net assets under management. If net assets
double, the adviser's fee will not double-a desirable result because the adviser's
costs almost certainly will not double. If net assets are halved the fee will not
be halved-similarly desirable because the adviser with many fixed costs will probably
not be able to halve its expenses.
297 See note 288 supra.
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research is irrelevant should not have to pay as large a percentage as
that paid by the benefited funds.29
With such adjustments, a scaled-down fee based on the total net
assets in a complex is a rational way to allocate the expenses of
investment management. Such a fee, however, has serious shortcom-
ings when applied to noninvestment management, or what are usually
known as "administrative" expenses. As noted, the benefit each fund
derives from administrative expenses may depend on some other stand-
ard besides relative net asset values.299 In addition, there is no point in
scaling down the fee if increased net assets do not generate proportionate
cost savings-that is, if the expenses applicable to the second hundred
million are no smaller than the expenses applicable to the first.8"0
In those complexes in which the funds have themselves been pay-
ing a wide range of administrative expenses in addition to the manage-
ment fee, the nonaffiliated directors should apply what they judge to be
the most appropriate formula to each expense the fund has incurred
jointly with other funds to insure that the fund is paying no more than
its appropriate share. In those complexes in which the adviser has
been paying the fund expenses, the nonaffiliated directors should con-
sider the possibility of separating the administrative expenses from the
investment management expenses and paying the adviser a separate
administrative fee.30' Thus, the fund would pay a management fee
keyed to collective net assets and an administrative fee keyed to some
other standard such as the relative number of shareholder accounts.
302
298 Keystone seems to have taken this into account in setting its fee for Keystone
Custodian Fund Series B-i, a bond fund which invests only in highly marketable
"obligations of the U.S. Government . . . and . . . other bond issues of high or
good grade." Keystone Custodian Fund Series B-i, Prospectus 1 (Feb. 28, 1969).
B-1 pays a management fee, based on the ratio of its market value to the combined
market value of all Keystone Custodian Funds, which is scaled down from .5 of
1% while the other funds pay a management fee which is scaled down from .5 of 1%.
Two of the other funds in the group are also bond funds, but they invest in more
speculative types of securities.
299 See text accompanying notes 285-88 supra.
30 Although an increase in net asset value, or in the number of funds, or in
the number of shareholder accounts may allow efficiencies in the administration of
shareholder accounts, see note 273 supra, or in the preparation of shareholder reports
and prospectuses, see note 272 supra & accompanying text, the efficiencies may not
be as great as they are in the area of investment management. Even with a highly
computerized system, for example, a large clerical staff is still needed to administer
shareholder accounts, and as the number of accounts grows, the manpower needs
increase. Thus, once a complex reaches a size sufficient to support its own in-house
data processing system, additional efficiencies may be limited at best. Size may also
produce no real savings with respect to other administrative expenses such as fund
accounting. In the IDS group, for example, each of the funds has its own full-time
accountant.
301 For a discussion concerning the desirability of an administrative fee, see
MUTUAL FUNDS 312-17 (PLI 1970).
302 In some large complexes, the cost of administering shareholder accounts may
so overshadow the other costs that a formula based on the relative number of share-
holder accounts can be used for all the administrative expenses. Those few funds
'which today pay an administrative fee in addition to a management fee use a formula
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Whether the funds pay their administrative expenses directly or
pay the adviser an administrative fee, the logical extension of the fore-
going analysis might be to pass on at least some of the administrative
expenses to the shareholders as a per account charge rather than as a
charge per dollar of investment. Thus, instead of imposing an equal
charge on each dollar invested in the fund, the fund might impose an
equal charge on each shareholder account, regardless of whether the
account were large or small. If the cost of administering shareholder
accounts is unrelated to the dollar size of the accounts, why should
larger accounts have to pay more than smaller accounts for their admin-
istration? The answer of at least one adviser in rejecting a per account
charge is that such a charge is too burdensome on the small investor.303
In light of the public outcry that has accompanied the New York Stock
Exchange's efforts to raise the minimum commission on small trades,
the adviser's decision may have been politically wise. Nevertheless, if
larger accounts are in fact subsidizing smaller accounts, the nonaffiliated
directors should be aware of this when they decide how expenses should
be passed on to fund shareholders. Policy reasons may justify such a
subsidy, but an intelligent evaluation of these reasons requires that the
subsidy be identified as such.
V. DISCLOSURE
Disclosure plays a central role in the administration of the federal
securities acts. Reports filed with the SEC facilitate its regulatory
function and provide interested persons with a wealth of information
on reporting companies.304 Prospectuses used in selling a company's
shares acquaint investors with the enterprise in which they are investing
and alert them to any special risks which may be involved. In addi-
tion, disclosure forces companies to implement policies rational enough
keyed to net asset value. See SEC REPORT, .rpra note 2, at 92-94. A fund that
pays almost all its own expenses should not also pay an administrative fee. The
administrative fee should replace part of what today is known as the management
fee; it should not merely be a supplement designed to afford the adviser an additional
source of compensation.
303 A $10 per account charge, for example, will increase by only 3.3% the total
expenses borne by a $100,000 account which has been paying a fee of .3 of 1% or
$300. On the other hand, the same charge will increase the fee payable by a $1000
account from $3 to $13, an increase of 333%.
304 Before a mutual fund conducts any business, it must comply with the regis-
tration and reporting requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the
Securities Act of 1933. Specifically, a fund must file a notification of registration
with the SEC on Form N-8A. CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE ff 2,012, at 1,312.
Within three months after filing this notification, the fund must file a registration
statement under the Investment Company Act of 1940 using as a guide Form N-8B-1.
Id. ff 2,013-14, at 1,313-14. The securities issued by the mutual fund must be regis-
tered under § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 e (1964). The registration statement
prescribed by Form S-5 contains the information found in Form N-8N-1 plus financial
statements and exhibits. CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 1 2,021-23A, at 1,340-61.
In addition, the fund must register its shares under the states' "blue sky" laws.
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to withstand public scrutiny. Although a detailed discussion of dis-
closure is beyond the scope of this study, this section will outline a
general scheme of disclosure appropriate to the problems of fund com-
plexes.
If prospectuses are to be read by the ordinary investor, they must
be short, nontechnical, and straightforward. Intricacies will go over
most investors' heads, and will discourage them from reading the sec-
tions of the prospectus which are most important and which, hopefully,
they can understand. 0 ' For these investors a summary prospectus
highlighting only the essentials would seem to be most appropriate. 3°6
The prospectus should first explain that a mutual fund is a com-
pany that has as its main asset a portfolio of securities, that the investor
is buying shares representing a portion of that portfolio, that the port-
folio is managed in light of a predetermined investment objective, and
that the value of the shares will fluctuate with the value of the portfolio
securities. It should point out that shares in the fund are continuously
offered (if this is the case) and may be redeemed at any time.30 7
The prospectus should then describe the objective the fund seeks
to achieve. It should state the objective in a sentence or two and
elaborate upon it by describing the policies and approach taken to
achieve the objective. 30
Having explained what a mutual fund is and having delineated the
fund's investment goal, the summary prospectus should describe the
way in which the fund seeks to achieve this goal. For example, the
prospectus should name the fund's directors 309 and point out that the
actual job of running the fund is done by the investment adviser, XYZ,
pursuant to an advisory contract.310  The prospectus should identify
the affiliated directors 3 ' and should name any other funds to which the
adviser provides investment advisory services.
312
3 0 5 See SEC DISCLOSURE STUDY GROUP, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAP-
PRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER. THE '33 AND '34 AcTs 77-83
(1969) (the Wheat Report).
306 SEC administrative policy does not presently contemplate a summary or short-
form prospectus for mutual funds. But § 10(b) of the 1933 Act authorizes the SEC
to promulgate rules permitting the use of a "summary prospectus" which "omits in
part or summarizes information" contained in the full § 10(a) prospectus. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j (b) (1964). Rule 434A promulgated by the SEC under § 10(b) of the 1933 Act
specifies when such a summary prospectus can presently be used and might be amended
to encompass a short-form mutual fund prospectus. 17 C.F.R. § 2 3 0.434a (1970).
307 Such an explanation is embodied in the summary statement suggested in the
SEC's Proposed Guidelines to Form S-5. SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 5634 at 3-4 (Mar. 11, 1969).
30 8 See id. 5.
ao9 Id. 4.
3 1 0 Id. 14-15.
311 Id.
312 E.g., Ivest Fund, Inc., Prospectus 4 (Jan. 1, 1970, revised Feb. 25, 1970):
Wellington Management Company is a mutual fund management and distribu-
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At this point, the prospectus should deal briefly with any salient
information concerning the investment process by which the fund is
managed. Thus, if the fund is managed by a portfolio manager, the
manager should be named in the prospectus and perhaps a summary of
his experience during at least the last five years should be given. This
is a disclosure ordinarily not made in fund prospectuses, but which
seems especially relevant in light of the responsibility which may be
vested in a portfolio manager and the publicity which some managers
receive in both the mass media and the shareholder reports of many
funds.313 Although naming the portfolio manager in the prospectus
may reinforce the "star" system, the system already is well entrenched
and it seems important to inform investors that the portfolio manager
whose fund they think they are buying is or is not in fact running the
fund. To place the role of the portfolio manager in the proper per-
spective, the prospectus should also indicate whether he relies on re-
search prepared by either a collective research staff or the staffs of the
other funds, whether he has his own staff of analysts, and like infor-
mation.
A chart portraying the fund's historical performance should fol-
low such disclosures and should include a statement in bold letters that
past performance was achieved under a number of different methods of
investment management and that the present method, vesting decision-
making power in Mr. Y, has been operating since, for example, June
1968. This statement is needed to make historical performance mean-
ingful because a sterling record under a certain portfolio manager loses
some of its relevance if the manager is no longer working for the fund.
Of course, advisers may argue that top management, the group that
hires the portfolio managers, is the most important contributor to the
fund's success. But top management is not the only important con-
tributor and should not object if additional information is included to
enable investors to make a better informed appraisal of past performance.
The summary prospectus should also describe the sales charge and
the advisory fee. Description of the advisory fee should focus on the
expense ratio rather than on the percentage payable to the adviser and
might point out whether each dollar of fund assets is bearing a charge
tion company which acts as investment adviser to six funds (Wellington,
Windsor, Gemini, Exeter, Exeter Second, and Exeter Third Funds) . ...
In addition to the Fund, IVEST, Inc. serves as investment adviser to
Explorer, Technivest, W. L. Morgan Growth and Trustees' Equity Funds.
313 See note 92 supra. The need to name the portfolio manager in the prospectus
is most pressing when the adviser has publicized or has allowed the portfolio manager
to be publicized in other advertising media, so that his name is generally associated
with the fund. If the portfolio manager is not associated in the public's mind with
any one fund and if portfolio managers are continually shifted from fund to fund,
the need for disclosing the portfolio manager's name may be indicated.
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which is higher, lower, or about the same as that borne by other funds
with like objectives. Finally, the prospectus should describe the serv-
ices available to shareholders, such as voluntary accumulations plans,
periodic withdrawal plans, and load-free exchange privileges.
If an adviser wishes to use a summary prospectus, it must also
prepare a full-scale prospectus containing more detailed information
which may be of interest to sophisticated investors. 14 The summary
prospectus should indicate prominently that a more detailed prospectus
is available and can be obtained on request from the fund or from
broker-dealers selling fund shares. 1" Broker-dealers should keep such
prospectuses in stock so that they can fill customer requests without
delay.
The full prospectus should include the same information contained
in the summary prospectus but should also deal with more technical
problems. These include investment restrictions, fund policy towards
dividend and capital gains distributions, the fund's tax status and the
percentage of the fund's portfolio represented by unrealized apprecia-
tion, the precise formula for determining the management fee, the
expenses borne directly by the fund, a description of the common stock,
policy for pricing shares, treatment of fund brokerage, and legal pro-
ceedings. 1 ' In addition, the prospectus should highlight the conflict of
interest problems raised by a fund complex.
The prospectus should indicate that because the adviser serves a
number of other funds, in some situations the fund may have to com-
pete with these other funds for the adviser's services or for particular
investment opportunities. At times, the fund may have to forego
recommendations of the collective research staff because insufficient
shares are available to satisfy the portfolio needs of all the funds in the
group. At other times, the fund may have to take a smaller position
or pay a higher price than otherwise would have been necessary.
317 If
another fund in the group has a similar objective but pays the adviser
314 Section 10(b) of the 1933 Act expressly requires that a summary prospectus
be "in addition to the prospectus permitted or required in subsection (a)," the full,
statutory prospectus. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (b) (1964).
315 Present rules authorizing the use of a summary prospectus require this legend.
SEC Reg. 434A(e), 17 C.F.R. §230A34e (1970).
316 For the present requirements of the complete prospectus, see SEC Investment
Act Release No. 5634 (Mar. 11, 1969).
317 Such a disclosure appears in the prospectus of only a few funds. E.g., Oppen-
heimer A.I.M. Fund, Inc., Prospectus 2 (Feb. 9, 1970):
2. Because of the similarity in investment objectives of the Fund and Oppen-
heimer Fund, Inc. it is possible that the two funds could compete for the same
security at the market place which competition, should it occur, might have
a detrimental effect on the price of the security involved and on the size of
the position obtainable so that the Fund might be disadvantaged in not being
able to acquire as large a position in such security as it might have
desired . . ..
1970]
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a performance fee as opposed to the fund's straight percentage of net
assets, the potential difference in the adviser's self-interest is sufficiently
great that this also should be disclosed. The prospectus should then
describe, at least in general, the techniques for resolving these conflicts.
Thus it might state that portfolio decisions are made separately for
each fund,31 and that when two funds wish to buy or sell the same
security executions are allocated pro rata or in a manner deemed equi-
table by the adviser. 19
The prospectus need say no more regarding the special complex
problem of pooling fund brokerage than that fund brokerage is (or is
not) pooled with that of the other funds when used to obtain research or
to reward sales of fund shares.32 ° The question of pooling is a relatively
minor problem and cannot be properly appreciated without reference to
such other factors as the fund's need for additional outside research and
the benefit to the fund of additional or improved sales of the other
funds' shares. Consideration of such factors is better left with the
nonaffiliated directors.
All prospectuses presently describe in detail the fee arrangement
between the fund and the adviser, but in only a few instances do
prospectuses include a statement that the fee is not reduced in accord-
ance with the combined assets of all the funds in the complex.3 '1  It is
hard to see why such a disclosure should be made since the fee arrange-
ment is negotiated by the nonaffiliated directors and since a fee figured
on total assets may be no lower than a fee figured on the respective
assets of each fund: if the fee is to be figured on total assets the points
at which the percentage is reduced may simply be set at higher levels.
3
1
318 E.g., id. 12:
The Fund's portfolio security transactions are conducted independently of
those of Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. for which the Management Corporation is
also investment adviser, except when decisions are made to purchase or sell
securities by the two funds simultaneously . . . . The two funds have similar
objectives of capital appreciation, but it is not anticipated that investment
decisions relating to the same security will ordinarily be effected contem-
poraneously because for the most part different personnel will be making
investment recommendations in respect of the two funds.
-319 Compare United Funds, Inc., Prospectus 10 (July 3, 1969) ("When the same
security is purchased or sold for two or more Funds at the same time, the amount
of each purchase or sale is prorated among the Funds on the basis of the size of
the respective authorized purchases or sales."), with Ivest Fund, Inc., Prospectus 5
(Jan. 1, 1970, revised Feb. 25, 1970) ("If purchase or sale of securities consistent
with the investment policies of the Fund and one or more of the other investment
companies or clients served by the advisers are considered at or about the same
time, transactions in such securities will be allocated among the several investment
companies and clients in a manner deemed equitable to all by the advisers.").
32o See notes 210, 238 supra.
321 See, e.g., Oppenheimer A.I.M. Fund, Inc., Prospectus 2 (Feb. 9, 1970):
3. The Fund and Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. do not reduce advisory fees as
combined assets of the two are increased, although the basic fees for the
funds are each reduced as their respective net assets increase . . ..
3 22 See text accompanying notes 291-95 supra.
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The annual report filed in accordance with Form N-1-R is a third
vehicle for disclosure and should include even more detailed informa-
tion than is contained in the prospectus and registration statement.
The N-i-R should describe in detail the techniques used to allocate
investment opportunities and daily purchases and sales of shares for
which more than one fund has entered an order. Who makes the
decision which fund is to invest in a company which, because of its
small public float, may be purchased by only one fund? What formula
is used or what factors are considered when executions are allocated?
Who makes this decision? How much of the fund's brokerage was
used to obtain research and how much to reward sales of the shares
of all the funds in the group? How much to reward sales of the
funds shares ?
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE NONAFFILIATED DIRECTORS
The emergence of the "complex" as the dominant form of organi-
zation within the mutual fund industry has added a new dimension to
the problems raised by the external management relationship between
most funds and their investment advisers. Each fund in a complex
must be concerned not only with problems arising in its direct dealings
with the adviser but also with problems arising in the adviser's dealings
with it and the other funds. Problems arise in the areas of investment
management, fund brokerage, and fund expenses.
Although the adviser initially will resolve these problems, a fund's
nonaffiliated directors should review the solution which the adviser has
adopted, especially when the adviser has a stronger self-interest in
other funds in the group. If a nonaffiliated director sits on the boards
of several funds, he should consider the danger of prejudice from each
fund's viewpoint. Considerations of efficiency may render different
boards for each fund impractical and, so long as the nonaffiliated
directors have an equal self-interest in all the funds, overlapping boards
seem unobjectionable. Indeed, they may prove beneficial by affording
the directors an overview and hence allowing them to compare the
treatment the adviser gives to the various funds they serve. For
example, their acquaintance with the different companies in each
fund's portfolio will help them to judge whether any of the funds have
been consistently missing good investment opportunities which because
of the small public float could be purchased by only one fund. To
conclude this study we will draw together some of the recommendations
as to what the nonaffiliated directors should do to perform their role
effectively.
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1. They should acquaint themselves generally with each of the
funds in the complex. They should know when each fund was formed,
its investment objective, and its net asset value. They should know
each fund's sales volume and its fee arrangement with the adviser. On
the basis of such information they should decide whether the adviser
has a stronger self-interest in some funds than in others. In making
this decision, they should consider the relative importance of each
fund's sales to the total sales of all the funds in the complex, the
relative dependence of each fund's sales upon portfolio performance, and
the relative lucrativeness of each fund's fee arrangement. They should
be particularly sensitive to incentive fees, especially if their fund's fee
is unrelated to performance. They should focus specifically upon the
benefits their fund offers the adviser as compared with the benefits
offered by other funds with similar investment objectives.
2. If the nonaffiliated directors conclude that the adviser's self-
interest in their fund is comparatively weak, they should assure that
the fund's interest is protected in situations where the adviser may
favor other funds in the group. To do so effectively, they must under-
stand the process by which the fund's portfolio is managed. They
might garner information on the investment process in interviews with
the director of investment management, the fund's portfolio manager
or a member of its investment committee, the central trader, and
possibly an analyst in the collective research department.
Some relevant questions would be:
a) To what extent does the adviser rely upon outside research
and to what extent upon in-house research?
b) Is research done with particular funds in mind or does a collec-
tive research staff pursue whatever investments seem most promising?
c) Has a formal system been established for distributing research
to the portfolio decisionmakers?
d) Are fund portfolio decisions made by a portfolio manager or
investment committee working solely for the fund, or by an individual
or committee which manages all the funds in the group?
1) If by a manager or an investment committee serving
several funds does some person or group in the investment
management division represent only the iund's interest?
e) How does the central trader execute transactions, especially
when more than one fund wishes to purchase or sell the same security?
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With the answers to such questions the nonaffiliated directors will
be in a good position to judge whether the procedure by which the
fund is managed provides a solution to the conflicts which potentially
might arise between the funds. Thus, if each fund conducts its own
research and keeps this research for its sole use and if each has its own
trader to handle its executions, no problem of allocating investment
opportunities or executions arises. Alternatively, if the adviser does
collective research or a central trader serves all the funds, a portfolio
manager or other representative may champion the fund's interests.
If their fund has such a champion, the nonaffiliated directors' principal
duty is to see that he is doing an effective job. Through regular inter-
views, they should assure themselves that he is sensitive to possible
conflicts and should determine whether he has encountered any in-
stances in which he thinks the fund has received adverse treatment.
The nonaffiliated directors should handle such interviews delicately
so as not to create tension between the portfolio manager and the
adviser. They should also ascertain whether the portfolio manager's
salary is affected by fund performance and whether formal methods of
disseminating information give him equal access to the basic research
product.
If the fund does not have someone to champion its interests, then
the nonaffiliated directors themselves should assume the task. They
might want to use a chart which lists the significant holdings of each
fund in the complex and indicates all purchases and sales for the
month. After a few months, the nonaffiliated directors may be able to
detect from such a chart a pattern in which certain funds always seem
to be investing in the seemingly attractive companies with too few
shares available to go into more than one or two portfolios. If they
do detect such a pattern, they should have the adviser explain why
the fund has not been investing in such companies. If the adviser
answers that such investments are inconsistent with the fund's invest-
ment objective, the nonaffiliated directors might want to ask whether
the objective might not be better achieved by investing in stocks of
diverse quality which, when mixed together, reflect the desired degree
of volatility. If, on the other hand, the adviser answers that such
investments are too small to have a significant impact on the fund's
performance, the nonaffiliated directors might want to explore with the
adviser the possibility of increasing the number of stocks in the port-
folio or of setting apart a portion of the portfolio for smaller-than-
average holdings.
Where the funds do not have separate traders, the nonaffiliated
directors should also review the method that the adviser has been
using to allocate purchases or sales of securities among the funds in the
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group. They should decide whether the method used is evenhanded
and might want to consider whether it causes the fund to incur higher
commissions by spreading purchases over a greater number of days.
3. The nonaffiliated directors should also direct their attention to
the brokerage generated by fund portfolio transactions. They first
should consider whether the funds collectively might not be able to
support a brokerage subsidiary which could recapture for the funds
part of the value of the commissions routed through it. If a sub-
sidiary is economically feasible, they should require the adviser to
show convincingly that such a subsidiary would not be in the fund's
interest. If the adviser is a broker-dealer and has been keeping the
commissions for itself or if a subsidiary has been created and the
adviser is continuing to place portfolio business with other brokers in
order to obtain benefits such as outside research, the nonaffiliated
directors should take into account the value to the adviser of the
commissions or benefits when negotiating the next management con-
tract. In the case of the brokerage subsidiary, however, they should
be aware that considerations of best execution may sometimes justify
the adviser in placing trades with other broker dealers.
If a decision is made not to create a subsidiary, the nonaffiliated
directors should focus on the consequences of pooling the fund's
brokerage with the brokerage of the other funds. In considering
brokerage for outside research, they should determine whether such
research is important and whether it is assigned by persons working
directly for the fund. If it is not, then they have no reason to concern
themselves further. If it is, the nonaffiliated directors of the funds in
which the adviser has a comparatively small self-interest might want
to determine from the portfolio manager and analysts working directly
for the fund whether they have been assigning all the brokerage that
they think the fund can profitably use. If they have, there is no prob-
lem since the fund is not losing out on any outside research that it
might have put to use. If they have not, the nonaffiliated director, with
figures secured from the adviser, might make a comparison each month
of the amount of brokerage allowed to the fund's analysts and manager
and the amount of brokerage that the fund has contributed to the
brokerage-for-research pool. If the comparison is unfavorable, they
might argue that the fund's brokerage budget be increased.
The nonaffiliated directors should also examine the consequences
of pooling brokerage used for sales. If such brokerage is being pooled,
they should decide initially whether additional sales of fund shares are
in the fund's interest. They might do this by ascertaining whether such
sales exceed redemptions and, if so, whether the portfolio manager fore-
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sees any difficulty in managing a larger portfolio. In addition, they
might consider whether an increase in assets will produce a meaningful
reduction in the fund's expense ratio and whether the adviser has been
receiving sufficient compensation to maintain a professional and well-
staffed investment management division. If the nonaffiliated directors
conclude that sales or at least improved sales are not in the fund's in-
terest, they should prohibit the adviser from using the brokerage of the
fund or of any other fund in the group to promote sales of the fund's
shares. It should be noted, however, that they still might decide to
allow the adviser to use the fund's brokerage to promote sales of other
funds in the group if growth of the other funds produces indirect benefits
for their fund.
If the nonaffiliated directors conclude that an increase in fund net
assets is desirable and if the adviser's self-interest in their fund is com-
paratively weak, they should require a monthly comparison of the
amount of brokerage which the fund has contributed to the pool and
the amount of brokerage which has gone to reward sales of their fund.
If this comparison suggests that the fund is being slighted, they should
pressure the adviser into making more proportionate the ratio of the
brokerage which the fund contributes to the pool and the brokerage
which is assigned as a reward for sales of the fund's shares. Should
this prove ineffective in spurring sales, they might allow the adviser
free reign in assigning brokerage.
4. Regardless of whether the adviser's self-interest in the fund is
large or small, the nonaffiliated directors have an active role to play with
respect to fund expenses. The nonaffiliated directors first should
examine the expenses (other than the management fee) which are paid
directly by the fund itself. They should have the fund's accountant ex-
plain how each major expense incurred jointly with other funds has
been allocated. If they judge that the allocation is not in accordance
with the benefit which the fund enjoys, they should argue that a dif-
ferent basis for making the allocation be adopted.
Second, the nonaffiliated directors should evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the management fee in terms of the actual cost incurred by the
adviser for the services which it furnishes the fund. The cost of some
of these services such as the salaries of an accountant, portfolio manager,
or analyst who works only for the fund will be easily identifiable, but
other costs will have to be allocated among the funds in accordance with
some formula. The cost of collective research and the general expenses
which go to support the adviser's whole organization should probably
be allocated in accordance with the funds' relative net asset values; the
cost of administering shareholder accounts, if borne by the adviser,
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should be allocated in accordance with the relative number of share-
holder accounts.
Having identified the cost to the adviser of running the fund, the
nonaffiliated directors can then set about negotiating a fee which reflects
these costs. If the costs are primarily costs of collective investment
management, they should consider a fee which is based on a percentage
of net asset value and which is scaled down in accordance with the
combined net assets of all the funds within the complex. If the adviser
also incurs special expenses in managing the fund, the nonaffiliated
directors might want to pay for these expenses separately or they might
agree to a higher percentage of net assets than that payable by the other
funds. If the fund does not benefit from a significant portion of the
collective research, the nonaffiliated directors might argue that the per-
centage based on total complex assets should be lower than that paid
by the other funds. Finally, if the adviser has been paying a substan-
tial amount of nonmanagement expenses, the nonaffiliated directors
should consider paying for these expenses with a separate administrative
fee, based on some other formula such as the number of shareholder
accounts.
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